Honest mistake in Peace Triton photo caption

Having been in the hospitality line since May 2008, I picked up a catch phrase from my F&B colleagues that applies to the messed up Peace Triton photo caption in today's newspaper - it only takes one roach leg to spoil a good soup.

Some netizens were aghast that after nearly 45 years of nation building, Singapore's main English language broadsheet, The Straits Times (aka the 90 cents newspaper), can let slip a mistake like "Royal Singapore Navy".

The "R" has tripped up foreign defence writers many times before, defacing otherwise well-researched articles penned by scribes who have yet to learn Singapore is a republic.

Surely the 90 cents newspaper would know better?

Whether you want to term this a glitch, human error or an honest mistake, the point to note is that a newspaperman's credibility can be sunk by what could be politely termed as quality control issues.

Years ago, a friend of mine bore the brunt of a news editor's rage when the then 55 cents newspaper published a photo of Oxford University upside down. His defence that he wrote an otherwise flawless story proved futile. The newsroom's stand was that a journalist earns his/her byline not just by delivering clean copy within deadline, but also for ensuring that the story is error-free from headline to deck summary to photo caption.

It is irrelevant whether the caption was provided by the photo journalist. Good teamwork should see photographer and writer check one another's work to ensure picture complements the story, and vice versa. My personal preference has always been to make space for good pictures and this is how seemingly mundane events like a Minister of State for Defence MOS(D) ACCORD visit to the Naval Diving Unit can end up splashed across two Home pages - the pictures were worth it.

To this day, that friend feels the Oxford Uni mistake was unfairly credited to his account.

In those days, the 90 cents newspaper took a serious stance against errors. Offenders had to bear the shame of having their mistakes pinned on the newsroom notice board along with their hand-written defence. Street smart journalists kept their arguments brief and took it on the chin; those who had yet to grow up spilt a lot of ink in ultimately futile defences which were pinned up for all to see (and laugh at).

It is no laughing matter when newsroom policy dictates that a journalist's bonus will be forfeited when three or more inaccuracies are kept on file for that work year. This is why some journalists try to hide their mistakes by bargaining with news makers not to report their oversights. It is unsavoury and less than ethical, but it has happened.

As a quality control measure, newspapers rely on copy editors to polish unedited copy. Some young reporters with poor news sense barely recognise their story drafts after copy editors throw it back to them to check the facts. In some cases, the only things left unchanged are the full stops.

Even then, mistakes are made - one memorable recent example being the case when the 90 cents newspaper published the wrong picture of a man who died during an endurance race.

Defence stories in the 90 cents newspaper thread the line between writing for the masses and catering to fact hungry defence buffs eager to pick a bone with the smallest glitch.

It does not help when journalists end up calling every man-of-war a "battleship" (warship would be a far safer catch-all term), every armoured fighting vehicle a "tank" and every automatic weapon a "machinegun".

During an assignment to cover the F-15SG Strike Eagle roll-out, a journalist sought my help with his copy. He asked what was the big deal with the Republic of Singapore Air Force's new warplane radars, since all fighter jet radars were also "AN" radars. I thought he was joking and waited for the punchline, then realised he was serious and proceeded to give a quick tutorial on United States Department of Defense airborne radar nomenclature.

This is where the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) should step in. If MINDEF really had a strategic view of PR, it would have invested in peacetime tutorials not just for defence journalists but all scribes down the line to teach them the rudiments of military hardware and jargon.

MINDEF's Malaysian counterparts in Jalan Padang Tembak have done so for years - please scroll back to my earlier posts to see how the Malaysians treat their own media.

MINDEF's (the Singapore MINDEF, not the KL one) investments in educating Singaporean newsrooms will help prevent red faces as somewhere in the newsroom's chain of command, someone is likely to pick up glitches like the RSN one.

Journalists joke that today's Page 1 story is good enough to line trash bins or wrap fish tomorrow. That may be the case, but military units the world over take pride whenever their units are showcased in the media in a positive light.

During my past visits to Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) establishments, I have always enjoyed seeing how SAF units take pride in clipping out - sometimes laminating - newspaper or magazine stories they like and pinning them on notice boards. Many of these stories were not written by me, but by local and foreign journalists whose bylines are the buzzword for credibility and authoritativeness in defence reporting.

It will be interesting to see how our Seahawk helo crew will explain to visitors that their birds cannot, as reported by the 90 cents newspaper, carry Aster or Harpoon missiles, plus the fact that Singapore isn't headed by royalty.

With the SAF due to receive more hardware this year and with military exercises ratcheting up their size, scale and complexity, Singaporean defence journalists will have no shortage of opportunities to showcase how crisp, clear reporting can tell a good story.

Failing which - as the "Royal Singapore Navy" episode clearly demonstrates - the rest of Singapore will have a good laugh at their expense.

God Save The Queen.

Blue on Blue: Part 22

Realistic war games ensure the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) trains as it shall fight, but nothing will prepare Singapore's citizen soldiers for the shock of its first casualties.

The speed with which SAF commanders stabilise the situation is critical in peace and war as their leadership has a direct impact on the will to fight among their troops... or lack thereof.

Back in May 1996, a Singapore Army war game almost went offline after two signallers were killed during a road traffic accident.

The 3rd Signal Battalion, which was involved in field trials of the Army's First Generation Command and Control Information System (CCIS), had to make the painful decision whether to proceed or shelve its part in the war game after two signallers were killed and one injured.

I am told that a Signal officer, Major David Koh (now BG Koh), rallied 3 SIG signallers and got things on an even keel with his firm, decisive leadership. The signal battalion not only recovered from the shock of the tragedy but went on to accomplish the objectives of the CCIS battle manoeuvres.

That said, there was a time to mourn and tears were shed by grown men as they came to grips with the reality they would never see their friends again.

Simulating casualties during war games will never come close to the psychological trauma that warfighters will face when body bags pile up. If the body count of just two soldiers during peacetime field manoeuvres can unsettle a battalion, it doesn't take much to understand the psychological perils of a shooting war involving the SAF's full force potential.

If the SAF mismanages the battle situation, that scenario could see body bags of teenage Singapore soldiers and middle age Operationally Ready National Servicemen (i.e. reservists) pile up in frightful numbers.

Psychological conditioning is thus a vital component of planning before hostilities. It can help SAF personnel recognise the nervous tension people will experience when coping with the loss of someone they care for. This of course assumes the hostile entity goes with the game plan and affords tiny Singapore a headstart in its defence preparations. Alas, we may not have the luxury of time.

Our ability to recognise that military operations carry substantial risks - despite the best efforts at minimising or mitigating such risks - is not the same as saying that SAF personnel should develop stone hearts towards one another.

Soldiers fight harder when they care for one another. Indeed, numerous studies have shown that in the heat of combat, individuals are prepared to make ultimate personal sacrifices not for volk, fuehrer or fatherland but for the soldier fighting alongside them on their left and right.

People watching the SAF have told me that Singaporean society comes across as being casualty averse.

Losing five dragon boaters at one go becomes a national tragedy. The crash of Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 pained the entire country and resulted in "live" television updates of the death tally.

It was pointed out to me that the Malaysian Army, by comparision, lost three paratroopers on the eve of Malaysia's biggest air show in December 2007 and the column inches devoted to the dead servicemen and women paled in comparison with SAF tragedies in the Lion City.

Whether we like it or not, foreigners have been known to look at our limited, behind-the-wire deployments to places such as Afghanistan and Iraq and argue that we are a citizen's army not prepared for the shock of combat.

In some ways, they are right.

The discussion on the level and depth of coverage that fatal incidents deserve is beyond the scope of this commentary on psychological conditioning. My sense of the matter is that the amount of coverage Singapore devoted to military casualties and other national tragedies reflected the sense of loss Singaporeans feel towards their fellow citizens.

That said, we should be cognizant of how foreigners view our attitude towards casualties. They may not view things the same way we do and will interprete the situation in a manner that advances their own agenda. This is Psywar 101.

Efforts to condition Singaporean warfighters to the brutal face of war must factor in the impact that information superiority will have on SAF personnel.

It is a military truism that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. This means SAF personnel must recognise and accept the hard, painful reality that a clash of arms may not swing in its favour all the time.

With Battlefield Management System (BMS) features such as Blue Force Tracking, BMS-equipped units are given a broader appreciation of unfolding firefights with more immediacy, detail and accuracy than ever before.

When Blue icons start to disappear, how will commanders and soldiers react?

In the past, soldiers had a worm's eye view of the firefight that extended a modest distance from the lip of their foxhole.

Today, SAF wide area sensors allow Singaporean warfighters to see first and see more. The theory behind BMS argues that seeing first and seeing more will, in turn, allow warfighters to decide better, act faster and finish decisively. That, ladies and gentlemen, is the theory.

If reality doesn't match the catchy tagline for Integrated Knowledge Command and Control (IKC2; known tongue in cheek by NSmen as "I can see too!"), SAF personnel may feel a sense of loss that the new fangled systems are not working as advertised. There is the concurrent risk that the shock of this eureka moment will have a destabilising effect on unit cohesiveness and the "will to" fight. Soldiers may feel let down.

Imagine a platoon commander who sits at the Line of Departure staring at his BMS monitor. Wide area sensors and battalion-level tactical sensors feed information to his display which show the positions of known Red Force positions, weapon characteristics and movements. Blue Force Tracking completes the picture by showing the position of friendlies. The PC takes comfort from seeing numerical superiority and believes the SAF is technologically superior to the Red force.

When SAF manoeuvre forces start moving into action, the wily enemy springs a surprise. Blue icons start disappearing with alarming speed, knocked out by heretofore unknown enemy assets.

In a pre-BMS situation, the platoon commander would fight his own war across a relatively narrow frontage that has been assigned to his platoon. BMS is a game changer. The Singaporean officer's worm's eye view has evolved to a bird's eye view, near realtime and 24/7. How would the Singaporean soldier react when he realises he is up to his neck in hostile territory and the odds are suddenly stacked against him?

The use of BMS also means that commanders will likely be tied to a command node farther from the frontline. I know this is a debatable point as I have attended SAF briefings that point out that the command presence will move closer to the action.

My point is that the current state of play of defence electronics demands a command platform with a certain footprint and a minimum number of plasma screens so commanders can make best use of the available battlefield intelligence. The SAF is unlikely to position such a command node close to the forward edge of battle area.

As the Israelis found to their cost during clashes north and south of Israel, heavy dependence on plasma resulted in a somewhat diluted command presence at the front line. The battle cry, Follow Me, had morphed into 21st century battle orders sent via text messaging informing such and such a unit of their next objective.

The SAF must never allow plasma to replace the value of command. "Follow Me" must never give way to an "After You" mentality, particularly for an untested citizen's army.

Moving forward, it may be worth the SAF's while to experiment with the psychological impact of BMS.

Try fiddling with the data displayed during an ATEC exercise or a large force-on-force encounter during an Air Force or Navy battle exercise and watch how the command staff react. Do this unannounced. Stack the odds massively against the Blue Force. Do it to a scholar officer gunning to raise his CEP, secretly film the moment and see what results. : )

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) must also be mindful how it calibrates publicity for its Third Generation SAF.

The transformation effort is a journey which involves constant evolution and adaptation.

From time to time, this journey may result in the SAF walking down what former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam described as "blind alleys". Truth is, not everything will work. This is what battle experiments and field trials are for.

MINDEF's spin doctors must therefore have the backbone to realise that publicising the 3rd Gen SAF means more than goading the national media to bang out heaps of praise, as is currently the case.

Is the current Public Affairs Directorate up to it? *crickets*

Heart of War

Today, the Singapore Artillery remembers two of its fallen gunners in an annual tribute it has carried out for the past 13 years.

The newspaper tributes pass almost unnoticed year after year, except for people familiar with the events that took place during the first Thunder Warrior artillery war game on 9 March 1997 in Waiouru, New Zealand.

On that fateful day, tragedy gave way to heroism as Singapore’s citizen soldiers and New Zealand Defence Force personnel fought to save the gun crew of an FH-2000 155mm field howitzer that blew up during the live fire exercise.

Full-time National Serviceman (NSF) Third Sergeant Tan Han Chong, 21, an artillery specialist, and NSF gunner Lance-Corporal Low Yin Tit, 18, died when a 155mm shell exploded prematurely in their FH-2000. The shell had been armed with a faulty fuze, sourced from the United States but actually Made in China. Go figure.

The gunners were from the 23rd Battalion, Singapore Artillery (23 SA). Eleven other SAF servicemen were injured and four were hospitalised.

Years before this blog was started, I noticed that Headquarters Singapore Artillery (HQ SA) would remember 3SG Tan and LCP Low on their death anniversary. At first, I wondered if interest would peter out after a couple of years.

But HQ SA has never failed to mark the occasion.

I may stand corrected but the Artillery formation is the only one I know among all the SAF Services – Army, Navy and Air Force - to have run tributes for so many years. Defence watchers who track SAF developments from open source material are likely to have arrived at the same observation.

I find the newspaper tributes very touching. HQ SA’s dedication to its gunners exemplifies the core value “Care for Soldiers” (in this case, “Care for Gunners”?). It is one of the seven core values that many Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) servicemen will probably be unable to recite by heart even with the threat of extra duty.

The gunners in 23 SA would have been refreshed several times over in the past decade and it is likely that few NSF artillery officers and gunners in the battalion would know 3SG Tan and LCP Low personally.

At HQ level, probably only a handful of gunners who gained firsthand experience with Exercise Thunder Warrior 1/97 are still in service.

But the tributes continue, reflecting the Singapore Artillery’s desire never to lose touch with its past.

The inquiry into the fatal incident produced results that could have shaken the confidence of a less cohesive command structure.

But live-firing exercises resumed and gunners’ confidence in their weapons was restored.

How long more the newspaper tributes will carry on is open to question.

Even if the annual tributes are dropped some day, I am confident that somewhere within the ranks of HQ SA, the two fallen gunners will be remembered.

At 23 SA, every round counts. So does every gunner.

Remembering 9 March

I wonder if they'd do it again.

Two views of Ops Crimson Angel'97

Singapore's largest air evacuation operation, codenamed Crimson Angel, made front page news in July 1997.

Denied an opportunity to accompany the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) as the Non Combatant Evacuation Operation unfolded, the Singaporean media had to be content with photographing the returning C-130s at Paya Lebar Air Base. That was the only photo opportunity that the Singaporean media was granted. If not for the headline and caption, one could be forgiven for thinking the picture was taken after a aircraft joyride at an Air Force Open House.

Almost a week later, a picture published by the International Herald Tribune (IHT) caught the eye of Singapore's future prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong. It captured Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers in action in Phnom Penh.

He said that "this single photograph spoke volumes for the professionalism and reputation of the SAF".

"It did more to improve the SAF's image than any advertising campaign," said Mr Lee.

If Singaporean photo journalists had been given the opportunity to photograph Ops Crimson Angel in-theatre, I am sure the Singaporean media would have showcased just what they are capable of doing when the shackles come off.

Better than any SAF advertisement

With Work Plan season round the corner, the Defence Ministry's spin doctors are likely to be polishing their arguments for more defence dollars.

A more insightful Public Affairs Directorate (PAFF) at the Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) would argue for less, because it can count on outside voices to tell its side of the story with more impact, literary panache and credibility than any PAFF organ.

Indeed, PAFF's weakened ability to host media embeds will count against the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in peace and in times of troubled peace. Don't even get me started on whether PAFF can support the SAF if Singapore were to fight a Wallaby or Forging Sabre-type battle scenario north of the border. Simply put: we can't do it and will lose the battle for hearts and minds.

In 1997, then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong described a newspaper lensman's image of SAF soldiers in action as one that "spoke volumes for the professionalism and reputation of the SAF".

"It did more to improve the SAF's image than any advertising campaign," Mr Lee added.

That picture was taken by a foreign media photographer who operated out of Phnom Penh's airport. He was not part of the media entourage that the SAF escorted to Phnom Penh aboard one of the 122 Squadron C-130s tasked to execute Operation Crimson Angel, the SAF's largest non-combatant evacuation operation. Indeed, the only photographers allowed on that flight were PAFF's own photographers.

There are many reasons why the media may not accompany a military operation. Lack of space is one, safety and security is another common reason/excuse. A defence information professional, say for example a competent Director Public Affairs, must weigh the benefits of capturing the moment for a larger audience, and push his case in situations where the value of publicity merits the presence of a credible voice.

In times of need, media pools are one way in which rival newsrooms close ranks to share resources.

I reproduce the article below, plus Mr Lee's comments published in the 90 cents newspaper on 21 July 1997 in an article titled "Better than any SAF advertisement".

International Herald Tribune, 10 July 1997

"Recently, the SAF mounted an operation to evacuate Singaporeans from Cambodia. The Singaporeans there had organised themselves, worked out emergency procedures, set up communications, gathered at designated places, and calmly evacuated from Phnom Penh. Their SAF training showed. The RSAF flew out 450 people from Phnom Penh on six flights in four C-130s. The operation went smoothly.

"The International Herald Tribune published an Associated Press photograph of the operation. It showed two SAF soldiers, in full battle order, checking two civilians about to board the aircraft, using hand-held metal detectors.

"A third soldier stood alert in the background, near the loading ramp of the C-130, weapon held at the ready. They looked totally competent and well-organised, which they were. The caption was factual: 'Singaporean troops conducting a security check at Phnom Penh airport before evacuating their countrymen'.

"But this single photograph spoke volumes for the professionalism and reputation of the SAF. It did more to improve the SAF's image than any advertising campaign." - Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister (now Singapore PM), Lee Hsien Loong, 20 July 1997

Now let's look at how PIONEER magazine photographed the same event from the safety of the C-130 cargo ramp.

The same event, photographed from a different perspective, resulted in a picture that in my humble opinion is less dramatic than the one published in the IHT.

PAFF realised the importance of media embeds and this reached the high water mark during Operation Flying Eagle when it hosted the largest contingent of local and foreign journalists after the Boxing Day 2004 tsunami.

The capabilities carefully built up since then have been whittled away, due to reasons which many of you will be familiar with.

Today's PAFF seems casualty-averse, going by the flurry of excuses they throw to Singaporean news editors and journalists whenever they ask to accompany SAF operations to places such as Afghanistan. Truth is, ladies and gentlemen, you could die just as easily in Singapore after being knocked down by a rogue diplomat or other assorted life-robbing events.

If roving foreign journalists can produce heart-stirring images that beat any SAF advertising campaign, just think about the impact such images can have on public sentiments if lensmen one day photograph the SAF in a negative light.

Not every operation will unfold the way we would like it to happen. In combat situations, particularly those on occupied territory, the SAF will have to work hard to buff up its international image.

It is true that allowing independent observers to watch your combat forces at work entails some risk to your public image. Red faces may ensue should journalists write about events, issues or observations MINDEF/SAF would rather keep under wraps.

But MINDEF/SAF defence professionals should have the confidence that the SAF will project the "right" international image and maintain the moral high ground.

No less important is having the backbone to roll with the blows. Afterall, a soccer match with a 1:0 result in one's favour is a match won. So is a match with a 6:4 result. You won the match even after letting in some goals.

This sort of mindset and strategic level of public affairs calls for a very high standard of defence information management, which is something beyond the capabilities that the current-day PAFF can deliver.

Are you surprised when high-risk SAF combat deployments to Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden received paltry coverage and local and international awareness?

Blue on Blue: Part 21

Trust but verify

Singapore's Home Team agencies can teach the Defence Ministry a lesson or two about "hearts and minds", looking at the high scores the Home Team earned in a "trust poll" conducted by the Asian Reader's Digest magazine.

The poll's results show that having truck loads of tax-payers money to burn annually on expen$ive public relations campaigns doesn't always bring the desired results. The Public Affairs Directorate (PAFF) at Singapore's Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) should take note (Apologies to seasoned followers of this blog for lack of creativity in the barbs... you would have seen this one coming.)

Results of the poll published in the Singaporean media today show that Home Team entities were ranked among the top 10 of "Singapore's most trusted individuals" as well as the 10 "most trusted professions"in Singapore.

Earning fourth place in the honour roll of "most trusted individuals" is Khoo Boon Hui, the former Commissioner of Police, Singapore Police Force.

Firefighters were given top billing in the ranking of "most trusted professions". Well done, Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).

Why has the Home Team - an umbrella team for security-related entities under the charge of the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs - done so well?

Why won't Singaporeans trust the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) warfighters who put their lives on the line 24/7 in security operations like Ops Bascinet, protecting people in Singapore from harm?

The poll was conducted in October 2009. It is said to reflect the views of 760 Singaporeans from a cross section of society. Respondents were asked to rank the shortlisted individuals and professions they had the most faith in.

I had never heard of this poll prior to cracking open today's newspapers and reading stories about the results. I'm also wary of street survey findings as these may not always represent general sentiments.

But seeing the Home Team share the glory box in the list of "most trusted individuals" and "most trusted professionals" made me wonder how MINDEF calculates the key performance indicators for PAFF's hearts and minds campaigns.

To be sure, PAFF's war chest isn't small. PAFF's media campaigns are the envy of public relations (PR) agencies in the Lion City, as they command top dollar in a market still reeling from the financial crisis.

Alas, the size of PAFF's budget isn't always directly proportional to the results, is it?

Government departments cannot craft their PR strategies in a vacuum. An organisation that fails to run as fast as its competitors will be out paced, out gunned and out played in the PR arena. The regular stream of positive coverage on the SPF and urban rescues done by SCDF firefighters probably helped cement the mental image of these Home Team agencies as trustworthy.

PAFF has an uphill fight winning the hearts and minds of the Singaporean public. Many cynics and SAF detractors have heard horror stories about SAF training accidents or mismanagement and distance themselves from the Singaporean military. To these people, the two years of compulsory National Service is a total waste of time. SAF to the cynics means Serve And Forget - so strong are the negative sentiments they harbour.

In addition, the urban myths passed from a father from the First Generation SAF to his Third Generation SAF national servicemen son will no doubt see such negative mindsets linger for at least a generation more.

This is not to say that no one trusts the SAF. There are many Singaporeans who do.

In my younger days, I joined the Navy Biathlon because it sounded like a good idea at the time. I had never done an open sea swim in my life, and went to Sentosa island's Siloso Beach early one Saturday morning to try out the route of the sea swim in the lagoon there. It was ill-advised to swim alone, so I hesitated and decided to mentally chart how I would tackle the course from the safety of the beach.

The Naval Diving Unit (NDU) showed up early that morning and a NDU fatigue party went about its work setting up buoys and lane dividers for Sunday's race. With NDU in the water, I felt I would be safe and went about doing my laps. Even with the signature tune from the movie Jaws playing in my head, I wasn't worried about sea creatures or the off-chance I would get into difficulties while in the water because the NDU combat divers were nearby. I never felt safer swimming in the sea.

As an aside, I should mention that the sea swim took place years before that fateful article in which I wrote that NDU divers played mahjong (it's a noisy Chinese game played with tiles carrying symbols and characters) during a certain SAF operation. I somewhat doubt they'd save me today.... : )

During the tsunami relief operation in Indonesia, concerned colleagues from the 90 cents newspaper and some friends wrote to ask how I was holding up during the operation. I replied I never felt safer. Close at hand were SAF surgeons, doctors, nurses and combat medics - a Singapore Army hospital in the heart of the disaster zone. I knew serious medical casualties could be heli-evacuated by Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Chinooks and airlifted to Singapore in C-130 Hercules aeromedical flights, if the need arose.

That knowledge helped me sustain the 25-day embed with the Operation Flying Eagle team. I left aboard RSS Endurance when the Tank Landing Ship cast off from Tuas Naval Base on 31 Dec 2004 and returned with the LST on 25 January 2005.

It was an experience of a lifetime and I would not have stayed with the SAF one minute more than necessary if I did not have faith in the OFE team.

I really wish I could say the same for PAFF.