Singapore's Defence Budget FY 2011/12

The record amount of $12.08 billion (US$9.5 billion, RM 28.8 billion, Rp 84 trillion) earmarked for Singapore's defence this coming financial year provides much food for thought for Singapore watchers.

For military buffs, the proposed FY2011/12 defence budget is likely to trigger spirited debates over the type and number of war machines on the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) shopping list.

For government critics, the largest slice of the planned Budget provides ammunition to attack the spending plans of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP).

Singaporean journalists from the mainstream media are likely to churn out arguments defending MINDEF's war chest. And while some reports may build up a case along the lines of "how much is enough", just wait for the "but" in the story for the usual catch phrases and predictable quotes to kick in. *yawns*

With a General Election looming as early as the April-May 2011 timeframe, such arguments better be good.

To skeptical tax payers, painting a doomsday scenario of an underfunded Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) falling victim to threats unseen, unexpected and unfriendly towards Singapore may not sit well with the voting public. They have heard this tune replayed for the past 45 years and the rehashed public relations (PR) script is looking far too predictable.

What Singaporeans need to hear is how the SAF is earning its keep.

And this, in my opinion, is an area MINDEF's spin masters from the Public Affairs Directorate (PAFF) have to work hard to excel at. Spending more than S$100,000 on expen$ive media offensives to carpet bomb Singaporeans with Total Defence messages and televised sing sings is not the way to win hearts and minds.

As Singaporean parliamentarians gear up for the Committee of Supply (COS) debates in March'11, one would hope PAFF would be more creative in selling the SAF's story.

The cookie cutter approach to churning out MINDEF/SAF-friendly media reports based on a rigid PR stylebook and predictable punchlines may not work as threat-weary Singaporeans and carefree Gen Ys throw caution to the wind. Add left-leaning Singaporean politicians into the mix, plus sweet talking politicians north and south of the Lion City and PAFF's storyline may border on paranoia.

It would be tragic for the Republic's defence and security posture if money assigned to protect its national interests ends up triggering voter discontent. Restive voters and a complacent attitude towards national security could undermine the political system that pencilled in that amount for the FY2011/12 spending in the first place, thus contributing to the freak election result theory.

Explaining what makes up operating expenditure should take Singaporean readers and viewers behind the fencelines of vital installations. This way, the media can help citizens see and understand what Island Defence is all about. Such operations, carried out 24/7, have kept the SAF at a high operational tempo since the 9/11 attacks a decade ago.

The security threats are real. Question is: Are heartlanders convinced?

Operating expenditure also embraces SAF missions overseas. Singaporeans need to know why sons of Singapore put their lives on the line on foreign soil and on the high seas far from Singapore's shores. I bet many do not realise what is at stake.

At the same time, MINDEF/SAF must show citizen soldiers that the defence system uses its soldiers' time and commitment prudently. It must also demonstrate that the system is financially prudent and astutely managed. Damage is done whenever citizen soldiers see, sense or experience wastage in terms of their time (through administrative cock ups) or poorly executed military training. Stir coffee with any operationally ready national servicemen and each would have his own stock of stories about the SAF's infamous hurry up and wait culture.

The development expenditure side of the story could provide a tantalising glimpse into the SAF's 3rd Generation transformation effort. Many defence systems and platforms take years to develop, and then some, before the new acquisition attains Initial Operational Capability.

A lot of work also takes place behind the scenes so that SAF war machines can meet its specific operational requirements. Such vital work accounts for part of defence spending and tax payers ought to know more about what they are paying for.

In doing so, one need not give MINDEF/SAF censors a heart attack by revealing trade secrets. PAFF can cherry pick the list of retired SAF war machines for compelling examples - and there are many - of MINDEF's concept-to-retirement approach in defence development. Along the way, introduce the defence engineers, scientists and SAF warfighters who were involved in everything from Project Almond to Project Archer to Project Zebra to make the story come alive. This way, even the Singaporean layperson can appreciate the amount of effort in Ops Tech integration needed to sharpen and maintain the SAF's defence readiness.

Such stories would probably amaze young Singaporeans, many of whom know more about foreign soccer teams than their own country's armed forces.

The PAP's critics have already got their defence themed counter arguments prepared. Red button topics include the need for and duration of National Service, as well as the amount of money spent on defence... with no enemy in sight. When told by a natural orator in front of a crowd hungry for political entertainment, such defence themed jibes are likely to stir listeners into a frenzy because they touch on issues every Singaporean son can relate to.

Such political entertainment comes at a price and a dip in yardsticks used to measure fuzzy concepts like commitment to defence (C2D) is the least of the problems MINDEF/SAF planners need to worry about.

The real worry comes when vigilance fatigue extracts a price in blood from Singaporeans - whatever their age, skin colour or political persuasion.

The FY 2011/12 budget estimates for MINDEF/SAF are a done deal. This is the reality of a one party system. The green light to spend will not mark the end of the story. The real action starts when various political parties hit the campaign trail to woo voters to their camp.

Record defence spending may be needed to make Singapore more secure. At the same time, the billions of dollars proposed for MINDEF/SAF make the system more vulnerable to barbs from its critics.

Such is the irony of politics.

Singapore raises defence spending by 5.4% to a record $12.08 billion

News report from the Singapore media. Analysis of the Defence Budget will follow soon.


Budget 2011: S'pore to raise defence budget by 5.4%

From: Channel New Asia
Posted: 18 February 2011 1609 hrs

SINGAPORE : Singapore, which has one of Asia's best-equipped militaries, has raised its national defence budget by 5.4 per cent this year, government data showed on Friday.

The government plans to spend S$12.08 billion (US$9.5 billion) on defence in the 2011 fiscal year, up from S$11.46 billion the year before.

Singapore's navy, army and air force will get S$11.53 billion to buy and maintain military equipment, for the upkeep of camps and for payment of salaries.

The city-state currently has a population of more than five million, a quarter of whom are foreigners.

Singapore's economy grew 14.5 percent in 2010, the fastest in Asia.

The defence budget is about five per cent of gross domestic product.

National Day Parade 2011 - Singapore Spirit T-shirt design contest launched!

The National Day Parade 2011 Executive Committee (NDP 2011 EXCO) invites you to have a go at designing a T-shirt celebrating NDP 11's "Singapore Spirit".

For more, please visit www.facebook.com/NDPeeps

The Milnuts are proud to support NDP 11 and look forward to CR1. :-)

Advance & Overcome!

Singapore's Defence: The week ahead

The week ahead includes three items that Singapore watchers may want to pencil into the diaries.

These are:

1. Monday 14 February 2011, Parliament sitting
Debate on Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) training safety in the wake of the death of LCP Eugin Wee on 28 January 2011.

2. Tuesday 15 February 2011, 69th Anniversary of the Fall of Singapore
The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) will sound its Public Warning System to mark the occasion.

3. Friday 18 February 2011, Budget for FY 2011/12
Look out for the sum budgeted for the Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF). This is expected to be another bumper budget for MINDEF as the transformation of the Third Generation SAF advances further and as the SAF takes on operational commitments overseas.

Malaysian military operations that made headline news in the past 10 days

Regardless of whether Malaysian warfighters will fight to protect you or fight against you, there is no denying the amount of newsprint the Malaysian military has generated in the Federation's media in the past 10 days.

Print, online and broadcast media reports of Malaysian Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malaysia) operations around the globe tell Malaysian defence watchers what the ATM can do in peace and war.

In Operasi Fajar (Operation Dawn, a chapter in the holy Koran), ATM special forces showed how they will deal decisively with suspected sea pirates. No lives were lost on 21 Jan 2011 when a gun battle erupted between the pirate suspects and ATM commandos embarked aboard Bunga Mas 5 and a Fennec flying overwatch.

To those who know how the ATM trains its commandos, the end result of the firefight was a foregone conclusion even before the first shot was fired. The commandos showed tremendous fire discipline in rounding up the suspects – all 18 were captured alive. Had they wanted to, they could have easily shot and disposed of all 18 suspects on the high seas as the firefight took place out of sight of the media and far away from the big shots who work at the Defence Ministry HQ along Jalan Padang Tembak.

I hope Malaysian authorities are keeping track of the weight of the skinny pirate suspects, because the amount of care they are given under the custody of the Federation of Malaysia is likely to see them in a better state of health than before their capture.

In Operasi Piramid (Operation Pyramid), thousands of Malaysians have been airlifted to safety from the Egyptian cities of Cairo and Alexandria amid the chaos of a country on the brink of civil war.

Ops Pyramid may be a non-combatant evacuation operation conducted under benign conditions (i.e. no one is shooting at your forces), but Malaysia's ability to pull it off is a noteworthy counterpoint to those who speak dismissively about its joint force capabilities.

I am willing to bet that the vast majority of Malaysians ferried out by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (TUDM) do not even know the skuadron the TUDM fliers belong to or the type of aircraft fielded by TUDM. But whatever the case, the TUDM personnel executed their assigned mission as they were trained.

With operations unfolding in different theatres, the ATM also launched its third contingent to the Lebanon under MALBATT 3. Malaysia's ability to mount and support operations involving its air, sea and land forces, around the globe and almost simultaneously, says a lot about its potency as an integrated fighting force.

With Singapore’s Defence Budget due to be announced next Friday, budget script writers in Singapore would do well to ponder the ATM’s track record before blowing the trumpet for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).

To be sure, the SAF has had an eventful year conducting operations in far flung places like Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden.

But one would hope the script writers show some humility and restraint, as the SAF’s track record will naturally be compared against those of its neighbours.

Headlines scored by ATM warfighters in the past 10 days point to the Malaysians' ability to plan, execute and support complex, multi Service operations, in different theatres and time zones, at the same time. Ops Fajar and Ops Pyramid are likely to provide discussion points for staff level presentations in years to come, just like the SAF's Ops Flying Eagle is still talked about in the Lion City six years after the tsunami relief mission ended. The net result is likely to be a boost in morale within the ATM's ranks, with greater confidence in its combat and combat service support capabilities reinforcing Malaysia's steadfastness during a period of tension. Such confidence, even if misplaced, will dent the impact of a foreign opponent's deterrent posture. Food for thought for SAF mission planners and those who man the AFCP.

It would be a mistake to cherry pick past snafus, such as the Sauk siege in 2000, puzzling procurement choices and the botched live-fire exercise where a Sea Skua anti-ship missile decided to become a torpedo in March 2006, to talk down the ATM’s combat capabilities.

In my opinion, there is a disturbing among some defence watchers to do so.

Credit should be given when it is earned and the ATM has done so – rather convincingly in my view - in recent days.

Civil Resources in action: Malaysia launches Operasi Piramid (Ops Piramid, Operation Pyramid) to airlift Malaysian citizens from Egypt

Malaysia's largest strategic airlift operation, codenamed Operasi Piramid (Operation Pyramid), is the angel of mercy which is flying Malaysians to safety from troubled Egypt.

Ops Pyramid demonstrates the ability of Malaysian authorities to rapidly plan, mobilise and deploy civil-military resources for a national effort, at short notice, with no rehearsal and at long range.

That the operation is taking place five time zones, some 7,400 km from its main support area in Kuala Lumpur and demands that flight schedules tie in with Malaysian Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malaysia; ATM) ground support elements in Egypt illustrates the complexity of Ops Pyramid.

The operation's mission planners have on call three TUDM C-130 Hercules medium-lift transports, a pair of Malaysia Airlines (MAS) B-747 jumbos and an AirAsia A330 airliner. These planes are tasked to form an airbridge from Egypt to a forward staging area in the Saudi Arabian city of Jeddah, where the Malaysians will be flown to Kuala Lumpur.

In addition, the MISC vessel, Bunga Mas 5, now on Q ship duty in the Gulf of Aden as pirate bait, has been retasked for Ops Pyramid. The converted merchant ship, with TLDM special forces elements embarked, will stage out of the Egyptian port city of Alexandria.

The operation makes a compelling case for anyone who underestimates Malaysia's ability to harness its civil resources. Although it is premature to dub the operation a resounding success, early indicators point to a positive start.

In particular:
1. The Malaysian Defence Ministry (KEMENTAH) and Markas Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (Malaysian Armed Forces HQ) launched Ops Pyramid on 2 Feb'2011 with no funding. Money apparently came from Malaysia's National Security Council.

2. Wisma Putra (Malaysian Foreign Ministry) and TUDM air operations planners were successful in negotiating overflight clearance over eight countries for the C-130s. There were also issues over visas for the flight crew and other bureaucratic hurdles, which were subsequently sorted out.

3. Inclusion of Malaysian Army religious teachers from Kor AGama Angkatan Tentera (KAGAT) and ATM medical personnel to muster and roster Malaysia's citizens for the airlift is a nod to Malaysia's understanding of the principles behind sound civil-military relations (CMR). The air evacuation is a complex task involving a passenger manifest totalling some 10,000-plus Malaysians, drawn to air hubs in Alexandria and Cairo amid traffic chaos and civil disorder in ancient cities which, even in peacetime, are not exactly models for traffic planning. In addition, the Malaysians in Egypt will probably turn up in no particular order and in varying states of distress. The passengers will need to be triaged, with the most pressing cases receiving priority seats, and family/student groups may need to be airlifted as a group to preserve some form of organisational cohesiveness.

4. No less important is the contribution of mission planners in the Saudi city of Jeddah, which is the transit point before Malaysians are flown home. TUDM air operations planners are working round-the-clock to ensure the airbridge can be sustained with fuel, fresh water and flight crews who are adequately rested.

5 It is likely, and prudent considering the volatile situation in Cairo, that Ops Pyramid packs a drawer plan to ratchet up security should central authority collapse in Egypt and airports there descend into chaos.

6. As Ops Pyramid gains traction, the growing number of evacuees in Jeddah demands close coordination to track every single person before assigning them follow-on flights to the Federation. Some 160 ATM personnel from TUDM and the Malaysian Army are forward deployed in Jeddah for this task.

7. The media plan for Ops Pyramid has ensured that Malaysia's Rakyat back home receive timely updates on the mission. National media embedded with the Ops Pyramid team in Jeddah provide on-the-spot coverage that has dominated Malaysian TV coverage during the long Chinese New Year weekend - usually a dry spell for hard news. The professionalism and operational readiness demonstrated by ATM personnel in this unprecedented recall and deployment of Malaysia's civil resources is a great advertisement for KEMENTAH/ATM recruiters.

8. Lessons learnt from Ops Pyramid are likely to reinforce the Federation's ability to plan, mount and support an airbridge between East and West Malaysia using TUDM transports and civilian airliners. That such experience gives ATM planners the ability to surge its forces in either theatre goes without saying. It is worth remembering that long-range TUDM fighters like the SU-30MKMs have the reach and endurance to prevent foreign forces from interfering with Malaysia's airbridge over the South China Sea.

All the best to Ops Pyramid personnel. Ta'at Setia.

Singapore Armed Forces Training Safety Audit 2001 to 2010: A look at training halts

Four lives lost from RSS Courageous in the Singapore Armed Forces’ (SAF) worst training accident in the last decade did not result in a training halt.

SAF training also continued throughout 2009, the year which chalked up a grim tally of 10 lives lost. The year emerged as the SAF’s deadliest year from 2001 to 2010.

But two deaths in as many days in June 2008 spurred the SAF to order a “time out for physical and endurance training”. Both incidents occurred off Singapore island.

The first training incident involved full-time National Serviceman Andrew Cheah Wei Siong. He fainted on 10 June 2008 during a 2km walk on Tekong island, off Singapore’s Changi coastline, and died later in hospital. The very next day, a Republic of Singapore Air Force regular, Officer Cadet Lam Jia Hao Clifton, collapsed while on jungle orientation training several hundred kilometres away in Brunei. OCT Lam received a posthumous promotion to the rank of Second Lieutenant.

The three-day training halt was an extreme measure not taken since early 1997. The training halt that year resulted from two deaths in the FH-2000 chamber explosion in New Zealand in March 1997 and one death in Singapore when infantrymen picked up a Armbrust blind (i.e. an unexploded anti-tank warhead from a misfired Armbrust light anti-tank weapon).

The reactions of the Singaporean Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the SAF to training deaths spaced out over a period of time make a noteworthy comparison with official responses to a spike in fatalities.

As a Singaporean, I personally hope the theory that MINDEF/SAF will react more vigorously to deaths occurring one after another compared to a situation with fatalities spread out over time is never put to the test.

What is clear from the SAF’s fatal accident record is the Singaporean military’s move to call a stop order after training incidents claimed two SAF deaths in two days.

This may be prudent. It may have been done to calm public concerns and disquiet among NSmen. But such a move may also be read by defence analysts from neighbouring countries as proof of the Lion City’s aversion to casualties. If and when these analysts do so, it will whittle away the SAF’s value as a deterrent force.

It is this very point, which stems from the public’s hazy appreciation of when a training halt is called and when a situation does not merit one, that underlines why a clear and credible public communications plan should guide information management of training incidents.

While it is arguable that accidents will occur despite the best policies, leadership (or lack thereof) and good housekeeping, Singaporeans should never desensitize themselves to SAF training accidents and near misses.

The 42 lives that SAF training accidents claimed in the decade just ended comprised the following:

Singapore Army: 26 deaths.
Republic of Singapore Air Force: Eight deaths, including the loss of an F-16C.
Republic of Singapore Navy: Seven deaths, including an Anti-submarine Patrol Vessel beyond economic repair.
MINDEF: One Defence Executive Officer (DXO).
The deadliest accidents:
3 Jan 2003, Four RSN women regulars died after RSS Courageous was rammed by a container vessel.
11 May 2007, Two NSFs killed by a ROCAF F-5F which crashed into a warehouse in Taiwan. A third NSF was flown to Singapore for treatment but died in Singapore more than a week later.

We must not be afraid to ask ourselves how situations could have been prevented or risks mitigated in a military organization that trains more vigorously around the globe than any other armed force in Southeast Asia. At the same time, MINDEF/SAF must gird itself for probing questions from citizens whose commitment to defence (C2D) is a cornerstone to Singapore’s citizen’s armed forces.

Singaporeans have endured news of SAF training deaths for more than four decades already, which is why every training death is one death too many. If Singaporeans appear frustrated hearing the SAF's usual line that it will tighten its already vigilant safety regime, then such sentiments must be seen more as a reflection of the need for MINDEF/SAF to communicate its safety message better/more convincingly than a signal to beat down dissent.

MINDEF/SAF must reach out to rebuild trust and confidence in the national service system proactively and as behave a friend to its citizens. If it cannot even handle public reaction anger to a single training death or spate of safety lapses, I worry for its prospects in a hot war scenario where the likelihood of SAF NSFs dying in large numbers is high.

We can expect astute opponents to capitalise on such a perceived weakness.

And when situations arise which – to the layperson at least – appear to mirror past incidents, MINDEF/SAF should take immediate and proactive measures to address the natural concerns that the organization is not doing enough for its people or was asleep at the switch.

Concomitant with such measures is the need for officialdom to keep its processes transparent and open to public scrutiny. Nothing hurts commitment to defence (C2D) more than an opaque mechanism for reporting training accidents which lags behind what citizen soldiers and Singaporeans are saying about Our Army. In a worst case scenario, netizens may be the first with the news with PAFF following up with a somewhat belated news release. In such situations, MINDEF/SAF essentially surrenders the initiative to news gatherers who can work faster than its own information gathering cycle (i.e. planning-direction-collection-interpretation/analysis-dissemination).

A look at MINDEF/SAF incident reports for the 2001 to 2010 period reveals that the MINDEF website does not mention the deaths of 2LT Daryl Loh in February 2001, CPL Ricky Liu Junhong in November 2007 and the near miss in which a Commando was shot by a Thai farmer in 2010.

It also puzzles me why the loved ones of a full-time National Serviceman injured in the shotgun incident had to speak up before Singaporeans learned that the incident involved more than one soldier.

In addition, Singaporeans had to read a Forum Page letter to learn about the incident where Recruit Liam Kai Zheng fainted at the SAF Ferry Terminal in Changi and died in hospital a day later. The letter was written by REC Liam's father.

These lapses/honest mistakes do not win the hearts and minds of netizens. One would hope that the MINDEF Public Affairs Directorate (PAFF), which has at its disposal various communication channels in cyberspace, will use these tools more effectively in future.

Past is not prologue. But it would be ill-advised and simplistic to credit the SAF’s fatality-free record in 2010 to constant reminders on training safety issues. Was the excellent safety record due to, or independent of, the tighter safety regime?

SAF training halts should serve as a time out to improve the organisation and reinforce troop morale, not a cop out from reporting what Singaporeans need to know about their own armed forces.