Singapore's 12th Parliament: Gearing up for the Defence Budget debate for Work Year 2012/13

We're just months away from learning how much Singapore will spend on defence for its 2012/13 financial year, which begins on 1 April 2012.

Defence planners now punching out the sums can expect their budget estimates to be closely scrutinised not just by noise-making netizens but also by an increasingly vocal public who will speak its mind.

This past week, we saw a parent question the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) over the $2.50 surcharge each guest had to pay for refreshments at an air force graduation parade.

Such attention is not all bad because it beats apathetic citizens with zero commitment to defence.

If the Singaporean Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF calibrate their defence messages astutely, questions on defence spending can do much to strengthen awareness of, appreciation for and support towards our island nation's defence needs.

This will be a tall order in 2012. Next year's defence budget is expected to crown the S$12.08 billion defence budget for FY 2011/12 and the hike in spending will come amid harsher economic conditions and increasingly likeable neighbours.

Explaining why tax payers have to cough out more for guns over butter at a time when jobs are scare and pay checks are hardly growing will be a major challenge for MINDEF/SAF. Support for a citizens armed forces from Singapore citizens and SPRs is therefore a mindset MINDEF/SAF must work hard to gain, first and foremost.

This challenge will come amid increasingly warmer ties with Malaysia, Indonesia and the rest of our ASEAN neighbours. This is the second challenge for defence budget script writers because our chumminess with Malaysia, Indonesia and stronger support from powerful forces from the United States will make it tougher for MINDEF/SAF to explain big ticket purchases.

If the threat of outright invasion is remote or theoretical, why arm ourselves to the eyeballs with guns, bullets and bombs?

At the same time, calls for this island nation not to let down its guard against transnational terrorism may in turn trigger calls to scale down the SAF's conventional defence posture in favour of a purely homeland defence/counter terrorism force. It will be cheaper, less manpower intensive and more relevant to the security environment.

If this theme sounds familiar, it is because we heard the idea raised during the 2011 General Election by some Opposition candidates. Expect an encore if we experience a recession and spike our defence spending.

MINDEF's budget planners must be aware that debates in Parliament over defence spending, known formally as Committee of Supply (COS) debates, will take place in a House with an unprecedented presence from Opposition parties.

The COS statements tabled by MINDEF's three political appointees must therefore be robustly road tested before they are read out in the House to avoid being caught wrong-footed when the debate is in full play.

Defence-related public relations flops include the National Service Recognition Award (NSRA) and MINDEF's attempts at explaining the White Horse issue. That we hardly hear a squeak about the NSRA these days points to the lost opportunity at using this expensive scheme to cultivate better C2D. The NSRA is a good idea gone bad because of poor PR positioning, it has become the bastard child of defence PR that is best not talked about. What a shame.

What we are seeing these days is a concerted effort by MINDEF to showcase the new Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister of State for Defence Lawrence Wong Shyun Tsai and Senior Parliamentary Secretary Dr Mohamad Maliki bin Osman to citizen soldiers through the mainstream media.

They appear at every grip-and-grin photo opportunity in front of cameras and will get another PR platform at Exercise Wallaby in Australia.

Initial feedback that has trickled back to this blog from citizen soldiers who were part of the media opportunities is positive. The trio appear competent, well-briefed, able to hold their ground when meeting Operationally Ready National Servicemen (i.e. reservists) who may not have voted for the MIW in the first place.

Time will tell whether the PR coaching and behind-the-scenes TV screen tests will result in political appointees who can explain the sensitive topic of sky high defence spending in a convincing manner, not just to skeptical Singaporeans but also to neighbours who may rightly ask what all those war machines are meant for.

Defence planners who are shaping the Third Generation SAF must also ask themselves if the growth of SAF capabilities must continue on a linear basis with a newer war machine replacing an outdated weapon platform or weapon system.

Innovative solutions to defending Singapore may be a wallet-friendly alternative aside from simply renewing the SAF's arsenal when the life-of-type of weapon platforms and systems approach their respective use by dates.

When the Polish army went to war in September 1939, its cavalry regiments were acknowledged as among the best in the world. These had been developed and honed through the centuries and Polish lancers and other horse-borne soldiers were considered the apex of this capability development.

But German invaders broke tradition by investing in the panzer. Breaking the rule book on positional warfare, the German General Staff combined its panzer regiments with dive bombers, which they used as flying artillery, and airborne spotters orbiting the battlefield in prop-driven Fieseler Storch light planes whose incredible short takeoff/landing performance made them as versatile as today's helicopters.

More recently, Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon have shown they do not have to match the Israeli army tank for tank to draw blood.

Hezbollah's mastery of their home ground, use of fortified primary, secondary and alternate firing positions, liberal use of guided munitions to target armoured vehicles and awareness of the limitations of omni-present Israeli UAVs (most of which scan the battlespace in black and white imagery with a limited field of view) made Hezbollah fighters credible opponents against the Israelis.

Armour deficient with no warplanes or combat helicopters and no naval combatants, Hezbollah fought the Israelis to a bloody stalemate during the Summer 2006 war.

We also have to be aware that our vigilant defence posture does not end up breaking the bank. There are indications that the United States deliberately emphasized its space defence effort, dubbed Star Wars, to lure the Soviet Union into investing in weapon development on an unsustainable basis. We could fall into a similar trap if we mindlessly raise, train and sustain a numerically superior army without backing this with a credible public position on how such forces can win a war.

The relevance of these examples to an SAF intent on growing its capabilites year-on-year is clear.

SAF equipment due for replacement include the Super Puma/Cougar medium-lift helicopters, M-113 Ultra and Bionix 1 armoured fighting vehicles and Fearless-class Patrol Vessels. Fast landing craft are also needed to ferry the SAF's third MBT type, the Leopard 2SGs.

Our wish list is long and our pockets may be deep, but our threats are difficult to see or explain without ruffling the feelings of our neighbours or alarming the populace with a seige mentality.

Therein lies the challenge for MINDEF's FY2012/13 budget planners.

Whatever the case, the COS debate next year should be a show-and-tell well worth following.