Republic of Singapore Navy Type 218SG submarine buy caps 18-year journey in underwater warfare

This week's announcement that Singapore has ordered two new Type 218SG submarines from Germany sends a clear and definitive answer to the question floated more than 18 years ago when defence planners pondered adding subs to the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).

When German shipyard ThyssenKrupp delivers the boats from 2020, the Type 218SGs - the world's most modern conventional subs - and two Archer-class subs presently in service will give the RSN the largest fleet of submarines in Southeast Asia (provided regional fleets stay the same).

It is an acquisition to cheer; a prudent hedge against choppy waters in regional sealanes.

With the subs operating in concert with the RSN's six Formidable-class stealth warships - the world's most heavily-armed frigates which can collectively bring into play up to 144 anti-ship missiles - and with the Republic of Singapore Air Force flying top cover, the seaward defences of Singapore will never have been sharper.

The Singapore navy may not have made it this far, if Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and RSN defence planners were not given the time, know-how and resources needed to make an informed case for or against buying subs.

And so, in September 1995, Singapore took the plunge when it bought a single, low-cost second-hand sub from Sweden to see if the RSN should add subs to its fleet. Yes, we bought a submarine to assess if we should add subs to the RSN.

Try before buy
If that leap of logic baffles you, bear in mind that MINDEF/SAF force planners in the 1990s were pitted against a formidable anti-submarine "weapon" - a sceptical and influential politician whose say-so carries some heft. That politician was Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's founding father.

"Every armed force believes it ought to upgrade. For years I told the Singapore Armed Forces, which wanted submarines 'You are crazy. These are shallow waters. You will easily be detected and bombarded with depth charges.'

"But well, OK. Here is the Swedish submarine. The economy is doing well and it is a cheap sub. Its purchase will still be within the 5 per cent of GDP  assigned to defence. So, why not use it for some training," said Mr Lee in his first comments on the RSN's foray into submarine warfare.(Straits Times 11 Oct 1995)

To his credit, the time and space Mr Lee allowed the RSN has helped shape Fleet RSN into the compact yet credible fighting force it is today.

Sub operations from S'pore
Subs are not new to Singapore. Prior to the Second World War, British naval planners recognised their value even in the shallow seas around Singapore. The Royal Navy's 4th Flotilla of submarines operated out of Sembawang Naval Base. That we heard nothing of their contribution to the Battle of Singapore was due to their redeployment to the eastern Mediterranean during the halcyon two years and three months before the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

As war raged in Europe, the aircraft carrier which operated from Singapore, HMS Eagle, was also reassigned to Mediterranean waters to bolster British naval forces fighting the combined might of German and Italian forces. There, the subs and aircraft carrier from Singapore fought with distinction.

Had they remained in the Far East, it would be fascinating to contemplate the "what-if" scenario involving the Royal Navy's Force Z centered on the battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser, HMS Repulse, with the weak escort of just four destroyers.

Alas, both Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk on 10 December 1941 by Japanese bombers off Kuantan. But their loss underlined the importance of fighting a naval war in regional waters with a "balanced" navy - which in today's context means having naval forces able to conduct operations against surface, underwater, aerial targets as well as packing an electronic warfare capability to be used against sensors like radars and guided weapons.

MINDEF/SAF defence planners have apparently heeded these lessons well.

In the past 18 years, the RSN has looked at more than merely adding more subs to its order of battle. The first hand-me-down from Sweden, renamed RSS Challenger, was joined by three other Challenger-class boats before a more capable albeit second-hand class of sub, which we renamed the Archer-class, was bought from Sweden.

Uniquely Singapore
Singapore has recognised that submarine support operations are vital too. Today, the RSN is the only Southeast Asian navy with a submarine rescue capability complemented by strong underwater medicine expertise. This is a low-profile capability, arguably less eye-catching and not as sexy as warships with all their guns and missiles, but is one that is nonetheless vital for submariners to have peace of mind while at sea.

Singapore has also used its defence science know-how to give our submarines a secure homeport to operate from. The reinforced concrete submarine pen at Changi Naval Base is probably unique in the region as it allows our subs to berth within a concrete enclosure, protected from the elements, prying eyes and enemy munitions.

Above all, the thousands of defence engineers are a precious asset that has allowed the RSN to order successive generations of subs tailored-made for local waters.

It is no accident that Internet search engines scouring cyberspace have failed to suggest the vital statistics or an artist's impression of our newly-ordered subs. This is because the Type 218SGs are said to be a class of sub specially designed for the RSN. The name change is not merely to allay  suggestions that ThyssenKrupp's current Type 214 subs were rebranded as "214" sounds like "sure to die" in Cantonese while "218" has a more auspicious "sure to prosper" ring to it. :-)

Homegrown expertise
Going forward, the "customised submarines" the RSN will receive from Germany make it clear that homegrown defence science know-how will be used to build a combat information system that forms the heart of the Type 218SG's combat potential.

In this regard, the Defence Science & Technology Agency (DSTA), which is spearheading the effort  to deliver the subs with German partners, has strong expertise to draw upon. The combat system that ties together various sensors and weapon systems aboard the Formidable-class frigates is the product of Singaporean defence engineers, who delivered the goods despite initial cynicism from foreign defence observers who could not believe the empty frigate hulls could be kitted out by Singaporean hands.

But we did it and several Defence Technology Prizes - the Oscars of Singapore's defence science community - were scooped by various project teams associated with the stealth frigate project.

To be sure, the task at hand for integrating various bits and pieces for a bespoke man-of-war designed to sink and fight from beneath the waves will be complex and will test the diligence and creativity of our defence scientists and naval planners.

However, thanks to the foresight of defence planners 18 years ago, the Type 218SG project team can draw upon nearly two decades of experience in sub operations plus a growing alumni of MINDEF/SAF underwater warfare experts.

One has little doubt that the Type 218SG project team stands to earn its own Defence Technology Prizes in time to come.

The coming Red tide: China's ambitious push into the South China Sea and its impact on Singapore

Although Singapore is far enough from China's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that our foreign ministry and defence ministry staffers can enjoy their normal weekend, the question that begs asking is whether Chinese aggression assertiveness nationalistic endeavours will stop at just imposing an air curtain off the Chinese seaboard.

If this is a sign of things to come, one can expect even more from the People's Republic of China (PRC) when (and not "if") it builds the military muscle to project and sustain its naval presence in the South China Sea (SCS).

At the current state of play, China's ADIZ can be monitored using its mainland air defence assets and naval units maintaining a radar picket offshore.

Naval aviation is confined to shipborne helicopters or mainland-based warplanes whose operational radii are tethered to their air-to-air refuelling capability or internal fuel and drop tanks.

Their sole aircraft carrier, Liaoning, is more a prop, a showpiece that makes an impressive backdrop for photo shoots involving carrier-borne fighters or PLAN heavy units. That single training carrier, devoid of an established concept of operations grounded on sound naval doctrine, operating with no organic AEW&C aircraft, sailing without the security of an outer perimeter of light forces, submarines and an inner ring of heavy naval units, no UNREP support ships worth talking about, is not a serious contender should she be pitted against present day naval forces in the region.

PRC naval aviation in 2030
But telescope China's military capabilities 15 years forward, sustained at the current growth trajectory, and one is likely to count fully operational two aircraft carriers that can project China's military ambitions closer to our neighbourhood.

By 2030, the ruffled feathers over the ADIZ would have long accepted the zone as status quo.

By 2030, regional analysts would have been desensitised to years of watching China's air and naval forces operate in the South China Sea.

That may pave the way for China to assert a stronger presence in the neighbourhood, using its SCS islets as anchor points and the aircraft carriers as patches of sovereign Chinese territory from which it can generate and sustain naval air cover.

Having China declare and secure territorial waters around South China Sea islets would change the game for defence planners so used to watching what the neighbours are up to. Emboldened by the ADIZ experience acquired in 2013, it would be interesting to theorise if they would pull a similar gig in the SCS once they have the military muscle to back words with deed.

Strategic realities
All the present-day talk about military options against China and analysis of how Red China is militarily weak compared to regional forces ignores two strategic realities.

First, military action against the PRC must reckon how industry would react when China is, and will continue to be, essentially the world's factory. Hitting China is unlike bombing the Ruhr during WW2. Industry magnates would have done their sums and quiet lobbying may hamstring military options, particularly when Western economic interests are at stake should things turn nasty.

Second, order of battle comparisons and us-versus-them scenarios generated by defence analysts and armchair generals from *insert your country of choice* seem to ignore the reality such tussles might see Chinese tactical nukes thrown into the equation. What then? Yes, it is mad. But many wars have stemmed from miscalculations of minor consequence snowballing into wider strategic effect (think about how the complex interplay of strategic alliances led to WW1 after Archduke Ferdinand was shot).

Dearth of analysis
Cold War calculations benefitted richly from decades of analysis which bred two/three generations of experten who devoted their lives to analysing how war across the Iron Curtain could flare. All sorts of scenarios from limited exchange on short warning, long war scenarios, proxy wars, launch on warning/launch on impact, command relationships with strategic nuclear forces, second strike capabilities and so on were studied and discussed extensively. Effects on global weather patterns were theorised (nuclear winter), movies were made and best seller novels on Cold War battles became vacation staples.

All this brain power amassed over the years made a positive and decisive contribution to deterrence. Because both sides understood the chilling costs of war. And no one was left to any doubt about the cost of miscalculation.

Compared to the Cold War, the standoff between China and its neighbours suffers from a dearth of literature which helps us get a better grasp of the situation.*

Concerns expressed in the past week about the ADIZ becoming a flashpoint probably stem from the realisation of the dreadful consequences that have resulted when one mixes nation willpower with misfired firepower.

Singapore's Foreign Minister K. Shanmugan said on 29 November'13 at the Global Outlook Forum in the lion city:"An incident can easily happen and we, the rest of the world, are to some extent hostage to what some ship captains might do. And how he might get us all involved in a conflagration that no one wants."

The concerns are not theoretical musings or scare mongering, but anchored on the substantial body count from the recent past in and around our immediate neighbourhood.

The April 2001 Hainan Incident, which resulted when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a United States (US) Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance plane off Hainan - where China's strategic submarines are based - is one example.

The September 1983 downing of Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 Flight KAL 007 off Russia's Sakhalin island, after a Russian air defence fighter guided by confused GCI controllers in the dark went weapons free is another.

Farther afield, we have the July 1988 case of the US Navy Aegis cruiser, USS Vincennes, shooting down Iran Air Airbus A300 Flight 655 after mistaking the airliner for an incoming flight of Iranian F-14 Tomcat warplanes. The Vincennes, in its time one of the latest US Navy warships, had info fusion capabilities that were then state-of-the-art. But this did not prevent the slaughter of innocents.

Whether it's a military-to-military encounter, warplane versus airliner or warship versus airliner, the tragedies that unfolded are real and may be sadly replayed should push come to shove in regional air and sea lanes. What's sobering to note is the individuals involved in shooting down the Korean and Iranian airliners were never brought to justice - which is a point ADIZ missileers and PRC foreign ministry staffers may have pondered.

A more robust presence by China in the SCS in not a cause for alarm. But it is unquestionable that  the region's strategic situation will be impacted, depending on the size, strength and longevity of Chinese military power sitting astride air and sea lanes that link Southeast Asia with key markets in North Asia.

What remains to be seen is if insurance underwriters can be similarly assured if and when China's naval ensign flies high in the SCS. Wasn't it not so long ago when Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore worked hard - collectively and energetically - to convince Lloyd's of London to remove the "War Risk" label for the Malacca Strait due to piracy/sea robber activity? We did so as this category would push up hull premiums and lead to higher shipping costs which, somewhere sometime downstream, would push up price tags for things we buy.

It is still some years away. Defence planners looking ahead must be aware that the current state-of-the-art - stealth warships or submarines - may be due for upgrading or replacement by 2030. What matters is the awareness that one should look beyond the immediate neighbourhood to factor in other players who can be expected to trail their coats off one's doorstep, in years to come.

Be that as it may, what is intriguing is the Chinese mindset that seeks to sweep aside and explain away regional concerns about its unilaterally declared ADIZ - air traffic has not been disrupted (true), it is within China's sovereign rights to do so (true) and that other nations have done so too (true).

It is not so much the rhetoric but more the intellectual intransigence in being able or willing to see the other side's point of view and bulldozing forth with one's perspective that points to the kind of future we can expect to see when the Red tide flows south.**

We can look further north than we're already used to, or we can sit tight and be totally blasé about regional geo-politics, only to wake up in 2030 to realise that the Singapore coastline pre-WW2 was better defended against warships than the city in the garden we're building together.




* This paragraph from The Straits Times report on the Global Outlook Forum is a case in point. An ST  journalist theorised why the US flew B-52 bombers in the ADIZ:"He pointed out that the US chose B-52s - rather than, say, the F-35 stealth fighters - for the mission. B-52s are the biggest planes in the US fleet, he said, with the largest radar  profiles, so the message from the US was that 'we want you to know', he said." (ST 30 Nov'13, page A8 'Top of the News')

With respect, the analysis is farcical. Had the US sent F-35 fighters with stealth features, the message would have been heard loud and clear not just in Beijing but around the world as the F-35s are not even in operational service. The journalist would have done nicely leaving it generically at "stealth fighters" without elaborating on type ("If unsure, leave it out" - Journalism 101). Or he could have mentioned F-22s, which have flown show-of-force missions in this region - and made paying participants at the forum feel they got their money's worth.


** Speaking of not being able to see the other side's point of view, the risks to flight safety when military flights take-off at their own whim and fancy without due regard to Air Traffic Control instructions was made apparent during the TNI's recent Angkasa Yudha war games. Indonesia's largest deployment of warplanes to Hang Nadim Airport in Batam came under the guidance from Changi Airport's ATC, as agreed by Indonesia as the airport's radar coverage is rudimentary. This blog is aware that some TNI flights took to the skies, destination Natunas, while ignoring instructions from Changi whose job was to ensure safe flight separation between commercial traffic and the TNI warplanes.

Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Black Knights aerobatics team stage photo shoot over Singapore city

Residents over eastern Singapore had a sneak peak of precision flying by the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Black Knights aerial display team when six F-16Cs in prominent red/white/black team colours, accompanied by an F-16D (in usual warpaint) possibly as a photo ship, flew low over the city skyline early Saturday morning.

The Black Knights team had a cloudless Saturday morning for their photo shoot. According to plane  spotters, the team formed up over RSAF Paya Lebar Air Base around 8:15am before heading southwards in tight formation.

Approaching the city from Paya Lebar Air Base, the six F-16Cs called smoke on about 8 km out and trailed a banner of smoke all the way to Singapore's iconic city skyline, with the chase plane in close contact.

Results of this morning's photo shoot could be intended for Black Knights publicity material.

The reformed Black Knights are due to make their public debut at next year's Singapore Airshow (11 to 16 February 2014).


Update: Image taken at around 11:38 Hotel, update posted at 11:45 Hotel
Black Knights back for another run past the city. White smoke trails. Here's a picture.

 Delta Chevron Flyby

 

Update: 16:42 Hotel. Video of Black Knights practice submitted by reader Raymond Lee KL. Filmed from Sengkang at around 11:40 Hotel almost directly under flight path. Note the faithful F-16D chase plane following the action at close range.

 

Chevron Roll



Acknowledgements:
Many thanks to all plane spotters who contributed sighting reports this morning.

Visit to Muar

Fur ball: Kittens at play on the grounds of Masjid Jamek Sultan Ibrahim. The one in front, an eager hunter, looked like a tiger cub. Note the kittens' playmate striking out like a fencer from right of frame while the rest of the pack are boxed in.


Hi everyone,
Am winding up a three-day visit to Muar - which isn't your usual touristy place.

Had a wonderful time poking around town and its surroundings on the road/estates leading to Melaka. :-)

To the people of Muar, thank you for the hospitality. Your town will feature heavily at the front and tail end of a report am working on.

Wet gap water obstacle Irrigation canal in an oil palm estate outside Muar.

Admin note: Capability demo

Dear All,
Am in the process of sourcing a compact digital camera with video function to cover a capability demonstration. It will take place overseas and will involve air and ground combat forces from an ASEAN country.

Have received several suggestions. Photo buffs, if you have something in mind which costs less than $500, is compact and rugged enough to withstand blast shock, please email me. The camera may not survive the trip, hence the low budget :)

Details will follow once embargo is lifted. TY


David

Deal or no deal? Decision awaited on whether the F-35 will join the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)

Today's Straits Times report* headlined "S. Korea to buy 40 F-35 stealth fighters"' is a dress rehearsal for how the local media will describe the warplane if and when Singapore updates its fighter fleet.

If the Lockheed-Martin (LMCO) warplane is going to be touted by the Singaporean media as a "stealth fighter", one would hope our home audience of tax payers is discerning enough to know their war machines.

That's because in the world of low observable (aka "stealth") technology, there are stealth fighters and there are stealth fighters.

Clever marketing campaigns, below-the-radar lobbying and clueless newsrooms often conspire to upsell stealth wannabes as the real thing, when in reality the warplane falls short in the real world test of fighter jet versus integrated air defence system.

In the case of the LMCO F-35 Lightning II, design features such as its angular fuselage which make the fighter less observable have elevated the platform's status to that of a stealth fighter.

But what's linguistically correct may not pass muster in the eyes of discerning military buyers and knowledgeable defence scientists.

A warplane with low observable features does not magically transform into a stealth fighter just because one wishes it to. It would, for example, take an F-35 driver with boundless/misplaced optimism to fly against an island air defence system (like Singapore's) armed with current-day technology to deliver the miserable two bombs on target. If you wish, you could even pit an F-35 against an Su-30, like the ones they have up north, in a one-to-one gladiatorial contest and see if it can fly out again after stirring the hornet's nest.

That the F-35 has got short legs and a modest payload (to phrase it politely) counts against it. Ditto its uninspiring capabilities when pitted against current day dogfighters such as the F-16 or Su-30.

While the "stealth fighter" tagline is an instant conversation starter for defence buffs who are pro or anti-F-35, the stand first of the same article that said the warplane is a "costly jet" stands on firmer ground.

Hefty price tag
Even as the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and air warfare planners in the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) mull over the shape, form and lethality of Singapore's future air power capability, there are segments of defence-aware Singaporeans who have expressed private misgivings about the F-35's purported flyaway cost.

In and around Bukit Gombak, the figure touted is in the region of US$200 million per plane.

Now, you can argue that Singapore's peace and security is priceless. But there are many ways to defend our skies and the sound of freedom need not thunder out of the nozzle of a F-35B.

Options include buying more Boeing F-15 Strike Eagles, with bar talk suggesting that Singapore can buy several top-end F-15s for the price of a single F-35B.

Looking in the years ahead, there are unmanned options the RSAF can consider and if you are part of this conversation, there's no need to elaborate.

To be sure, the vision of overcoming land constraints by putting frontline military aviation on surface platforms is alluring. From a force survivability and operational flexibility point of view, there are convincing arguments for having strike aircraft based off mainland Singapore. The scenarios projected are interesting and yes, Singapore must start somewhere if potential game-changers are to be added to the list of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) capability options.

However, Singapore's air warfare planners must be self-aware that tech infatuation is a malady that may afflict military minds subjected to LMCO's relentless marketing blitz to find and secure buyers for the costly fighter.

We must also remember that the aggressive push by the United States to grow the F-35 fraternity is made with its self interest in mind, as it fights to enlarge the pool of buyers to make it economically sensible to commence F-35 low-rate initial production.

High-low fighter force
Not mentioned in the article on South Korea's decision on the F-35 is its stablemate, the F-22 Raptor.

Air warfare professionals have noted that since the 1970s, the United States Air Force fighter fleet has been raised on a high-low concept, with a high performance fighter complemented by larger numbers of fighters with a more modest performance envelope.

The high-low mix was defined by the F-15s and F-16s. Not for nothing is the F-15SG described as Singapore's most capable fighter, even though in terms of product evolution, the F-15's product life cycle actually began years before that which led to the General Dynamics YF-16 lightweight fighter. The RSAF's present day order of battle which comprises F-15SGs and a large flock of three variants of the F-16 (we fly Southeast Asia's largest F-16 fleet) is the state-of-the-art that has been combat proven by the Israelis and is a combination also adopted by the South Koreans.

In theory, today's USAF sees itself fighting with a high-low mix comprising F-22s and F-35s.

The F-22 is not for sale, owing to its superior technology and low observable features that are said to give American fighter pilots  a winning edge against fifth generation fighter platforms. As far as stealth fighters go, the F-22 is the Real McCoy.

So countries which hanker for the F-35 are not in the same league, developmental cycle wise, as those which aspired to add the F-15 Eagle to their air force once upon a time in order to achieve the high-low mix. Countries that want the F-35 must realise they are chasing the "low" in the high-low mix as the F-22  is not for sale.

With the Singapore Airshow 2014 around the corner, you can bet LMCO will go great guns to tout the F-35 as the fighter for the future.

But with the F-22 - also made by LMCO - barred from its sales catalogue, Lockheed salesfolk have no option but to bet the farm on that costly fighter.

As for the Singapore media - so prone to calling every armoured vehicle a tank and every large warship a battleship - let's hope the defence writers can tell rhetoric from reality.


* The story on South Korea's decision on the F-35, plucked from wire agencies, could have been copy edited to sieve out the marketing fluff.

National Service in Singapore: Things to bring on your first day and whether NSFs should be allowed to choose their vocation

One of the top questions Singaporean pre-enlistees have about National Service: What to bring on the first day of NS?*

If we cannot even address questions on what Maslow would define as basic needs of full-time National Servicemen (NSFs), we as a society are some way from addressing higher level topics such as aspirational ones.

Decades after NS began in 1967, the general level of defence awareness among Singaporeans is - if you excuse the expression - piss poor.

More can and should be done to elevate the shortfall in defence awareness. But you would probably appreciate this would take time, resources and sustained effort to build and retain mindshare among future enlistees.

The idea of allowing pre-enlistees to pick their NS vocation is interesting and certainly worth debating. One assumes that the objective would be to keep NSFs better engaged - to use HR parlance - during their two years serving the Singapore Armed Forces or Home Team (or defence research lab... but let's not go there).

In a climate where there's equal awareness of NS opportunities, one can imagine a scenario where close to 20,000 Singaporean teens make reasoned, informed choices on how they would like to serve the SAF when they enlist as citizen soldiers.

Are we there yet? Far from it.

Take the Infantry Formation, the backbone of the Singapore Army, as an example. The green berets have different types of infantry battalions in their order of battle - regular infantry, protection of installation troops and other special-to-task infantry battalions that carry Singapore Infantry Regiment (SIR) designations but perform a different role during operations.

We also have heliborne infantry, who come under the Guards Formation, and armoured infantry who come under Headquarters Armour.

Is one to assume that pre-enlistees can navigate the checklist of options entirely on their own?

Our teenage boys can certainly be educated about the SAF order of battle. And this exercise would involve working with individuals who want to make the most of their NS tenure. The unconvinced, disengaged or apathetic can choose to ignore the education blitz and allow the SAF's invisible hand to deploy them accordingly - as it has done for decades past.

Like all communication narratives, the strategic comms plan for this outreach would involve charting touchpoints as well as a realistic timeline for working with the target audience - future enlistees, their teachers as well as their parents/guardians.

In this regard, a multi-year effort that tiers information from baby steps upwards should do the job. For example, the National Education show (i.e. National Day Parade rehearsal) that Primary 5 students attend can be one formal touchpoint to inform and educate youngsters that we have an Army for land battles, Navy for fighting at sea and Air Force to protect our skies - it's as basic as that.

In later years, SAF open houses hosted by the respective Services can allow students to know the Singaporean military more intimately from Secondary 1 to 3. Such events cannot simply be excursions. There must be a deliberate programme to infuse teenagers with a deeper understanding of the SAF and Home Team units and build anticipation - not fear - about NS.

One more touchpoint should take place in Year 1 of junior college, Years 1 and 2 of polytechnic life and the first year of a NITEC student's journey with the Institute of Technical Education (ITE). This would arm teenagers with a better understanding of SAF vocations by the time they have to choose their own fate.

Along the way, expectations can be managed by teaching students that while a best effort will be made with matching the NS posting with the pre-enlistee's top choice, not everyone will get their vocation of choice.

This in effect teaches a life skill of managing one's disappointment. As adults, we all have to endure situations where we may not get our house or apartment of choice, that perfect job, best boss, dearest colleagues or sweetest life  partner. It's a valuable skill learning to live with what we have and to roll with the blows.

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF may also have situations where a willing buyer meets a willing seller, but the buyer wants out after discovering that the vocation is too tough or not as glamorous as they thought it would be. What then?

It should be apparent that the menu of NS vocations should be extended to pre-enlistees before Basic Military Training (BMT). Our NSFs have enough coping to do during their first weeks of military life without the added pressure of vocation choices.

Choice is one thing. Fitness level, attitude and performance demonstrated during BMT is quite another.

At a practical level, there will be situations where certain units may not be available for certain NSF intakes during the year. This situation would arise when an evergreen unit has not discharged its previous mono intake batch of NSFs. As there is no room at the inn, it goes without saying that NSFs for certain intakes may not be able to pick that unit but following cohorts will be able to do so. The cognoscenti sbould have little difficulty identifying these units and predicting their enlistment intake timetables. But will such information be open source? How would MINDEF/SAF explain this to NSFs without compromising operational security?

Once upon a time, when managing an internship programme that took in several hundred students annually, the question of whether internship candidates should be allowed to pick their posting in a theme park arose. Students felt some positions were more "glam" because the rides or uniforms were cool or had more girls. The youngsters thus tended to gravitate towards these popular positions.

Close consultation with teachers from all five polytechnics revealed that students would benefit more, in terms of academic skills, working experience and life skills, if their posting was left to the internship host. That is the approach adopted till this day and the Gen Ys and Linksters just have to suck it up.

Of course, this was backstopped with an all-out effort to inform and educate internship candidates as best we could, so everyone knew that the learning value from every posting was immense and that students would be given the chance to expand their learning during their 3 to 6 months with the company.

Alas, however much MINDEF/SAF aspires to incorporate a more consultative approach to the NS framework, one must always remember that NS will involve personal sacrifices.

Between a situation where pre-enlistees cannot choose their vocation and one where choice is offered, the one where you or your loved ones have a choice should be the preferred option.

But choices must be informed ones. And this starts with pre-enlistees knowing and accepting that choosing their NS vocation is vastly different from choosing a CCA.

A better way of doing NS should never result in a softer NS.



* Things to bring on your first day of enlistment

Identity card
Pen and notebook, possibly in a pencil case.
Small ruler
Black marker (to mark personal items)
Tooth brush, tooth paste
Face wash
Spare spectacles, screwdriver for specs
Spectacle band
Nail clipper with file
Talcum powder in small container
Shaver plus spare blades
Extra underwear
T-shirt and shorts for sleeping.
Clothes hangers (the hard plastic type will break. I used aluminium clothes hangers. About four to six should suffice)
Slippers
Bar of soap, spare soap and soap box for standby bed
Alarm clock (battery operated)
Orange cloth
Petty cash for canteen breaks
SAF-compliant handphone with spare battery
Washing powder and brush
Plastic bag (supermarket type) for soiled clothing before book out