Calculating the SAF's deterrent value

"The mission of MINDEF and the Singapore Armed Forces is to enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor."


Deterrence forms the heart of Singapore’s defence strategy, but how would you explain this abstract concept?

One of the best definitions I’ve heard came from a visiting Israeli who explained deterrence using a mathematical formula.

He defined the strength of deterrence (D) as military force (F) multiplied by the ability to use such firepower (A). In other words:

D = F x A

I love this explanation. It is easy to recall and sums up an abstract concept succinctly.

The D=FxA formula explain why countries armed with nuclear missiles that can destroy the world several times over failed to deter terror attacks on their soil.

In such cases, the nuclear firepower at their disposal is massive. This makes for a huge “F”. But the ability “A” for the nuclear-armed state to unleash such firepower is almost negligible for a host of reasons, including political, environmental and ethical considerations.

It is likely that terror cells that plotted attacks against targets in Britain (London Underground), Russia (assorted civilian targets in retaliation against operations in Chechenya) and the United States (9/11) were unfazed by the massive nuclear firepower that protected these countries.

When applied to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the D=FA formula explains why Singaporean defence planners made media events out of SAF Open Mobilisation exercises during past periods of tension.

This includes Singapore’s response to the joint Malaysia-Indonesia war games in Johor, which culminated in the Pukul Habis (Malay for "Total Wipeout") airborne insertion 20km from Singapore on 9 August 1991 – Singapore’s National Day.

SAF combat units have also equipped for battle under the glare of media cameras and television crews on several other occasions. Some of you may have been involved in the planning and execution of these operations.

In such situations, the Open Mobilisations demonstrated Singapore’s strident response to sabre-rattling close to its shores. Seen mathematically, the deterrent value of the SAF is kept strong by showcasing the SAF's defence readiness as soldiers draw “live” ammunition and other war material, ready to roll into action.

In my view, the media coverage must be matched by a framework which ensures journalists can tell the SAF’s side of the story during active combat operations. This capability has been eroded somewhat in recent years, for reasons which I have voiced on numerous occasions on this blog.

But let’s get back to deterrence. As with most formulae, there are exceptions to the rule. In this case, the formula does not apply to people who are not easily deterred.

Take the case of Israel. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) represents a mission ready deterrent with combat elements that boast of a formidable battle record. The Israelis seldom hold back from pre-emptive and preventive strikes against targets that threaten Israel’s national interests and will unleash the IDF even against the tide of international opinion.

But IDF firepower failed to deter the buildup of Hezbollah’s military strength in Lebanon and things came to a boil in summer 2006.

Hezbollah’s combat power consisted of more than a rag tag bunch of fanatical gunmen, as the IDF learned to its cost when Israeli forces rolled into southern Lebanon to hunt and kill Hezbollah fighters.

Ring fenced by political constraints, the military minds that designed Hezbollah’s order of battle fought the IDF to a stalemate. To be sure, opinions differ on what Hezbollah and the IDF actually achieved. What cannot be denied is the fact that from concept to capability, Hezbollah’s combat power proved a force to be reckoned with.

Powerfully armed Hezbollah ground units (I don’t think we can call them infantry in the conventional sense of the term), fighting from fortified positions in an urban landscape, engaged IDF units as they entered prepared kill zones covered by overlapping fire arcs. The traditional concept of an infantry battalion was discarded in favour of small fire teams amply armed with a plethora of anti-tank guided munitions.

Hezbollah’s battle tactics are not the province of a non-state actor.

A conventional army that has a strong special forces component could, if it so wished, align its special forces units along similar lines. Special forces units can be trained, organized, armed and supported with hard-hitting munitions and automatic weapons, and dispersed like ants in the operations zone to await the invader.

A brigade-size special services group would be the ideal force that can be tailored for Hezbollah-type land forces tactics that bloodied the IDF. It goes without saying that such commandos must first equip themselves with ATGWs such as the Metis-M and rocket-propelled grenades. Throw in more ATGWs to the mix and the lethality of the revamped special forces teams will go up several fold.

The greatest challenge to upsizing the special services group would come from tearing the army from conventional notions of how ATGWs should be used. In most cases, the ATGWs would be vehicle mounted to maximise their mobility and armoured regiments that have these weapons would fight hard to keep them.

If I had the opportunity to correspond with Hezbollah strategists, I would ask them how differently they would have done things if not for the political constraints they faced.

For example, would they have set up an air force, a navy and an army along conventional lines? Would they have introduced tanks? What were their takeways from the Lebanon 2006 war?

Just as the Spanish Civil War provided a testing ground for military minds to refine their warfighting ideas, the Lebanon 2006 war has many takeaways for defence watchers - including those from Singapore.

As we learn, we have to be mindful how we describe the SAF’s transformation. Foreign observers may not view all our new war machines as deterrence enhancers.

A senior Royal Malaysian Air Force (TUDM) pilot told me point blank he did not see the TUDM's lack of airborne early warning aircraft as a weakness - Singaporean air bases could be observed by TUDM special forces teams (PASKAU?). To him, the ability to report the size, composition and warload of Republic of Singapore Air Force raid packages was an "early warning" capability and such time-sensitive intelligence could be obtained by non conventional means.

During a period of tension, the SAF will not hold the monopoly for having its forces first in the battlespace. We need to recognise that a wily opponent will try hard to catch us in the midst of a mobilisation when the SAF is at its most vulnerable.

It is perhaps more than coincidental that the Malaysian Armed Forces chose to call its rapid deployment war game Eksesais First Strike. There was no risk of having anything lost in translation as the name of battle manoeuvres was in English. This war game pitted TUDM and Tentera Darat warfighters against enemy air bases and involved the deployment of Malaysian Army units and armoured forces along the Malay peninsula.

First Strike against whom?

Elements across the Causeway view defence modernisation in a different light and we have to be careful not to fall for our own propaganda.

If Hezbollah's war planners can look at the IDF impressive orbat and conclude that there's another way to skin the cat, can't others arrive at a similar conclusion when looking at the SAF?

If our defence information management plan fails to persuade foreign observers of the war-winning potential of the networked SAF, deterrence will be compromised as the big "F" (firepower) will be scaled down in their calculation.

At present, publicity about the Third Generation SAF seems cut to a fixed template:
Insert name of new war machine, insert media opportunity to showoff what it can do in an SAF exercise, insert exercise codename, insert over-used catchphrases – firepower of the SAF, arsenal, codename, findfix and finish, etc etc *yawn* – insert official quotes and then conclude that it enhances deterrence.

The anonymous comment to the previous post was spot on when he/she raised the point about the SAF’s Learning Organisation mindset.

This is a point we don't hear much about and it would be instructive to note how the transformation of the 3rd Generation SAF has overcome blind alleys.

Hezbollah is a Learning Organisation too.