Crippled wings: Time to relook Singapore's airbase security posture

You won't find Merah on Google Maps.

Despite its anonymity, it's a safe bet that this airbase-away-from-an-airbase is on the list of places to visit for foreign airpower analysts. If amateurs know, what more the professionals*?

If infiltrators embrace the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, detailed mission planning/rehearsal and elan that the 15-strong Taliban attack force displayed during the raid on Camp Bastion earlier this month, Merah would be hard pressed to resist a breach by even a small raiding party.

It is an irony that the deadliest Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) warplanes and helicopters are maintained and armed by engineers and armourers who carry nothing more lethal than a screwdriver during operations.

It is noteworthy that RSAF force protection troops were among the last to be equipped with the SAR-21 5.56mm assault rifle. They laboured for some time with M-16 rifles with iron sights** - rifles so worn out that their parkerized receivers were often worn away to a silver tinge by successive batches of full-time National Servicemen (NSFs).

For a period in the late 1990 till early noughties, we endured the illogical situation where our deadliest and most expensive warplanes were guarded by air force personnel armed with the oldest operational rifles you could find in the entire Singapore military. Had an aggressor called our bluff, the folly of this situation - having crown jewels guarded by ill-equipped jagas (jaga is a local term for night watchman) - would have been apparent to all.

It is baffling that RSAF Field Defence Squadrons (FDS) - so vital for defending the sharp end of Singapore's airpower - are treated almost like poor second cousins compared to Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) combat formations when it comes to rearming and equipping units with war material. Case in point: The V-200s used by FDS troops which are older than all the NSFs (and many Operationally Ready NSmen, i.e. reservists) who fight from these ageing vehicles even after the upgrade.

It is incomprehensible why our FDS - the Cinderellas of the SAF - are issued no side arm when scenarios for attacks on airbases will see them pitted against special forces armed to the teeth and then some.

Equally alarming is the almost complete lack of armoured vehicles in the FDS vehicle park. Apart from the V-200, FDS troops are asked to ride into action in soft skin vehicles like the Mercedes-Benz MB-240GD and MB-290 PSV.

If you believe in the motto "Airpower begins with Us", it will not take a great intellect to figure out who tops the target list should period of tension move from political bluster and diplomatic posturing to one of military action.

Whether by intention or strategic miscalculation, aggressors (both state and non-state actors) would want to have a go at RSAF airbases. Such infrastructure represents prestige targets where a successful action would lift one's market value up by several notches and make the world take notice.

Intruders who make it past the fenceline of an RSAF facility and penetrate into the heart of the Loop areas will find a target rich environment of expensive warplanes/helicopters and largely unarmed RSAF ground crew. It will be a turkey shoot.

This explains why case studies of asymmetric attacks on air force instructure (both successful and repulsed) should come under close scrutiny by defence planners here.

The September 2012 attack on Camp Bastion, the May 2012 attack on Pakistan's Mehran naval air station and the LTTE's raid on Colombo airport attack in July 2001 remind us why airbases have been described as the vulnerable strategic centre of gravity by airpower theorists. In all cases mentioned, the raiders had no air force to boast of, no proper staff college to study from and were not the kind of structured military force you would find in the IISS Military Balance.

These raids exemplify situations where air force war machines are not seen as elements to be feared, but targets to be attacked. Planned meticulously and executed with daring, an aggressor who fights with no exit plan usually gets his way.

When it comes to a situation of FDS versus special forces professionals who are trained, organised, armed and supported to create maximum mayhem, a special forces raid could cripple Singapore's wings more effectively than a raid by a hodge podge of warplanes attempting to whiz into Singaporean airspace on an air raid.

This is why the FDS force structure merits a serious rethink so that the warfighters charged with protecting Singapore's deadliest war machines get the tools they need to do the job. Warplanes and helicopters cannot be replaced on a whim. Considerations of cost aside, the lead-time needed to order, manufacture, deliver and commission a new aircraft makes the argument for a debilitating first strike against places like the Merah loop even more persuasive.

Over time, hardware can be replaced. What's irreplaceable are the pilots and groundcrew - which is why that multi-million dollar investment in trained fighter pilots must be fiercely protected. The RSAF must also be seen as having made best efforts in upping its active (i.e. FDS, area defence mines) and passive defences (camouflage, concealment, dispersal, intrusion detection sensors) so that any attempt at penetration will be stopped at the fenceline and the raid would have been in vain.

SAF force planners and RSAF publicists had better work fast.

When a special services group attains the critical mass, firepower and training needed to attack and overwhelm airbases, this special services group would offer their political masters a strategic option and represent a countervailing force against airpower.

When that day dawns, one must be perfectly clear who deters whom.



Footnotes:
*  The number in the time stamp for this post should mean something to those who know.
** One could make a similar argument for soldiers at ammunition depots - "The heart of the Army's firepower". In the 1980s and 90s, many pulled sentry duty armed with unwanted SAR-80 assault rifles that combat formations rejected.