Message from North Sea Boats in East Java after KRI Klewang caught fire on Friday arvo, just hours away from her first sea trial:"It’s very sad for everyone, but we will get through this and come out stronger at the end.
"And we certainly plan to go ahead and build again."
BT
VVVV
Sunday, September 30, 2012
Crippled wings: Time to relook Singapore's airbase security posture
You won't find Merah on Google Maps.
Despite its anonymity, it's a safe bet that this airbase-away-from-an-airbase is on the list of places to visit for foreign airpower analysts. If amateurs know, what more the professionals*?
If infiltrators embrace the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, detailed mission planning/rehearsal and elan that the 15-strong Taliban attack force displayed during the raid on Camp Bastion earlier this month, Merah would be hard pressed to resist a breach by even a small raiding party.
It is an irony that the deadliest Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) warplanes and helicopters are maintained and armed by engineers and armourers who carry nothing more lethal than a screwdriver during operations.
It is noteworthy that RSAF force protection troops were among the last to be equipped with the SAR-21 5.56mm assault rifle. They laboured for some time with M-16 rifles with iron sights** - rifles so worn out that their parkerized receivers were often worn away to a silver tinge by successive batches of full-time National Servicemen (NSFs).
For a period in the late 1990 till early noughties, we endured the illogical situation where our deadliest and most expensive warplanes were guarded by air force personnel armed with the oldest operational rifles you could find in the entire Singapore military. Had an aggressor called our bluff, the folly of this situation - having crown jewels guarded by ill-equipped jagas (jaga is a local term for night watchman) - would have been apparent to all.
It is baffling that RSAF Field Defence Squadrons (FDS) - so vital for defending the sharp end of Singapore's airpower - are treated almost like poor second cousins compared to Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) combat formations when it comes to rearming and equipping units with war material. Case in point: The V-200s used by FDS troops which are older than all the NSFs (and many Operationally Ready NSmen, i.e. reservists) who fight from these ageing vehicles even after the upgrade.
It is incomprehensible why our FDS - the Cinderellas of the SAF - are issued no side arm when scenarios for attacks on airbases will see them pitted against special forces armed to the teeth and then some.
Equally alarming is the almost complete lack of armoured vehicles in the FDS vehicle park. Apart from the V-200, FDS troops are asked to ride into action in soft skin vehicles like the Mercedes-Benz MB-240GD and MB-290 PSV.
If you believe in the motto "Airpower begins with Us", it will not take a great intellect to figure out who tops the target list should period of tension move from political bluster and diplomatic posturing to one of military action.
Whether by intention or strategic miscalculation, aggressors (both state and non-state actors) would want to have a go at RSAF airbases. Such infrastructure represents prestige targets where a successful action would lift one's market value up by several notches and make the world take notice.
Intruders who make it past the fenceline of an RSAF facility and penetrate into the heart of the Loop areas will find a target rich environment of expensive warplanes/helicopters and largely unarmed RSAF ground crew. It will be a turkey shoot.
This explains why case studies of asymmetric attacks on air force instructure (both successful and repulsed) should come under close scrutiny by defence planners here.
The September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion, the May 2012 attack on Pakistan's Mehran naval air station and the LTTE's raid on Colombo airport attack in July 2001 remind us why airbases have been described as the vulnerable strategic centre of gravity by airpower theorists. In all cases mentioned, the raiders had no air force to boast of, no proper staff college to study from and were not the kind of structured military force you would find in the IISS Military Balance.
These raids exemplify situations where air force war machines are not seen as elements to be feared, but targets to be attacked. Planned meticulously and executed with daring, an aggressor who fights with no exit plan usually gets his way.
When it comes to a situation of FDS versus special forces professionals who are trained, organised, armed and supported to create maximum mayhem, a special forces raid could cripple Singapore's wings more effectively than a raid by a hodge podge of warplanes attempting to whiz into Singaporean airspace on an air raid.
This is why the FDS force structure merits a serious rethink so that the warfighters charged with protecting Singapore's deadliest war machines get the tools they need to do the job. Warplanes and helicopters cannot be replaced on a whim. Considerations of cost aside, the lead-time needed to order, manufacture, deliver and commission a new aircraft makes the argument for a debilitating first strike against places like the Merah loop even more persuasive.
Over time, hardware can be replaced. What's irreplaceable are the pilots and groundcrew - which is why that multi-million dollar investment in trained fighter pilots must be fiercely protected. The RSAF must also be seen as having made best efforts in upping its active (i.e. FDS, area defence mines) and passive defences (camouflage, concealment, dispersal, intrusion detection sensors) so that any attempt at penetration will be stopped at the fenceline and the raid would have been in vain.
SAF force planners and RSAF publicists had better work fast.
When a special services group attains the critical mass, firepower and training needed to attack and overwhelm airbases, this special services group would offer their political masters a strategic option and represent a countervailing force against airpower.
When that day dawns, one must be perfectly clear who deters whom.
Footnotes:
* The number in the time stamp for this post should mean something to those who know.
** One could make a similar argument for soldiers at ammunition depots - "The heart of the Army's firepower". In the 1980s and 90s, many pulled sentry duty armed with unwanted SAR-80 assault rifles that combat formations rejected.
Despite its anonymity, it's a safe bet that this airbase-away-from-an-airbase is on the list of places to visit for foreign airpower analysts. If amateurs know, what more the professionals*?
If infiltrators embrace the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, detailed mission planning/rehearsal and elan that the 15-strong Taliban attack force displayed during the raid on Camp Bastion earlier this month, Merah would be hard pressed to resist a breach by even a small raiding party.
It is an irony that the deadliest Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) warplanes and helicopters are maintained and armed by engineers and armourers who carry nothing more lethal than a screwdriver during operations.
It is noteworthy that RSAF force protection troops were among the last to be equipped with the SAR-21 5.56mm assault rifle. They laboured for some time with M-16 rifles with iron sights** - rifles so worn out that their parkerized receivers were often worn away to a silver tinge by successive batches of full-time National Servicemen (NSFs).
For a period in the late 1990 till early noughties, we endured the illogical situation where our deadliest and most expensive warplanes were guarded by air force personnel armed with the oldest operational rifles you could find in the entire Singapore military. Had an aggressor called our bluff, the folly of this situation - having crown jewels guarded by ill-equipped jagas (jaga is a local term for night watchman) - would have been apparent to all.
It is baffling that RSAF Field Defence Squadrons (FDS) - so vital for defending the sharp end of Singapore's airpower - are treated almost like poor second cousins compared to Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) combat formations when it comes to rearming and equipping units with war material. Case in point: The V-200s used by FDS troops which are older than all the NSFs (and many Operationally Ready NSmen, i.e. reservists) who fight from these ageing vehicles even after the upgrade.
It is incomprehensible why our FDS - the Cinderellas of the SAF - are issued no side arm when scenarios for attacks on airbases will see them pitted against special forces armed to the teeth and then some.
Equally alarming is the almost complete lack of armoured vehicles in the FDS vehicle park. Apart from the V-200, FDS troops are asked to ride into action in soft skin vehicles like the Mercedes-Benz MB-240GD and MB-290 PSV.
If you believe in the motto "Airpower begins with Us", it will not take a great intellect to figure out who tops the target list should period of tension move from political bluster and diplomatic posturing to one of military action.
Whether by intention or strategic miscalculation, aggressors (both state and non-state actors) would want to have a go at RSAF airbases. Such infrastructure represents prestige targets where a successful action would lift one's market value up by several notches and make the world take notice.
Intruders who make it past the fenceline of an RSAF facility and penetrate into the heart of the Loop areas will find a target rich environment of expensive warplanes/helicopters and largely unarmed RSAF ground crew. It will be a turkey shoot.
This explains why case studies of asymmetric attacks on air force instructure (both successful and repulsed) should come under close scrutiny by defence planners here.
The September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion, the May 2012 attack on Pakistan's Mehran naval air station and the LTTE's raid on Colombo airport attack in July 2001 remind us why airbases have been described as the vulnerable strategic centre of gravity by airpower theorists. In all cases mentioned, the raiders had no air force to boast of, no proper staff college to study from and were not the kind of structured military force you would find in the IISS Military Balance.
These raids exemplify situations where air force war machines are not seen as elements to be feared, but targets to be attacked. Planned meticulously and executed with daring, an aggressor who fights with no exit plan usually gets his way.
When it comes to a situation of FDS versus special forces professionals who are trained, organised, armed and supported to create maximum mayhem, a special forces raid could cripple Singapore's wings more effectively than a raid by a hodge podge of warplanes attempting to whiz into Singaporean airspace on an air raid.
This is why the FDS force structure merits a serious rethink so that the warfighters charged with protecting Singapore's deadliest war machines get the tools they need to do the job. Warplanes and helicopters cannot be replaced on a whim. Considerations of cost aside, the lead-time needed to order, manufacture, deliver and commission a new aircraft makes the argument for a debilitating first strike against places like the Merah loop even more persuasive.
Over time, hardware can be replaced. What's irreplaceable are the pilots and groundcrew - which is why that multi-million dollar investment in trained fighter pilots must be fiercely protected. The RSAF must also be seen as having made best efforts in upping its active (i.e. FDS, area defence mines) and passive defences (camouflage, concealment, dispersal, intrusion detection sensors) so that any attempt at penetration will be stopped at the fenceline and the raid would have been in vain.
SAF force planners and RSAF publicists had better work fast.
When a special services group attains the critical mass, firepower and training needed to attack and overwhelm airbases, this special services group would offer their political masters a strategic option and represent a countervailing force against airpower.
When that day dawns, one must be perfectly clear who deters whom.
Footnotes:
* The number in the time stamp for this post should mean something to those who know.
** One could make a similar argument for soldiers at ammunition depots - "The heart of the Army's firepower". In the 1980s and 90s, many pulled sentry duty armed with unwanted SAR-80 assault rifles that combat formations rejected.
Saturday, September 29, 2012
KRI Klewang total loss after fire aboard ship
The Indonesian Navy's fast missile trimaran, KRI Klewang, caught fire yesterday afternoon while pierside in East Java.
Images uploaded from Friday afternoon show Klewang burned down to the waterline. Ship is a total loss. No word on casualties. Am awaiting further information from the yard.
The trimaran is made almost entirely of carbon fibre composites. Fully fuelled, the Klewang can embark 50,000 litres of fuel for her four MAN engines.
North Sea Boats explained in an earlier email that Klewang was built entirely in Indonesia, not merely assembled from modules shipped to the yard.
The shipbuilder said:"We built the boat from scratch. The rounded underwater hull sections were infused in a temporary wooden female moulds. The rest of the structure was built from flat, CNC cut, PVC cored, composite carbon fibre sandwich panels, that were infused on a large vacuum table, using room temperature cured vinylester resin."
The fire which razed Klewang in two hours unmasks the survivability of this class of ship. Warship enthusiasts would note that post battle analysis of Falklands war losses (especially HMS Antelope, HMS Ardent), the Exocet attack on USS Stark and the 1991 Gulf War (Coalition versus Iraqi fast patrol boats) persuaded naval designers to move away from aluminium superstructures to all-steel construction for a more robust ship design.
In the case of Indonesia's trimaran, the advantage of a lightweight vessel that was hard to detect on radar came at a price of a combustible design, as was vividly demonstrated yesterday.
The earlier post on KRI Klewang is found here.
Navy vessel catches fire in Banyuwangi
Wahyoe Boediwardhana, The Jakarta Post, Banyuwangi, East Java
Archipelago
Fri, September 28 2012, 9:37 PM
A fire raged through the Indonesian Navy's KRI Klewang-625 at the naval port in Banyuwangi, East Java on Friday at 3:15 p.m. No casualties have been reported but the Rp 114 billion (US$11.91 million) ship was severely damaged.
Indonesian Eastern Fleet (Armatim) spokesman Lt. Col. Marine Yayan Sugiana told The Jakarta Post that the vessel was undergoing maintenance by its builder, PT Lundin Industry. “The vessel had yet to be officially handed over to the Navy. It was still undergoing maintenance checks by PT Lundin Industry,” he said.
The navy, however, said it would investigate the blaze, which lasted for two hours before fire fighters managed to extinguish it. “We will deploy a team to investigate the cause of the fire. We will use the report to evaluate the case,” he said.
PT Lundin Industry's director, Lisa Lundin, said the company would deliver an official statement relating to the incident on Monday.
The making of the carbon-fiber composite vessel was initiated in 2007, when PT Lundin Industry undertook extensive research into building a fast, modern ship capable of evading radar. In 2009, PT Lundin started the construction of the 63-meter-long vessel.
Around 30 Armatim members were trained to operate the vessel in September this year. (ENDS)
Thursday, September 27, 2012
Defending neutrality: Singapore's position in the Pacific Rim land grab
If disputes in the Pacific Rim turn ugly and involve the American military, one of the first things Singapore will have to defend is the notion that it will remain neutral in the land grab.
Rhetoric aside, the presence of the United States (US) military on Singapore soil will befuddle any attempt by our diplomats to make us appear like we are uninvolved bystanders.
Singapore has long been used by the US as a swing around point for American war machines transiting to the Middle East from the Pacific Rim and vice versa. These include warships that come pierside at Sembawang and Changi Naval Base to top up on supplies and allow the ship's crew some R&R, to layovers for transport aircraft destined for places like Bahrain or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. On busy days, two to three MAC flights can be observed using Singapore as a stopover.
This strategic lily pad for the American military, so convenient for hops westward towards the Middle East or pivots east to (name your flashpoint) in the Pacific Rim, is likely to be closely scrutinised by policy watchers as they prepare their respective position papers.
In peacetime, the US presence will be noted by regional powers as a benign point of fact - something to be noted yet not quite a point of concern.
If and when Singaporean facilities make a clear, substantial and direct contribution to war machines fielded by the US military in regional disputes, such privileged access may compromise any noises we make on our neutral stand in the dispute.
This could spell unintended consequences for our city-state as we fall into the crosshairs of warring parties. Against regional powers with long-range missile artillery or strategic bombers, this crosshair could be more than a figurative reference as strategists work out their options against the staging area used by US forces in Singapore.
Once our neutrality is disregarded, Singapore will be ipso facto viewed as a co-belligerent in the eyes of military forces arrayed against the US.
Let us be clear on one thing: Access granted to the US to Sembawang port and Paya Lebar Airbase has supported America's regional presence under several US Presidents. But America's ability to project and sustain military power in the region is neither subservient to, nor dictated by, access to Singapore. The fact remains that US forces have long arms and powerful fists. Their forces can very well go it alone in terms of sustaining their show of force, unilaterally if need be.
So even if Singapore suddenly sticks its head in the sand and becomes a regional loner, the theatrics and power struggles between recognised, emerging and wannabe regional players will continue whether we like it or not.
Our national interests will be hurt more by our inability to sense and act ahead of the shifting tide; and our inability or unwillingness to proactively read overt and subtle diplomatic nuances and posturing between regional players.
The implications for Singapore's interests in contested waters and airspace are real and significant because our economy depends on free and unimpeded access to trade routes that ring the globe.
In such a situation, our diplomats could be caught in a situation that would really test their mettle.
Consider the strategic conundrums:
* Continue granting access rights to US war machines and Singapore may get sucked into a period of tension or conflict it does not want.
* Bar access to US warships and the city-state will earn the ire of the world's superpower.
* Open our air and port facilities to all foreign forces - regardless of flag or global ambitions - and we inevitably become a magnet for foreign forces waiting to square off against their adversary the moment they emerge from STW or our airspace (the Battle of the River Plate springs to mind).
The strategic grey areas that fall within the two extremes will put a premium on deft diplomacy and behind-the-scenes activity that ensure Singapore's national interests are not compromised.
It is heartening to note that such quiet diplomacy is already unfolding in pursuit of regional peace.
Monday, September 24, 2012
Malaysia Boleh! - Singapore Armed Forces wings its way Down Under for war games aboard MAS airliners
When it comes to moving warfighters across continents, Malaysia Boleh*!
Airliners from Malaysia's national carrier, Malaysia Airlines (MAS), airlifted the first wave of Singaporean troops to Rockhampton Airport on Saturday evening, ahead of Singapore's biggest unilateral war games in Australia, codenamed Exercise Wallaby.
Australian plane spotters observed two MAS Airbus A330-300 arrivals in Rockhampton (ROK) on Saturday night. These were 9M-MKA and 9M-MKJ, flown as flights MAS8726 and MAS8761 respectively. The airliners took off from Changi International Airport (SIN) on Saturday afternoon loaded with Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel. Please click here for their report and more pictures on the Central Queensland Planespotting site.
The commercial charter means that Malaysian pilots and flight attendants were among the first to get wind of the massive trooplift Down Under - before Singaporeans were informed of the upcoming military manoeuvres.
To those familiar with SAF doctrine, the use of Malaysian airliners to kick start the troop buildup for Exercise Wallaby would probably cause some chuckles, bearing in mind the simulated scenarios that will be fought across the Australian outback during the long, hot summer.
Perhaps there's no stronger signal of a warming of bilateral ties that having MAS deliver the SAF for one of the biggest live-fire exercises on its annual calendar?
The SAF troop strength in the Australian state of Queensland will be built up in coming weeks as the 1st Frame of Exercise Wallaby gets underway. The war game is an umbrella term for several component exercises staged under that name in Australia's Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA).
Six Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Super Puma have been observed on the ROK flightline and more RSAF helicopters are understood to be en route.
This week, Apache attack helicopters from 120 Squadron are expected to land in ROK, flown in partially disassembled aboard Antonov heavy lift transports.
Stay tuned for more reports. If you know of friends leaving soon for Wallaby 2012, please write in!
* Boleh is the Malay word for "can do".
Acknowledgements:
Deepest appreciation to the nocturnal plane spotters in Rocky. The year has flown by (bad pun) with astonishing speed and it's SAF war game season again Down Under.
Sunday, September 23, 2012
A fortified bastion in name only: Taliban raiders take on ISAF airpower in bold attack
In Singapore, warfighters are taught that air superiority and its loftier aspiration, air supremacy, will give the Lion City a decisive edge in combat.
In Afghanistan, opponents to the American-led occupation see ISAF air power not as a military advantage but a military target.
Events there a week ago saw six United States Marine Corps (USMC) AV-8B Harrier jump jets from Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) destroyed at Camp Bastion by Taliban infiltrators, with two more Harriers damaged beyond economic repair. The night raid achieved the biggest single day loss of USMC Harriers and was a toll on American warplanes unseen since the Vietnam War.
The Harrier unit lost their squadron commanding officer and a groundcrew from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 was killed. Nine others were wounded by the raiders, who reportedly donned US fatigues.
Taking a leaf from lessons of past wars, the attack on Camp Bastion's refuelling facilities indicates the raiders and their trainers who planned the raid understand the Archilles heel of airpower lies with the means to generate and sustain air power. The raiders also recognised that warplanes are weapons only when airborne. Aircraft on ground, both fixed and rotary wing, are stationary, high-value targets.
Losing fifteen raiders (one was captured) for the damage wrought is - by cold, loss exchange calculus - a worthy tradeoff in any language. Material losses aside, the raid will likely exact a psychological toll on ISAF personnel who think they are safe behind the wire.
Following the raid, their guard will have to be kept up even in supposedly safe areas with impressive-sounding names like Bastion. Forced to remain on guard constantly and faced with the chilling realisation that personnel wearing friendly uniforms might not be what they seem, nerves will be worn down sooner or later. When warfighters snap from the constant strain/uncertainty and are incapable of performing their duty, the raid would continue claiming victims long after the material damage is patched up.
The lesson for Singapore, which wields the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) as an instrument to deter aggression, is clear. Against raiders willing to pay the ultimate price, no airbase can be made secure.
This lesson has been vividly demonstrated in full-scale and brushfire wars from Biafra to Vietnam and all cardinal points in between.
RSAF airbases are protected 24/7 by air force security personnel grouped under Field Defence Squadrons(FDS), which are deployed for protection of installation, EOR security, counter MANPADS as well as counter attack force roles.
But while our warplanes and helicopters are under FDS protection, RSAF installations such as air defence units lack the ground firepower that protects military airbases against infiltrators. Action taken against such soft spots could rob the RSAF of its eyes and ears.
If ISAF airpower can be destroyed within the fenceline of fortified bases like Camp Bastion, out-of-base deployments by the RSAF during operations would put austere bases high on the hit list of special forces units on the other side.
Singaporean plane spotters have long known that airbase activities can be observed from vantage points around its long perimeter. In recent years, stories written in the 90 cents newspaper about the A-4 Super Skyhawk last flight from Tengah and the scramble at Changi Airbase (East) to intercept the Cessna Caravan floatplane were the work of plane-spotters who happened to observe unusual activity. The blog post on the crash of RSAF AH-64D Apache "Redhawk 69" came from the network of plane spotters less than 60 minutes after impact (please click here for the flash).
If you have a ground element who can observe and report air activity together with the underwing loadout, this heads-up can serve as an early warning to impending action as professionals can calculate how long a warplane can stay aloft on tanks and internal fuel.
As the Taliban has proven itself as a learning organisation, we are unlikely to have seen the last of such bold attacks at the heart of ISAF's airpower. Indeed, The Australian Sunday Times described the raid on Camp Bastion as the "birth of Taliban SAS" in A-stan (click here to read the article).
In Afghanistan, opponents to the American-led occupation see ISAF air power not as a military advantage but a military target.
Events there a week ago saw six United States Marine Corps (USMC) AV-8B Harrier jump jets from Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) destroyed at Camp Bastion by Taliban infiltrators, with two more Harriers damaged beyond economic repair. The night raid achieved the biggest single day loss of USMC Harriers and was a toll on American warplanes unseen since the Vietnam War.
The Harrier unit lost their squadron commanding officer and a groundcrew from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 was killed. Nine others were wounded by the raiders, who reportedly donned US fatigues.
Taking a leaf from lessons of past wars, the attack on Camp Bastion's refuelling facilities indicates the raiders and their trainers who planned the raid understand the Archilles heel of airpower lies with the means to generate and sustain air power. The raiders also recognised that warplanes are weapons only when airborne. Aircraft on ground, both fixed and rotary wing, are stationary, high-value targets.
Losing fifteen raiders (one was captured) for the damage wrought is - by cold, loss exchange calculus - a worthy tradeoff in any language. Material losses aside, the raid will likely exact a psychological toll on ISAF personnel who think they are safe behind the wire.
Following the raid, their guard will have to be kept up even in supposedly safe areas with impressive-sounding names like Bastion. Forced to remain on guard constantly and faced with the chilling realisation that personnel wearing friendly uniforms might not be what they seem, nerves will be worn down sooner or later. When warfighters snap from the constant strain/uncertainty and are incapable of performing their duty, the raid would continue claiming victims long after the material damage is patched up.
The lesson for Singapore, which wields the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) as an instrument to deter aggression, is clear. Against raiders willing to pay the ultimate price, no airbase can be made secure.
This lesson has been vividly demonstrated in full-scale and brushfire wars from Biafra to Vietnam and all cardinal points in between.
RSAF airbases are protected 24/7 by air force security personnel grouped under Field Defence Squadrons(FDS), which are deployed for protection of installation, EOR security, counter MANPADS as well as counter attack force roles.
But while our warplanes and helicopters are under FDS protection, RSAF installations such as air defence units lack the ground firepower that protects military airbases against infiltrators. Action taken against such soft spots could rob the RSAF of its eyes and ears.
If ISAF airpower can be destroyed within the fenceline of fortified bases like Camp Bastion, out-of-base deployments by the RSAF during operations would put austere bases high on the hit list of special forces units on the other side.
Singaporean plane spotters have long known that airbase activities can be observed from vantage points around its long perimeter. In recent years, stories written in the 90 cents newspaper about the A-4 Super Skyhawk last flight from Tengah and the scramble at Changi Airbase (East) to intercept the Cessna Caravan floatplane were the work of plane-spotters who happened to observe unusual activity. The blog post on the crash of RSAF AH-64D Apache "Redhawk 69" came from the network of plane spotters less than 60 minutes after impact (please click here for the flash).
If you have a ground element who can observe and report air activity together with the underwing loadout, this heads-up can serve as an early warning to impending action as professionals can calculate how long a warplane can stay aloft on tanks and internal fuel.
As the Taliban has proven itself as a learning organisation, we are unlikely to have seen the last of such bold attacks at the heart of ISAF's airpower. Indeed, The Australian Sunday Times described the raid on Camp Bastion as the "birth of Taliban SAS" in A-stan (click here to read the article).
Friday, September 21, 2012
Exercise Wallaby 2012
Air bridge from SIN to ROK about to be established, possibly this weekend.
Intent is to track and document all birds by type, in/outbound callsign, time of arrival and cargo loadout. Advance parties in-country ahead of 1st frame of exercise.
Good hunting.
Intent is to track and document all birds by type, in/outbound callsign, time of arrival and cargo loadout. Advance parties in-country ahead of 1st frame of exercise.
Good hunting.
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