Royal Malaysian Air Force to train with world's most advanced fighter in Eks Cope Taufan 2014

Cutting edge: A United States Air Force F-22A Raptor taxis past a Royal Malaysian Air Force S61A-4 Nuri helicopter at TUDM Butterworth on 6 June 2014 and is later ringed by ground crew. Photos courtesy of Dzirhan Mahadzir.

Starting tomorrow (9 June 2014), United States Air Force (USAF) Lockheed F-22A Raptors - the world's most advanced fighter jet - will join Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) warplanes and helicopters for the most complex US-Malaysia air warfare manoeuvres held in the Federation to date.

Codenamed Cope Taufan 2014, the bilateral exercise marks several milestones in US-MY defence relations. Taufan is the Malay word for Typhoon.

First, the deployment of six F-22As makes the RMAF the first air force in ASEAN to host the Raptor for war games held in regional airspace. The learning value for the RMAF is noteworthy. The commitment of all fighter types by the RMAF indicates that Malaysia recognises this point and wants to maximise opportunities for its pilots to fly with and against advanced fighters such as the F-22 Raptor and F-15 Eagle.

From the US point of view, American military aviators will probably relish the opportunity to fly with advanced Russian fighters such as the MiG-29 and Su-30 as the air combat serials represent the ultimate in dissimilar air combat training.

Second, Cope Taufan will see the United States military deploy its Joint Deployable Electronic Warfare Range (JDEWR) to Malaysia for the first time. This training aid should add value to the Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (Malaysian Armed Forces) as it will allow Malaysian warfighters to understand and appreciate how air combat tactics should be executed in contested airspace. Nurtured judiciously, this is expected to engender a shift in Malaysian mindsets from a platform-centric view of warfare to a network-enabled one involving integrated platforms working with one another. When they eventually see the light, it will mark a paradigm shift in the way they do business.

Third, the quantity and quality of American air assets now in Malaysia signals that the US is hedging its bets when it comes to regional engagement. Senang Diri understands that plans to fly F-22s to Malaysia were hatched at least six months ago - which is round about the time Singapore gave extensive publicity to its integrated live-fire exercise, codenamed Forging Saber, held in the United States. This point shows that the US has alternatives in anchoring its military presence in Southeast Asia and is prepared to look beyond, and work with, partners other than Singapore. Oftentimes, we tend to overrate our importance in grand strategy of major powers.

Last, the commencement of the war games - the largest and most staged between the two air forces - demonstrates the high exercise tempo of the RMAF's war games calendar. Cope Taufan comes close on the heels of the RMAF's recent involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangements war games, Bersama Shield, which saw it send Hawk 200 fighter jets to Singapore as part of the fighter land-away arrangement.

Eksesais Cope Taufan 2014 will see assets fly from 9  to 20 June from TUDM Butterworth, TUDM Kuantan and TUDM Subang near the Malaysian capital  Kuala Lumpur.  These air bases will offer the Cope Taufan exercise directorate flexibility in employing air assets as missions can be staged over the Andaman Sea to the west or eastward over the South China Sea.

The F-22s flew into TUDM Butterworth on 6 June (the historically aware will recognise the date as the anniversary of the Overlord landings in Normandy), with the moment captured by Malaysian defence journalists (see images above from Dzirhan Mahadzir).

Air assets from the following squadrons will be involved:

RMAF

6 and 15 Skuadron - BAE Systems Hawks

11 SKN - Sukhoi Su-30MKM

17 SKN - Mikoyan MiG-29

18 SKN- Boeing F/A-18D Hornets

USAF

131st Fighter Squadron, 104th Fighter Wing, Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts (F-15C)
199th Fighter Squadron, 154th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii (F-22A)
19th Fighter Squadron, 154th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii (F-22A)
36th Airlift Squadron, 374th Airlift Wing, Yokota Air Base, Japan (C-130)
517th Airlift Squadron, 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska (C-17)
535th Airlift Squadron, 15th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii (C-17)
204th Airlift Squadron, 154th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii (C-17)

A statement from the US Pacific Air Forces said:"Cope Taufan is an excellent opportunity to improve combined readiness and cooperation between the U.S. and Malaysia. This large force employment exercise will include operations in air superiority, close air support, interdiction, tactical airlift, and combat search and rescue."

US PACAF added that the war games will allow for "an exchange of techniques and procedures to enhance cooperation between U.S. and Malaysian Airmen". 

"It also provides a quality training venue for U.S. and Malaysian aircrew and maintenance personnel," it added."Pacific Air Forces has conducted exercises with the Royal Malaysian Air Force since the early 1980s. By participating in exercises with military forces from partner nations in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. demonstrates its commitment to peace and stability in the region."

Spouses of SAF Regulars deserve attention in ongoing defence narrative

If you think it is tough being in a military organisation like the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), where your rank in the social order hangs literally on your heart, try being in an organisation where one's standing in the pecking order must be sensed rather than seen.

For many young wives inducted into the SAF Officers Wives' Club (SAFOWC), their induction to the club set up exclusively for female spouses of the Officer Corps forces them to grow up quickly.

Make no mistake: the SAFOWC has done sterling work funding charitable causes, serving as a support structure for our men in uniform deployed for long and distant service in places like the Gulf of Aden, and in helping numerous Singaporean families come to terms with the demands of military service that only kith and kin can identify and empathise with.

Indeed, the SAFOWC is such a key part of our defence ecosystem that it is surprising scant attention has been paid to making sure it does not falter. Recent reviews of defence issues in Singapore have cast the spotlight (rightfully) on stakeholders such as National Servicemen and their families, on Regulars, employers and the role of women serving the SAF.

Alas, spouses who support the SAF leadership have to fend for themselves. And if you are the husband of a female Regular, good luck to you as there is no male equivalent club for SAF Officers Husbands.

In the Glossary of the recently-released Committee to Strengthen National Service report are found acronyms for organisations such as ACCORD (of which yours truly is a member), the SAFVC and SAFVL. But we've missed the SAFOWC, perhaps because of its charter which shapes it as a social club rather than a tool for winning hearts and minds? Pity.

The narrative thus far sidesteps the pivotal role that wives of SAF officers serve in keeping households in order when the head of household is away serving his country. And when the role of Family Liaison Officer brings the conversation into the household, it is done more to describe a functional role than a lead-in to a wider discussion on demands shouldered by the military family. This misses the opportunity exploring what more can or ought to be done to help wives of our officers and WOSPECS underpin commitment to defence (C2D).

And so the SAFOWC plods on valiantly. It gives uninformed observes the mental picture that it is all about chatty womenfolk who meet for high tea and the occasional jumble sale, when the influence such wives command should be better recognised and employed to advance C2D.

Fault lines in the social order
The SAFOWC deserves greater attention from the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF because the social structure that sets norms and expecations for its esteemed membership is crisscrossed by fault lines that could fracture the organisation, if we are not careful.

Take the example of the young officer's wife, pretty and demure, at her first SAFOWC function. Determined to expand her social circle, she mingled easily and chatted with new faces even as she struggled to remember all their names.

That social encounter was akin to an interrogation. But so subtle was the technique that one would hardly notice that some wives were trying to suss out where the newbie stood in the social order. Central to the conversation was the rank and background of her beloved hubby. You see, some members of the SAFOWC are adept at charting a mindmap showing the CEP of our officers. They will quiz a newbie with vigorous intensity to find out whether a newbie's husband is a scholar, and then whether he was funded to study locally or overseas (the latter signals he is set for higher things in life).

As senior appointments in the SAFOWC tend to mirror the hierarchy of the SAF leadership, the social order in the SAFOWC tends to mirror that of the SAF with wives of Generals at the top and everyone else falling in behind.

One wife found out the hard way when the SAFOWC planned an overseas trip for a social  event with the officers wives' club of an ASEAN country. Her excitement was dampened when she was put on the wait list, all because the wife of a more senior officer wanted to bring her kid along. Lo and behold, junior didn't go in the end and the wife on the wait list was told she could finally go. She didn't. She politely declined because the offer to go came at the last minute and she felt wives of junior officers should be treated more respectfully.

Today, her husband has risen to the SAF's senior leadership and she can recount that episode with confidence. The incident made her acutely aware of  the potential pitfalls that could beset the SAFOWC, should an invisible cast system infect the wider membership of the organisation.

Such reasons probably explain why a sizeable number of SAF officers wives are absent as active participants to  the SAFOWC's activities. It is not a hostile or cold environment. Far from it.

Pilllow talk
But moving in a social circle such as the  SAFOWC demands a high level of social intelligence and self-awareness because gossip picked up from social events could easily end up as pillow talk with the boss of young officers. Negative impressions, shared at an inopportune time, picked up by the wrong ears and spread as salacious gossip, could wreck a career if the impression that someone is lazy at housework or a lousy father ends up clouding impressions of one's ability and potential as an SAF officer.

The stress level for SAFOWC members also arises from the fact that people have a tendency to think that the spouse of a capable officer must be cut from the same template. Even if the husband is a charismatic leader who is a master at public speaking and a capable officer, it is unfair to expect the wife to be the same. Let's face it: opposites attract (ok, we generalise).

And while the husbands may be best buddies because they trained and exercised together or were OCS mates, we cannot expect their spouses to draw on the same emotional credit generated from the close working relationship forged between the men. Indeed, some spouses may not get along with one another, even though their husbands may be best of friends.

Here's where mirroring the leadership structure of the SAF in the SAFOWC works against the wives, because there are some who prefer to be quiet homemakers who shun the limelight and absolutely detest public speaking, yet have expectations cast upon them because their hubby is a rising star.

Mind you, the pressure from such expectations can be immense because no wife wants to letdown their other half. So some put on a show, pretending they enjoy the moment when their inner thoughts and feelings are to the contrary.

The anecdotes above underscore fault lines that could unsettle organisations like the SAFOWC. This is why MINDEF/SAF ought to keep the interests and needs of military families in its sphere of consciousness.

And if you think the wives of officers and WOSPECS are left to fend on their own, spare a thought for husbands of our growing number of Female Regulars. They are worse off as there is no umbrella organisation like the SAFOWC to take care of them.

One supposes it is a machismo thing, that husbands - as head of household - should be able to pull things together?

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue needs to uplift itself from tired, old template

Now in its 13th instalment, the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Asia Security Summit - better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) as its formal name cannot be crunched into a diplomatically acceptable acronym - now marks the calendars of regional powers as a must-attend event.

What started as an attempt to rouse defence and security officials to come together for talks under a non-official, non threatening Track 2 setting has lived up to its purpose.

Heavy hitters do make time to grace the Shangri-La Hotel's Island Ballroom year after year and they attend the SLD unafraid to speak their mind.

But for the SLD to stay relevant to the region's defence and security landscape, it must remake itself as more than just a talk shop where the Track 2 label gives officials ample leeway in articulating views that may be frowned upon or impossible to voice under more official settings.

This weekend's just-ended SLD signals that early efforts by the IISS in nurturing the summit into a forum where views can be shared openly and quasi-officially, all the while sidestepping the intricacies of Track 1 diplomacy, have been achieved admirably.

That said, the SLD's makeover ought to take place soon as a failure to break out of the now-familiar format risks turning the event into a glorified shout fest where it's all talk and no action.

Staff officers from the 27 nations represented at the 13th SLD must heave a sigh of relief now that the curtains have come down on the event.

It runs like clockwork. Alas, a tad too predictably.

Anxious to lend it a regional air, the keynote address has turned into a sort of musical chairs where speakers from regional countries are invited in turn, based loosely on the security topic du jour.

On the first say of the summit, all eyes turn to the United Stated Secretary of Defense as the representative from the world's most powerful military gives its take on the state of play for power politics.

Without fail, Singapore's Minister for Defence will host a lunch reception involving all defence ministers or their representatives. The novelty of this event has worn thin on the media, and they have thankfully moved beyond colour stories of what's on the menu or who-sat-next-to-whom.

Day Two offers regional speakers their chance to rebut, respond or recount the words that dropped from SecDef's lips. By this time, everyone is waiting for the clock to tick to the final bell and the wrap up by the raconteur, the indefatigable Dr John Chipman who has an unenviable job keeping the house in order as regional players snipe at one another.

As a template, the above format has worked its magic in coaxing regional power brokers and squabbling neighbours to sit in the same room for two days of boring intense debate.[Such debates would perhaps get more attention from delegates next year if the Shangri-La killed its wifi at strategic junctures, forcing the audience to focus their attention on the speaker rather than indulge in escapism courtesy of Whatsapp.]

But here's the rub: Group dynamics fostered by getting everyone together dissipates all too quickly as the feel-good impact has little time to sink in among all present. So to borrow taglines from group dynamics theorists, the SLD template ends after the Forming and Storming  phases, leaving no opportunity for the Norming and Performing to kick into action.

It comes as little surprise that regional speech writers will jump at the liberty afforded by the SLD's Track 2 label to let fly without mincing words. You won't find another event in this region which commands the kind of audience seen at the SLD. For the assembled media, the verbal jousting makes great copy and spawns the kind of headline grabbing stories that justify their time in Singapore.

You can bet that the tenor of this year's talks will provide much food for thought for next year's instalment as the assorted speech writers and policy types run through their respective after-action debriefs.

This is why the SLD needs an urgent makeover to break out of the template. It needs to uplift itself as more than a soapbox for power brokers to flaunt their oratorical prowess. Unless it does so, the tongue wagging and finger pointing will get us nowhere. Theatrical value aside, such sideshows do wear thin after awhile and when that moment comes, the SLD's star appeal will start to wane.

To be sure, there is value in the SLD's role as a sort of pressure relief valve which allows policy makers to vent their spleen. However, such jousting needs to be managed with a firm hand lest it upsets the raison détre of the summit, which is to promote peace and stability.

Architects of SLD redux could, perhaps, take a leaf from the suggestion by Singapore's Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, who urged Asia to build on multilateral frameworks such as the ADMM and ADMM-Plus to instruments of "practical cooperation and interaction" that foster regional peace and stability.

Perhaps work groups could be spawned with a longer mandate and broader terms of references that help delegates extend the theories and ideas postulated during the year's SLD. Under the work groups, the traction continues outside the Island Ballroom, enabled by technology like teleconferencing and underpinned by a broader desire to keep the tempo of regional cooperation going. Such work groups could sum up their success (or lack thereof) at the following year's summit. Done this way, there will be some continuity between each year's summit, a kind of intellectual bridging that ties the events together rather than having each summit stream into your consciousness like a flash bang - loud but short-lived.

Those familiar with the ADMM-Plus exercise hosted by Brunei will know the role the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) served in pulling things together. Whether or not the men and women from the SAF get screen credits for their work is beside the point. What matters is that 18 nations and 18 military forces converged in the Brunei sultanate to confer, coordinate and cooperate with one another, in so doing creating opportunities unseen at any previous regional military exercise.

Talk is cheap. It is time for sustained action to generate and sustain positive vibes between regional military forces.

Singapore's position of armed neutrality and the South China Sea dispute

When Singapore despatched the tank landing ship, RSS Endurance, for duty in the Northern Arabian Gulf in October 2003, our use of the geographical place marker favoured by the United States and her Arab allies placed the Lion City squarely with the coalition of the willing.

Nautical charts marked the area as the Persian Gulf. But Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel who served aboard Endurance during Operation Blue Orchid (OBO 1) would probably recall the quaint moniker coined for the area of operations by the acronym-obsessed American military - they called it the NAG.

Now, as things hot up in regional waters to our northeast, Singapore must tread carefully as diplomats who serve various flags will use assorted platforms to peddle their respective national positions. Such posturing will also see them seed arguments with media agencies in an effort to shape world opinion, win hearts and minds.

More than just calibrating the tone, context and syntax of our public positions, deciding what to call the patch of sea may inadvertently swing Singapore's position from one camp to the next. We need to be cognizant that when references are made to the East Sea, South Sea or West Philippine Sea, the area referred to could all point to the same grid squares.

One would hope that the stringent selection criteria for our civil service and intensive efforts at grooming our young talents has produced interlocutors who can tell the forest from the trees, and can manoeuvre deftly amid the shenanigans of regional politiking.

Our position in the South China Sea demands more than sharp minds and razor wit.

Our public position that this island nation stands neutral must be credibly explained to right-leaning elements in regional countries who may rise to challenge that position. We must be prepared for such challenges not just in words (which are easier to shrug off or explain away), but also in deeds (which would really make our policy makers earn their pay).

If Singapore gives safe harbour to an American carrier battle group as the jabber over regional waters turns nasty and mutual defence treaties have been invoked, how would that sit with our position of armed neutrality?

Should military forces from a claimant state request similar access to Changi Naval Base, do we or should we grant unimpeded access? Would that naval presence then represent a sort of fleet in being, placed as the southern wing of a hammer and anvil arrangement that allows the claimant state to command both the northern and southern approaches to SCS SLOCs?

If they come once and then come more often, what then? If access is denied, would that sit well with the claimant state and our neutrality claim?

Regional naval forces conditioned to the halcyon days - pre-SCS dispute - when warships of various flags breezed in and out of Changi Naval Base and oftentimes shared neighbouring berths, may chafe at the idea should visiting rights need to be curtailed.

Such musings may be more real than you think.

Defence policy makers in regional capitals north of ASEAN are likely to think of additional channels which could be leveraged to advance their respective positions. The addition of friendly ports of call for naval units would count as such leverage. When one scans the map for likely safe harbours in this neighbourhood, it is more than likely the little red dot will pop up in their stream of consciousness.

Persian Gulf or NAG? Batu Putih or Pedra Branca? Taiwan or ROC?

Our system has walked such ground before. And handled such ambiguity quite successfully too, one might add.

But the complex, multi-stakeholder SCS tussle that could involve home ground in general, Changi Naval Base in particular, is a different proposition altogether. And we must be ready.

Cold War? Never heard of it, says SAF officer: The state of military education in Singapore

Among the tidbits shared with this blog, the one about the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) officer who attended a strategic studies course clueless about the Cold War is one of the gems.

Granted, the officer was young (born after 1990). True, courses are tailored to upskill participants. Indeed, the SAF's mission readiness was not compromised by the said officer's ignorance and that officer is now more worldly-wise.

It reminds one of the true story of a non-uniformed SAF officer (NUSAF, this pre-dated today's DXO scheme) who, having been notified by AOD that an RSAF Scout 700 UAV had gone down around Poyan Reservoir, scribbled down frantic notes before screaming down the phone line:"But where is the pilot?" 

The strength of one's military awareness will not guarantee victory.

Lessons from the past
However, a lack of military awareness could possibly result in the SAF relearning painful lessons, paid in blood by more established armed forces, when such pitfalls could have been avoided in the first place as the possible solutions to many strategic, operational and tactical conundrums are enshrined in the lessons of war through the ages.

As a small nation with no hinterland, our first mistake on the battlefield could be our last. This is why the domain knowledge of SAF leaders should have breadth and depth, and must have a pedagogy that keeps up with the times .

It is easier said than done.

The anecdote from the military lecturer made a fine lead-in to the discussion on the state of strategic awareness among our fighting men and women, particularly officers in their 20s who are being groomed as future leaders in the most technologically-advanced fighting force in Southeast Asia.

Leading and learning
Quite possibly, many of our educators know the answer: Students conversant with world affairs and history stand out because such boys and girls are increasingly rare.

Move upstream, speak to our educators and you would find ample examples of book smart students who struggle cobbling together a coherent argument for the General Paper. Writing skills aside, speak to them in person and you may discover that outstanding grades do not correlate with poise, EQ and structure and logic in thought processes needed to sustain a conversation on a professional topic.

Done with their A levels or polytechnic diploma, those with leadership potential who find themselves in Officer Cadet School (OCS) during their full-time National Service face a steep learning curve when learning the rudiments of the profession of arms.

Fast forward a couple of years and when that young officer finds himself or herself at a diplomatic cocktail reception, clinking glasses with foreign counterparts and chatting about professional matters, that's when astute observers will be able to filter the standouts from the poseurs.

For many, such learning will be lifelong. For some, the education process will be a blooming chore.

GMKE's demise
Compared to earlier generations of SAF officers, the learning journey has been made less onerous now that the General Military Knowledge Exam (GMKE) has been dumped.

The GMKE used to be the bugbear of less historically-aware officers who struggled to quickly get up to speed with a plethora of factoids that the exam deemed worthy of a well-grounded military education. Remember, this was pre-Internet. Research was done the old fashioned way navigating a maze of book shelves with book lists (not Wikipedia) and the Dewey Decimal system (not Google) to guide one along.

The GMKE was despised and today, few mourn its demise.

If you believe in substance over form, then whether or not the Third Generation SAF counts the GMKE as part of its DNA is really immaterial. The loss of the GMKE should not be bemoaned for sentimental reasons. But one should ponder how we can raise and sustain awareness of, and appreciation for, the lessons of war among young Singaporeans who have made the profession of arms their career choice. 

A former MINDEF Perm Sec said:"It is a question of (command) emphasis. GMKE is not what made officers read widely. In the early years, it was Goh Keng Swee who took a direct interest in the education of SAF officers. I recall how he used to recommend books to read, and his suggestions were taken seriously, because he was the Minister for Defence. His interests were eclectic, and not just military history. 

"I think this situation is compounded by the advent of the Internet, which filters information that the individual is interested in, and most likely, it is not going to be history."

Learning gap

If there is a generational shift where technology makes competing demands for one's time and attention, then MINDEF/SAF must recognise that the pedagogy within our military education system must move with the times.

What now? GMKE for Dummies, downloadable via a smart phone app? Clausewitz's On War, crunched down into Twitter-size factoids for easy digestion? Modern-day strategic affairs distilled into a tip sheet so you won't sound stupid in front of foreign diplomats while performing staff officer duty during the Shangri-La Dialogue?

To be sure, MINDEF/SAF is well aware the knowledge gap should not be widened.

Someone who teaches MINDEF/SAF officers said:"In general, there is keen interest in deepening the curriculum in the SAF, but there are practical limits to what can be done. Interest also doesn’t always mean it becomes a priority. Time and ability are the biggest constraints. Officers can’t be on course for too long, and a significant number of them simply don’t have the ability (or inclination) to appreciate academic study. 

"I have to point out this isn’t a uniquely Singaporean problem. It’s visible in military education around the world. The ability and inclination for study, however, may change in the future with a greater emphasis on a broadened curriculum in school and university, and more time for officers to attend courses. The academic quality of officers (insofar as critical thinking and writing are concerned) seems to be increasing, and more of them seem genuinely interested in the lessons conducted, though I can’t say they form the majority, or even a sizeable minority, just yet. Still, one should be optimistic."

That sounds like a promising start: More capable officers who are eager to learn.

It is perhaps a sign of the times that higher operational demands after the 9/11 terror attacks have resulted in a higher operational tempo for the SAF. Higher demands placed on performing homeland security duties such as Ops Bascinet have eaten into the time available for professional development (Note: Such operational taskings should fall as new infantry units have been raised specifically as security battalions, allowing NS battalions to focus on hot-war scenarios. But we'll save this topic for another day.) 

As courses tend to focus on developing specific skill sets needed for one's vocation - rather than belly-gazing on arcane topics like the use of armour during the Malayan Campaign - and as the local security environment leans towards homeland security ops, we risk raising a generation of SAF officers with a constricted world view on the value and roles of the SAF. 

This narrow strategic view is compounded by the lack of a Singapore defence university run by, and staffed with, professional warfighters tasked with delivering a military education curriculum superior to anything available here today.

"The SAF has also always been practical-minded," noted one observer.

"First, the SAF doesn’t have a defence university with its own faculty because of a lack of critical mass of officers to justify the investment. It’s possibly the only modern, professional force without one. The solution adopted is to outsource it, in this case, to NTU (through RSIS and the SAF NTU Academy, which for now is merely an administrative body). This is a workable solution, but it's an imperfect (and in some instances, poor) replacement for having its own academic institution with its own uniformed talent. 

"Second, it seems to me there is a belief that investing in operational training with a tangible output that contributes to deterrence (that is, soldiers who can function better in the field) is a better use of time, than academic learning. After all, having a soldier who can shoot better is far more effective than one who can debate you."

Cold War or Cod War. MCV or MCMV. F-16 or M-16. Does anybody give a damn?

Republic of Singapore Navy Day 2014

On the eve of the Republic of Singapore's 47th anniversary on Navy Day tomorrow, we present fun facts anchored on Singapore about naval warfare and Singapore's Navy.

Do write to us at projectrocky@gmail.com if you have more factoids for this list.

To all those in our silent service: Happy Navy Day  :-)

Pre-WW2
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain's Royal Navy anticipated fighting with a balanced fleet out of the Singapore Naval Base. At full strength, this fleet would comprise a least one aircraft carrier, HMS Eagle, submarines grouped under the 4th Flotilla and heavy units deployed from Britain. This point validates the value of a balanced naval force structure, which includes submarines.

The Eagle and 4th Flotilla were reassigned to the Mediterranean theatre as Britain fought for her life for two years before war broke out in the Pacific. The presence of both would have added much bite to Force Z, especially if  Eagle was complemented by a second aircraft  carrier, the Indomitable. Naval units operating out of Singapore at full strength could have bought much needed time to reinforce Singapore with better combat planes and posed a serious menace to Japanese shipping supporting the Malayan campaign.

World records
They may not look it, but the RSN's 114-metre long Formidable-class stealth frigates are the world's most heavily-armed class of frigates. Each warship can be armed with a max warload of 24 Harpoon SSMs, which is the most number of anti-ship missiles carried by any frigate now in service.

Another world naval record: Compared to all known amphibious warfare ship classes, Singapore's 141-metre long Endurance-class ships can carry the most number of landing craft. This double-digit number allows each ship to land a battalion-size force in one wave.

Name games
Endurance-class Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) are, strictly speaking, Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). These warships were temporarily labelled with the uniquely Singaporean term, Helicopter Landing Ships, during the Indian Ocean tsunami relief mission in January 2005. This was done to make it clear to United Nations planners and the foreign media that the LPDs LSTs could embark helicopters.

Still on the LSTs: Our Endurance-class LSTs can each lay a causeway using pontoons attached to the side of their heli decks. This class of ships have never been seen publicly sailing with pontoons.

The special electronic warfare suite aboard upgraded Missile Gunboats, associated with the art of seduction/distraction, was codenamed Project Juliet. Another gizmo that helped the MGB crew detect the presence of enemy electronic transmissions was codenamed Project Eureka. The officer(s) who picked these project names must have had a poetic streak.

Naval hardware
The RSN's stealthiest vessels are also its oldest. These are the Challenger and Archer-class SSKs.

The two types of radar-equipped aircraft configured to support the Singapore Navy were converted from passenger/transport planes. The first was the Skyvan. The one now in service is the Fokker 50, heavily-modified as the Fokker 50 Mark IIS Enforcer.

Each stealth frigate can operate an air group of two types of platforms. The first asset is the familiar Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk. The other is unmanned.

There is a fast craft in RSN service, thought to be a semi-submersible, whose capabilities have yet to be disclosed. The warship was on the itinerary of the FFS squadron media embed in February 2009 but was not showcased due to a last minute decision. Yes, *sigh*.

The RSN operates the fastest firing weapon in the SAF's arsenal. This is the Dillon Aero M-134D 7.62mm minigun. Each fires at a rate of 50 rounds per second.

Trial versions of what evolved into the Fast Craft Equipment Personnel were initially propelled by screws. The propulsion was later changed to twin Hamilton waterjets.

A trial long-range radar array developed by the Defence Science & Technology Agency was mounted on the seawall at Changi Naval Base some years ago.

Our People
The term Ratings, used to denote RSN Specialists, never gained popularity in service.

Our submariners have all had their wisdom teeth removed.

More RSN officers and WOSEs from 3rd Flotilla have earned operational experience than those from 1st Flotilla, as the bulk of past overseas deployments were shouldered by LSTs. This ratio will change as personnel aboard our stealth frigates are sent for overseas operations more often.

Among the three SAF Services, the RSN has never had a Singapore Navy officer rise to the post of Chief of Defence Force. But the RSN beat the other Services when an RSN officer led the Ministry of Defence as its Permanent Secretary Defence - the top civil servant in the defence ministry.




Lastly and on a purely personal note: If I were young again and given a choice to sign on with any SAF Service, I would choose the Navy.

Too smart for our own good

After firing several million rounds over several years under operational conditions without a single stoppage, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) wrote to the weapon's maker to report a happy "problem": The ADF was still trying to figure out the weapon's mean time between failures.

The killing power from this weapon's prodigious rate of fire and accuracy has made this weapon sought-after by warfighters the world over.

Only in Singapore do we have an issue with this instrument of war.

Against a mountain of endorsements, only in Singapore can we find fault with the weapon by fussing over engineering that has evolved from generations of gunsmiths since the first Gatling gun was fielded.

Despite the weapon's fearsome reputation as a man-stopper, you can count on one hand the number of such weapons in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) arsenal.

Yes, this is a sad story that would become tragic if a single SAF man or woman died because of the lack of firepower in battle, slaving over a GPMG when they could bring on the rain on the Enemy and flatten them swiftly and decisively.

Make no mistake: Our special forces operatives would love to get their hands on as many of these weapons as they can. Ditto our Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) helicopter squadrons.

Procurement impasse
None will come their way until our defence engineers can convince themselves the weapon is safe to operate. You see, after the SAF acquired a trial batch for operations, additional procurements were tripped up by concerns over the possibility of a cook-off.

Concerns raised are valid.

Such attention to the quality of our firearms is commendable - and we say this with absolutely no sarcasm - as the safety and reliability of our war machines and instruments of war should be beyond doubt.

But this issue has had the weapon's maker perplexed as it ignores the weight of evidence that underlines the performance of the said weapon under demanding operational conditions.

Testimonies amassed from established armed forces like the ADF count for nothing. Neither do explanations that the cook-off cannot occur as imagined by the defence engineers concerned, simply because the rounds are not chambered in the part of the weapon our defence engineers have an issue with.

Sadly and embarrassingly speaking, this episode which is making its rounds among defence-aware individuals worldwide -  repeat: worldwide - is one case where our defence procurement processes are too smart for its own good.

Book smart, members of the project team in question undoubtedly have the paper qualifications needed for the job at hand.

What they perhaps lack is the exposure to the art and science of gunsmiths.

With more years in this field, they would also gain from additional exposure and experience that will help them appreciate weapon engineering considerations whenever foreign arms vendors come a-calling to introduce a new weapon.

So the Triple Es comprising Education, Exposure and Experience should be kept robust and balanced in our defence eco-system.

What we have witnessed is a procurement impasse as the project team concerned struggles works at gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanics of a proven weapon.

In the meantime, who loses? It is our men and women in the SAF who deserve every technological and operational advantage Singapore can give them before they deploy for operations.

This episode is noteworthy because our defence procurement processes and protocols are known worldwide for their rigour and no-nonsense approach to weapon evaluations. We are respected as a smart buyer. We have been feted as a reference customer by arms makers whose products survived intensive scrutiny by our weapon procurement teams.

Success stories
What happened in this instance should not detract from successes in military engineering that buffed up Singapore's reputation in the defence science and engineering realm.

Successes are lauded each year during the Defence Technology Prize ceremony, which are the Oscars of Singapore's defence science community.

Declared projects form the familiar narrative that underline and emphasize the Lion City's prowess in military engineering.

The low-profile projects reinforce this narrative by providing tantalising suggestions and hints at the breadth and depth of our weapons engineering capabilities.

Years after the RSAF stood down its A-4SU Super Skyhawks with one last flight across the island, Singapore watchers who scrutinised the size and composition of  the final formation that comprised a dozen TA-4SUs may have been puzzled at the RSAF's need for so many twin-seat Super Skyhawks. Add to this the 10 TA-4SUs in Cazaux, France, and one would have a good idea of the number in the RSAF orbat.

The project to weaponise the twin-seat Super Skyhawks as Wild Weasel radar-killers under Project S must rank as one of the lesser-known success stories in our defence science annals. The sizeable number of such warplanes available for special missions strengthened the air force's ability to carry out its assigned tasks in contested airspace with a cost-effective and hard-hitting warplane in the vanguard of air strikes. Our defence eco-system performed eminently well in this instance.

It is perhaps not surprising that cases where we could have done better become talking points, precisely - or thankfully? - because such episodes are uncommon.

Dog bites man is often not considered newsworthy (caveat: depending on which body part is bitten). But not the other way around.

Gossip surrounding the project involving the weapon with the high rate of fire is a man-bites-dog moment that makes it an instant talking point.

It will not break the system because our defence eco-system is strong and enduring.

But we have much to learn and internalise from this episode because we can do better when handling similar cases in future.