tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post3095332987414220503..comments2024-03-28T21:39:05.175+08:00Comments on Senang Diri: Calculating the SAF's deterrent valueDavid Boeyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11401913253357584603noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-10997315595147517342010-05-13T14:44:12.651+08:002010-05-13T14:44:12.651+08:00I would prefer to look at the comment from the RMA...I would prefer to look at the comment from the RMAF pilot that "Singaporean air bases could be observed by TUDM special forces teams (PASKAU?)....intelligence could be obtained by non conventional means" quite differently. I'm sure S'pore's electronic and airborne intelligence are also bolstered by human intelligence working on the ground in M'sia watching and monitoring the RMAF bases 24/7. The AEW aircraft is not useful just for early warning of enemy planes taking off but also, critically, directing and guiding interceptors during air battles, thus providing the interceptor pilots with multiple pairs of eyes and enabling them to react and fight faster. the potency of the 'eye in the sky' cannot be under-estimated, as evidenced in the IDF rout of the Syrian airforce in the air battle over the Bekka Valley in which the IDF destroyed more than 100 Syrian fighter planes without losing a single one of their own.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-60081589929149057712010-03-29T22:26:30.395+08:002010-03-29T22:26:30.395+08:00In addition to new technologies as mentioned ad na...In addition to new technologies as mentioned ad nauseum in our 3G SAF releases, there needs to be a relook at new ways of fighting as well... The ability to intercept and jam enemy communications for example, can be negated by having runners on bicycles, for example...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-21685917200890783032010-03-25T15:47:07.475+08:002010-03-25T15:47:07.475+08:00Do you give casino discounts???Do you give casino discounts???Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-66415702669634570062010-03-24T10:41:17.752+08:002010-03-24T10:41:17.752+08:00Like I mentioned before, I feel that the IDF still...Like I mentioned before, I feel that the IDF still lost the media battle for OP Cast Lead... for a variety of reasons, the most pertinent (to us) IMO being the perception of them as the aggressor. The doctrine of Forward Defence means that it would be easy to tar us with the same brush as well.<br /><br />Also, I'm not sure how effective NCW will be when combating tactics like the use of human shields, locating in heavily populated areas etc. that are the bread and butter of insurgents in Central Asia nowadays. The communications link between the trooper and the F-16 doesn't matter if the CG restricts the use of air support for fear of civilian casualties, as GEN McCrystal has done. The whole point of 'asymmetry' is to nullify the effect of overwhelming information and overwhelming firepower that conventional forces can bring to bear, and that includes systems like ACMS. On the other hand, for state actors to use such tactics would be to basically shoot themselves in the foot and delegitimize themselves, so this is probably not the most likely scenario, worst case as it might be. Against more conventional adversaries I'm sure systems like ACMS and BMS will work their magic, as long as we can win the ECM/ECCM battle :)edwinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12562366156265576380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-81729906776695774712010-03-24T09:46:19.528+08:002010-03-24T09:46:19.528+08:00To build on what Anonymous (non-flamer) said, I al...To build on what Anonymous (non-flamer) said, I also did mention that the BMS/ACMS would only be helpful if we knew what we were up against. If an infantry patrol stumbles upon an IED and sounds it off, it would be extremely useful for the next resup or even armoured column coming by. However, if they just see a pile of thrash and walk by when in reality it has an explosive hidden in it...hence the need for a strong LO? <br /><br />As to the silence around Cast Lead, I feel its also contributed by the fact that the IDF restricted journalists from entering...in fact I feel those that entered ended up reporting all sorts of bad news (remember them calling smoke shells some bizarre new weapon meant to kill and maim Palestinians?)...but yeah, given the present silence it proves IDF did so well to even override the bad press effect :PBen Choonghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17084017720412706428noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-34802129758932177902010-03-23T21:48:17.020+08:002010-03-23T21:48:17.020+08:00"If I had the opportunity to correspond with ..."If I had the opportunity to correspond with Hezbollah strategists, I would ask them how differently they would have done things if not for the political constraints they faced. " <br /><br />The question that I would have asked is if they were the Lebanon Armed Forces required to defend the suzerainty and territory integrity of Lebanon, and without the fall - back of Syria and Iran, how would they have designed their armed forces? Can the conventional armed forces of a sovereign state, with the responsibilities and role of a sovereign state, really hope to emulate the T&O of Hezbollah? It will be really instructive to see if the Hezbollah model is adopted by the Syrian and Iranians. I just want to sound a note of caution while 'asymmetric' seems to be a popular phrase nowadays....it can works both ways. A section of SAF infantrymen equipped with ACMS, plugged into the network of UAVs and other sensors, able to call on supporting fire from strikers such as F-16s and Apaches, may just about have a more than even chance against a Hezbollah 'section' occupying a fortified position. It's asymmetry in the reverse. I have said previously that the IDF failed tactically in Lebanon but learning from it, it refined its tactic in CASTLEAD. The shame is that because it did well in CASTLEAD, you have less commentators and analysts producing materials online about it. Nothing beats news like bad news I suppose.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-88481362376699480822010-03-23T15:19:58.230+08:002010-03-23T15:19:58.230+08:00Hannibal ante portasHannibal ante portas|-|05|noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-47730068582253144292010-03-22T10:42:57.707+08:002010-03-22T10:42:57.707+08:00"Why haven't they made you general yet or..."Why haven't they made you general yet or Military Media Moghul yet? We need you! You are the most important commentator of our military affairs! Without you, Singapore will be conquered! You speak for the common Hokkien peng! You are our beloved hero! We await your ascent to the pedestal of greatness! A modern day Hannibal!"<br /><br />Military Media Moghul = Hannibal?<br /><br />wait...OH MY GOD I SPOKE TO A FLAMING TROLL AAAHHH PLEASE DON'T CAST YOUR +999 FIRE MAGIC ATTACK ON ME AAAAHHHHBen Choonghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17084017720412706428noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-47041242911168796882010-03-22T10:26:30.903+08:002010-03-22T10:26:30.903+08:00so the refined formula should be D = (F x A)/M, wh...so the refined formula should be D = (F x A)/M, which is motivation to achieve aims regardless of cost? I just thought that perception is just another way of saying deterrence :P<br /><br />Its true, the proposed formula is quite simplistic, but I think it does cover quite a lot of ground. Of course, we can always run a regression on this and tease out which effects play a bigger role and identify missing ones, which is not unlike the statistics/econometrics homework I've been hammering away at last night :P<br /><br />On the issue of ATGWs, that's not the only weapon system a really motivated advesary can wield unconventionally to cause disastrous results. Grad rockets from MLRS systems have been used singularly in Gaza and Afghanistan. The best defence is indeed a learning organisation, thinking how to defeat the enemy outside the box. I have full faith in our military that as soon as these threats are identified, we'll work towards negating these threats. We have a strong R&D arm and I know our upper echelons are highly capable, but it'll be nice if the public can be informed of how MINDEF wishes to address these threats. I don't know, put editorials in the papers talking about these threats and how MINDEF has taken steps to deal with it? In that way, room for speculation gets squeezed out, and people's concerns are allayed?Ben Choonghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17084017720412706428noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-54707244121200906722010-03-22T10:01:17.926+08:002010-03-22T10:01:17.926+08:00Why haven't they made you general yet or Milit...Why haven't they made you general yet or Military Media Moghul yet? We need you! You are the most important commentator of our military affairs! Without you, Singapore will be conquered! You speak for the common Hokkien peng! You are our beloved hero! We await your ascent to the pedestal of greatness! A modern day Hannibal!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2348464617577736454.post-55336940899842611252010-03-21T21:27:18.509+08:002010-03-21T21:27:18.509+08:00Hmmm... the problem with simple formulas is that t...Hmmm... the problem with simple formulas is that they are simple :P I think that besides the capabilities of the force (F) and the ability to use it (A), deterrence also depends on the perception of the adversary (P). After all, the original formula makes it seem like deterrence is solely the product of your own actions, while in reality factors beyond your control also affect the deterrent effect that is generated. This is where agents like the media come into play.edwinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12562366156265576380noreply@blogger.com