The DIMwits will have a change of command three days before Hari Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.
Maintain close surveillance.
Watch LSE.
Monday, August 30, 2010
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Softening the defence burden: The National Service Recognition Award
Tonight's National Day Rally by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong provided ample fuel for debates on National Service (NS) and the part New Singaporeans serve in national defence, or more to the point, don't serve.
It also introduced a new acronym to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) stylebook with the announcement of the S$9,000 National Service Recognition Award (NSRA).
All Operationally Ready NSmen (i.e. reservists) stand to pocket a sum of $9,000 while serving out their NS obligation, which stretches to age 40 for Specialists (i.e. non-commissioned officers) and the age of 50 for officers and key appointment holders.
Details will be announced from tomorrow.
The NSRA's unveiling is a telling sign that the system has heard, sensed and has reacted to feedback from the ground about the defence burden. This basically centres around citizens' perception and unhappiness over the idea that they have been left to man the trenches while New Singaporeans get away scotch-free.
The post 9/11 era is one where Singaporeans have been made to realise that national defence is a pressing need. We live in an age where citizens have been bombarded with messages of vigilance through umpteen speeches and newspaper editorials. Many sons of Singapore have heeded that message.
It is thus painful for them to see the full weight of the defence burden borne by sons of Singapore while New Citizens chatter and play in the sunshine in their native tongues.
The argument that the offspring of New Singaporeans will serve NS carries with it the following assumptions:
1. That New Singaporeans will actually stay.
2. That New Singaporeans will marry.
3. That New Singaporeans who marry will procreate.
4. That the children of New Singaporeans are boys.
5. That the boys will not end up as NS defaulters.
The NSRA scheme is tacit recognition that there is an imbalance in the defence burden between New and Old Singaporeans. It is, however, a reactive scheme that is several years late.
One would have hoped that the NSRA scheme was introduced before the annual influx of 100,000 to 150,000 New Singaporeans hit our city-state. It was this influx - sudden and unannounced in timing and intensity - which chafed the feelings of Old Singaporeans, regardless of race, language or religion. Seldom has Singaporean society closed ranks as readily as it has against this influx.
But Singaporeans have been told it is for the betterment of society. Many grin and bear it, but there's no denying that if you peel back the academic arguments about national productivity, replacement ratios and the future of the city-state, feelings have been hurt. (I would have been alarmed if Singaporeans did not feel aggrieved, because it would only underscore the sad fact that they don't care enough for their homeland.)
Now that the system has heard ground sentiments, it appears to have swung into reactionary mode.
This step will flop unless the NSRA scheme is policed rigorously to take into account the feelings, sentiments and feedback from NSmen and their families.
Feelings and emotions are touchy feely. Hard to quantify.
But that $9,000 stamps a dollar value on how much the sacrifices of NSmen are worth. Assuming a full-time NSman Specialist completes his two-year stint at the age of 21, this means $9,000 spread over his 10-year cycle. If you do the math (or maths, as Singaporeans like to say), it works out to an extra $900 a year or something like $2.50 a day.
Cynics will probably have a field day jumping all over this figure, which can hardly buy you a meal plus drink at a hawker centre and counts as a one way ride on Singapore's distance-based-fares-will-save-you-more public transport system. It will, however, buy you five issues of PIONEER magazine, so I suppose that counts for something.
I would argue it's a positive development by MINDEF - and I'm not being sarcastic.
Now that the system has scrambled into damage control mode with a General Election looming, these are some issues the NSRA committee should take note of:
1. The scheme will have to be policed pro-actively to ensure the $9,000 is not whittled down to pittance by the inevitable inflation over time.
2. Some thought should be given to recognising the 700,000 Singaporean NSmen who have completed their NS obligation. They probably won't qualify for the NSRA. There will be cynics and incurable whiners who will poo-pooh the NSRA quantum. But I'd argue conversely that if you ask any of the NSmen who don't qualify for this sum, this amount of money is no small chunk of change.
3. A public education campaign is vital. No smoke and mirrors. No father knows best. NSmen deserve to know how that $9,000 figure was calculated. You know why? Because they paid for it in the form of tax dollars.
4. The system should consider being proactive for a change by telling Singaporeans what's next after the money is doled out. Is there a NSRA Mark 2, a Product Improved NSRA in the pipeline? How will the system be tweaked? Who will make the recommendations etc.
So we await the great MINDEF Public Affairs Directorate to creak into motion to inform and educate us all. Cue: Applause.
P.S. I intend to run a poll on this blog on the NSRA once details are out. Please look out for it.
It also introduced a new acronym to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) stylebook with the announcement of the S$9,000 National Service Recognition Award (NSRA).
All Operationally Ready NSmen (i.e. reservists) stand to pocket a sum of $9,000 while serving out their NS obligation, which stretches to age 40 for Specialists (i.e. non-commissioned officers) and the age of 50 for officers and key appointment holders.
Details will be announced from tomorrow.
The NSRA's unveiling is a telling sign that the system has heard, sensed and has reacted to feedback from the ground about the defence burden. This basically centres around citizens' perception and unhappiness over the idea that they have been left to man the trenches while New Singaporeans get away scotch-free.
The post 9/11 era is one where Singaporeans have been made to realise that national defence is a pressing need. We live in an age where citizens have been bombarded with messages of vigilance through umpteen speeches and newspaper editorials. Many sons of Singapore have heeded that message.
It is thus painful for them to see the full weight of the defence burden borne by sons of Singapore while New Citizens chatter and play in the sunshine in their native tongues.
The argument that the offspring of New Singaporeans will serve NS carries with it the following assumptions:
1. That New Singaporeans will actually stay.
2. That New Singaporeans will marry.
3. That New Singaporeans who marry will procreate.
4. That the children of New Singaporeans are boys.
5. That the boys will not end up as NS defaulters.
The NSRA scheme is tacit recognition that there is an imbalance in the defence burden between New and Old Singaporeans. It is, however, a reactive scheme that is several years late.
One would have hoped that the NSRA scheme was introduced before the annual influx of 100,000 to 150,000 New Singaporeans hit our city-state. It was this influx - sudden and unannounced in timing and intensity - which chafed the feelings of Old Singaporeans, regardless of race, language or religion. Seldom has Singaporean society closed ranks as readily as it has against this influx.
But Singaporeans have been told it is for the betterment of society. Many grin and bear it, but there's no denying that if you peel back the academic arguments about national productivity, replacement ratios and the future of the city-state, feelings have been hurt. (I would have been alarmed if Singaporeans did not feel aggrieved, because it would only underscore the sad fact that they don't care enough for their homeland.)
Now that the system has heard ground sentiments, it appears to have swung into reactionary mode.
This step will flop unless the NSRA scheme is policed rigorously to take into account the feelings, sentiments and feedback from NSmen and their families.
Feelings and emotions are touchy feely. Hard to quantify.
But that $9,000 stamps a dollar value on how much the sacrifices of NSmen are worth. Assuming a full-time NSman Specialist completes his two-year stint at the age of 21, this means $9,000 spread over his 10-year cycle. If you do the math (or maths, as Singaporeans like to say), it works out to an extra $900 a year or something like $2.50 a day.
Cynics will probably have a field day jumping all over this figure, which can hardly buy you a meal plus drink at a hawker centre and counts as a one way ride on Singapore's distance-based-fares-will-save-you-more public transport system. It will, however, buy you five issues of PIONEER magazine, so I suppose that counts for something.
I would argue it's a positive development by MINDEF - and I'm not being sarcastic.
Now that the system has scrambled into damage control mode with a General Election looming, these are some issues the NSRA committee should take note of:
1. The scheme will have to be policed pro-actively to ensure the $9,000 is not whittled down to pittance by the inevitable inflation over time.
2. Some thought should be given to recognising the 700,000 Singaporean NSmen who have completed their NS obligation. They probably won't qualify for the NSRA. There will be cynics and incurable whiners who will poo-pooh the NSRA quantum. But I'd argue conversely that if you ask any of the NSmen who don't qualify for this sum, this amount of money is no small chunk of change.
3. A public education campaign is vital. No smoke and mirrors. No father knows best. NSmen deserve to know how that $9,000 figure was calculated. You know why? Because they paid for it in the form of tax dollars.
4. The system should consider being proactive for a change by telling Singaporeans what's next after the money is doled out. Is there a NSRA Mark 2, a Product Improved NSRA in the pipeline? How will the system be tweaked? Who will make the recommendations etc.
So we await the great MINDEF Public Affairs Directorate to creak into motion to inform and educate us all. Cue: Applause.
P.S. I intend to run a poll on this blog on the NSRA once details are out. Please look out for it.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Forewarned is forearmed
In peace and war, forewarned is forearmed.
Knowing your opponent's intentions gives one the flexibility to repay an account in full and with interest.
However much energy, resources or determination one devotes to the quest for improved battle sense, the end result is never enough. There's always room for that additional nugget of data, that Easter egg uncovered that will make a report shine or give it unprecedented prescience and value.
No less important is knowing what to do with all the information amassed.
There are some secrets that will have to remain so forever. There are collaborators whose selfless and tireless service to the common cause cannot be unmasked.
During the Second World War, Allied commanders made doubly sure that success in breaking the German Enigma signals was protected and screened by elaborate disinformation. The Ultra intelligence gleaned from reading German signals - some of these decoded before the German recipients decoded their's - could not be used unless a plausible source could serve as the possible source of the tipoff.
On occasion, Ultra intelligence could not be acted upon because there was no plausible source which could have alerted Allied forces. For example, Ultra intelligence about U-boat sailing schedules could not be acted upon unless the Germans could be convinced that a loitering Coastal Command aircraft or patrolling warship had spotted the submarine.
To Allied commanders, the ability to read their enemy's mail was a godsend. The absence of any overt indications of thanks should not be mistaken for a lack of a deep sense of gratitude on their part.
Many books have been written about Ultra, more than a handful of movies have enthralled people about the shadowy world of intelligence work.
Even so, some aspects have never been unveiled and never will be.
More than 70 years after World War Two, the network of Allied agents in occupied Europe who helped downed fliers reach friendly territory has never been detailed. This network of informants and friendly agents served with distinction but have never been recognised publicly.
Their courage working behind enemy lines, fighting their opponent with total commitment, made a telling contribution to the war effort. Their service has been guarded by grateful handlers who repaid their loyalty by protecting their identities till today.
High level intelligence is also said to have come from within the ranks of the Axis High Command. After the war, several Axis generals aired the suspicion in their auto biographies that turncoats could have sabotaged the war effort.
Theories about double agents fuelled witch hunt paranoia among the Axis . But they could never quite get a grasp of the extent, number or determination of collaborators who had infiltrated their ranks. It must have been frustrating and professionally debilitating to sit in a room not knowing who would leak the precious secrets.
Even the best efforts of the Axis passive (PCI) and active counter intelligence (ACI) machinery proved no match for selfless individuals who knew in their heart they were doing the right thing. The infiltration was so effective and thorough that multiple sources of information helped corroborate tipoffs.
Used with discretion, these tipoffs exacted a heavy price from Axis forces. Attacks hatched by the tipoffs were relentless and committed to mission success.
Once information superiority was lost, it was only a matter of time before the Axis lost the war. They were made to pay a heavy price indeed for opening the account.
Knowing your opponent's intentions gives one the flexibility to repay an account in full and with interest.
However much energy, resources or determination one devotes to the quest for improved battle sense, the end result is never enough. There's always room for that additional nugget of data, that Easter egg uncovered that will make a report shine or give it unprecedented prescience and value.
No less important is knowing what to do with all the information amassed.
There are some secrets that will have to remain so forever. There are collaborators whose selfless and tireless service to the common cause cannot be unmasked.
During the Second World War, Allied commanders made doubly sure that success in breaking the German Enigma signals was protected and screened by elaborate disinformation. The Ultra intelligence gleaned from reading German signals - some of these decoded before the German recipients decoded their's - could not be used unless a plausible source could serve as the possible source of the tipoff.
On occasion, Ultra intelligence could not be acted upon because there was no plausible source which could have alerted Allied forces. For example, Ultra intelligence about U-boat sailing schedules could not be acted upon unless the Germans could be convinced that a loitering Coastal Command aircraft or patrolling warship had spotted the submarine.
To Allied commanders, the ability to read their enemy's mail was a godsend. The absence of any overt indications of thanks should not be mistaken for a lack of a deep sense of gratitude on their part.
Many books have been written about Ultra, more than a handful of movies have enthralled people about the shadowy world of intelligence work.
Even so, some aspects have never been unveiled and never will be.
More than 70 years after World War Two, the network of Allied agents in occupied Europe who helped downed fliers reach friendly territory has never been detailed. This network of informants and friendly agents served with distinction but have never been recognised publicly.
Their courage working behind enemy lines, fighting their opponent with total commitment, made a telling contribution to the war effort. Their service has been guarded by grateful handlers who repaid their loyalty by protecting their identities till today.
High level intelligence is also said to have come from within the ranks of the Axis High Command. After the war, several Axis generals aired the suspicion in their auto biographies that turncoats could have sabotaged the war effort.
Theories about double agents fuelled witch hunt paranoia among the Axis . But they could never quite get a grasp of the extent, number or determination of collaborators who had infiltrated their ranks. It must have been frustrating and professionally debilitating to sit in a room not knowing who would leak the precious secrets.
Even the best efforts of the Axis passive (PCI) and active counter intelligence (ACI) machinery proved no match for selfless individuals who knew in their heart they were doing the right thing. The infiltration was so effective and thorough that multiple sources of information helped corroborate tipoffs.
Used with discretion, these tipoffs exacted a heavy price from Axis forces. Attacks hatched by the tipoffs were relentless and committed to mission success.
Once information superiority was lost, it was only a matter of time before the Axis lost the war. They were made to pay a heavy price indeed for opening the account.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
The best customers
11 March 2023 update: Books Kinokuniya in Singapore has stocked Pukul Habis. Please visit its main store in Ngee Ann City or Bugis Junction, or check the Kinokuniya online store here. The title should be available via Kinokuniya Malaysia soon. Please enquire with the KL store.
For readers elsewhere, please check the Amazon sites that serve your location. "Look Inside" function on some sites shows sample pages.
Singapore: https://bit.ly/3XJzInH
1 December 2022 update: My first novel, Pukul Habis: Total Wipeout, a fictional story of war in Malaysia and Singapore, was released on Amazon in November 2022. Available from Amazon sites that serve your location. "Look Inside" function on some sites shows sample pages.
Singapore: https://bit.ly/3XJzInH
Australia: https://amzn.to/3ViaX0i
Canada: https://amzn.to/3VkjqQP Look Inside
France: https://amzn.to/3uenBS5 Look Inside
Germany: https://amzn.to/3XLcJc0 Look Inside
Japan: https://amzn.to/3gS2Loz Look Inside
Spain: https://amzn.to/3OSfi7S
Sweden: https://bit.ly/3GWq7UI
United Kingdom: https://amzn.to/3EZ6clA Look Inside
USA: https://amzn.to/3Ui3Eo1 Look Inside
My friend who is in the security business says he doesn’t even have to make a sales pitch. He just stands and waits for two questions: How much do I owe you? When can it be installed?
Spend some time with insurance agents and you will learn that their best customers are those who had a recent brush with death. Stage 1 cancer detected in the nick of time. Wanderlust brought to a halt by a near-death experience. A small home fire that nearly became a newspaper page lead. These are all it takes to convince skeptics that insurance is worth paying for. And they’ll pay till it hurts.
Spend some time with a friend of mine and you’ll realise why he says a prayer of thanks after every work day. He is with the Home Team.
I’m not sure what sort of paperwork he is privy to, neither do I want to know too much, but I do know he spends a great deal of time with threat assessments.
He says the threats to this island nation are real. And I believe him.
The security threats this country faces will hurt people using a macabre and cruel interpretation of the words of our pledge. They will hit us regardless of race, language or religion.
Sadly, the success of our security agencies working behind the scenes is also the source of their greatest bugbear. Success breeds complacency. It stokes a sense of smug security bordering on stupidity, a kind of blasé stupor that will not be shrugged off short of seeing the worst effects of a terror attack, blood and mayhem on our streets. This is the wake-up call our society is waiting for.
When it comes, are you ready for it?
Conventional threats, too, loom real in our neighbourhood.
Our neighbours know that sabre-rattling achieves little because of the round-the-clock vigilance by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and Home Team agencies.
Back in 1991, the combined might of Malaysian and Indonesian armies staged a parachute drop just 20km from Woodlands. The exercise was codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for "Total Wipeout"), which was a wonderfully chosen moniker. Indeed, some SAF war game codenames and targets on the simulated hit list would send a chill down our neighbours’ spines too. When Mal-Indo forces announced they would stage the Pukul Habis airdrop on 9 Aug 1991 - Singapore's 26th National Day - the war games resulted in an unprecedented open mobilisation of SAF armour battalions on the eve of National Day. The unzipping of SM1 light tanks from dri-clad wraps and engine start by the NSman armour battalion was widely covered by the Singaporean media.
In years that followed, such posturing was also played out in numerous incidents-at-sea in the waters around Horsburgh Lighthouse. The lighthouse is sited on Pedra Branca, an islet disputed by Singapore and Malaysia until its ownership was resolved by the International Court of Justice in Singapore’s favour (a day after my best friend’s birthday, I might add).
It is fortunate that the Malaysian military showed tact and restraint. Had the standoff flared into a shooting match, they would have quickly discovered that Horsburgh can unleash a lot more energy than the lighthouse's revolving lights. At the frontline were SAF warfighters who were deployed under operations that have never been publicised so as not to antagonise sentiments on both sides of the border.
As military provocations proved futile - indeed counterproductive as they only help thicken the Lion City’s national education syllabus – new tricks have been added to the bag.
Our island nation endured a virtual blockade of sand and granite in the past couple of years. This was enforced in the name of environmental concerns but was really primed to hit Singapore’s construction boom. Sand barges were intercepted and detained within sight of Singapore harbour. The sea blockade was later extended to granite shipments. Fallout from this blockade resulted in higher prices for home renovations and construction work and delayed the opening of the massive Marina Bay Sands integrated resort too.
It is perhaps fortunate that the blockade was confined to sand and granite. Had it encompassed food shipments, Singapore would have acted decisively as this counts as one of our vital interests. Ready at the frontline, the SAF.
The SAF and the demands of National Service (NS) are natural lightning rods for Singaporean critics - and there are many of them. We love to poke fun at the SAF. This includes everything from cookhouse food to scholar officers and war machines that are always several rungs down from what armchair generals claim we should buy.
But when push comes to shove, like the occasion in March 1991 when Singapore Airlines Flight SQ117 was hijacked by Pakistani radicals, everyone trusts and believes the SAF will magically appear and do the "'right" thing. The battle streamer that hangs on the flag of HQ Commando marks the successful conclusion of Operation Thunderbolt - the hostage-rescue mission spearheaded by Commandos. [In recent days, we've all seen how such missions can go belly up with tragic results.]
And in December 2004 and January 2005, when Singapore served as a regional coordination centre for relief supplies sent to tsunami and earthquake-hit areas, SAF logisticians and Combat Service Support units quite literally delivered the goods. The mission readiness and professionalism of CSS units, their ability to coordinate the sudden surge in flights, cargo volume and foreign rescue personnel isn't happenstance (look at how Haitian authorities were overwhelmed). Years of investments that built-up CSS capabilities and the Republic of Singapore Air Force's Air Movement Centre positioned Singapore well as a hub for regional relief efforts.
That said, all it takes is one ill-fitting sock bought from an SAF eMart to trigger a torrent of jokes about how farked up the SAF is. Haven't we all contributed to this stock of jokes at one time or other?
While it's now blue skies and sunny weather, one can expect the antics to continue in this neighbourhood despite the smiles and handshakes among politicians.
What’s next is anybody’s guess.
What's certain is this: Remove the reassuring presence of the SAF and the schemers will almost certainly exploit that imbalance of power.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Soldier scholars: IQ versus EQ
If emotional intelligence was an examination subject, how many Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) officers would score a distinction?
Having seen SAF officers on operational deployments on four occasions (Ops Flying Eagle (Taiwan), Ops Blue Heron I, Ops Blue Orchid I, Ops Flying Eagle 2004), I’m sure many would do fine. But a number of book smart scholar soldiers seem to lack the street smarts to make them true officers and gentlemen.
Case 1:
It was standing room only at the PBH briefing. Intent on getting his seat, a Lieutenant Colonel eyed the seated participants for a suitable victim. He found one.
Crouching over the junior officer, the LTC tapped his own shoulder epaulette and then pointed to the seat.
The junior officer got the message and vacated it promptly. Senior officers command that privilege.
Many eyes saw that incident and it became a talking point long after the war game had ended.
Case 2:
Lunch at Gombak was always a boring affair, so the branch head scholar soldier treated his branch to a meal outside the premises. He brought his staff officers to his country club where they enjoyed a hearty meal. Everyone thought they should buy a lottery ticket after that rare treat.
That single, once-in-a-blue moon occasion was brought up time and again by the scholar officer who boasted about how much he’d spent to feed his branch.
Such crass behaviour didn’t go down well with his staff officers who would rather he split the bill. It’s true what they say: there’s no free lunch.
Case 3:
Scholar officer had won an overseas prize which shares the same name as a twin turboprop transport plane. He was feted by the media but inexplicably disappeared from the estab of his service after a few years. Scholar officer had the smarts but lacked leadership. Zero charisma. Tasked with an S3 appointment during his command tour, he had to be virtually shadowed by a fellow officer as his CO felt he might drop the ball. The system wasn’t blind and the scholar soldier soon found himself on civvy street.
The incidents cited above come with real names left out intentionally.
Just as some officers poison their reputations with incompetent behaviour, there are many astute commanders who know just what it takes to earn the trust of men and women under their command.
I’ve heard at least two Singaporeans relate to me the same story of how a certain Singapore Army officer showed he cared for his men. After a demanding exercise, soldiers were taking a break when the senior Army officer swept in to speak to his men. He sat down by the longkang (drain) with the soldiers and spoke to them casually with no airs or ceremony. This made an impression with the battalion of Operationally Ready National Servicemen and reinforced the officer’s reputation as someone who cares for his soldiers.
In a citizen’s armed forces, leaders must earn the trust and respect of citizen soldiers.
Citizen soldiers (especially those who are Singaporean) are champion cynics. They will see through any theatrics from commanders who pull off PR stunts with an ulterior motive.
Being a tough commander isn’t the same as being an effective leader.
By the same reasoning, it would be a mistake to caricature a caring commander as being a softie.
Above all, it would be a colossal mistake to equate book smarts to leadership potential.
More than a handful of SAF officers have told me that the most important exam they took in their lives was the A Levels when they were 18. This is the benchmark the system uses to pick its future leaders and separate the wheat from the chaff.
They related how scholars who aced their A Levels ended up coasting through their university days – performing as well as but perhaps no better than the late bloomers who somehow botched their A Levels.
But once scholarships are minted and career endpoints charted, all these high fliers need do is watch out not to step on anyone’s toes or rock the boat too much. Creativity and innovation is needed in so far as getting the obligatory PRIDE Day submission in one’s P-file. And of course there’s the obligatory essay to the Pointer that proves one’s writing and analytical skills haven’t gone rusty.
Nobody likes a wild card in the pack. Same goes for an unpredictable maverick in a system where conformity rules. This is perhaps why most scholar soldiers seem cut from the same template: exam results which are virtual facsimiles of one another, attendance at an overseas staff college is a must, trophy girlfriends followed by marriage and kids by a certain age etc.
A contact who used to work at a particular Ministry of Defence department dealing with SAF officer matters related how he used to field cold calls from officers anxious to know whether they had been scheduled for a particular command course. You see, there’s fierce rivalry among ambitious officers to top the league table. Attendance at some courses, which are a pre-requisite for higher command, are treated as a leading indicator of the market worth of up-and-coming officers.
With their IQ applied for the right exam and charmed with an astute sense of EQ, high fliers can indeed go far.
But there are some scholar soldiers who fail the system with their absymal performance. To its credit, the system is smart enough to recognise and weed out these anomalies.
Don't we all know a couple of these flunkies?
Having seen SAF officers on operational deployments on four occasions (Ops Flying Eagle (Taiwan), Ops Blue Heron I, Ops Blue Orchid I, Ops Flying Eagle 2004), I’m sure many would do fine. But a number of book smart scholar soldiers seem to lack the street smarts to make them true officers and gentlemen.
Case 1:
It was standing room only at the PBH briefing. Intent on getting his seat, a Lieutenant Colonel eyed the seated participants for a suitable victim. He found one.
Crouching over the junior officer, the LTC tapped his own shoulder epaulette and then pointed to the seat.
The junior officer got the message and vacated it promptly. Senior officers command that privilege.
Many eyes saw that incident and it became a talking point long after the war game had ended.
Case 2:
Lunch at Gombak was always a boring affair, so the branch head scholar soldier treated his branch to a meal outside the premises. He brought his staff officers to his country club where they enjoyed a hearty meal. Everyone thought they should buy a lottery ticket after that rare treat.
That single, once-in-a-blue moon occasion was brought up time and again by the scholar officer who boasted about how much he’d spent to feed his branch.
Such crass behaviour didn’t go down well with his staff officers who would rather he split the bill. It’s true what they say: there’s no free lunch.
Case 3:
Scholar officer had won an overseas prize which shares the same name as a twin turboprop transport plane. He was feted by the media but inexplicably disappeared from the estab of his service after a few years. Scholar officer had the smarts but lacked leadership. Zero charisma. Tasked with an S3 appointment during his command tour, he had to be virtually shadowed by a fellow officer as his CO felt he might drop the ball. The system wasn’t blind and the scholar soldier soon found himself on civvy street.
The incidents cited above come with real names left out intentionally.
Just as some officers poison their reputations with incompetent behaviour, there are many astute commanders who know just what it takes to earn the trust of men and women under their command.
I’ve heard at least two Singaporeans relate to me the same story of how a certain Singapore Army officer showed he cared for his men. After a demanding exercise, soldiers were taking a break when the senior Army officer swept in to speak to his men. He sat down by the longkang (drain) with the soldiers and spoke to them casually with no airs or ceremony. This made an impression with the battalion of Operationally Ready National Servicemen and reinforced the officer’s reputation as someone who cares for his soldiers.
In a citizen’s armed forces, leaders must earn the trust and respect of citizen soldiers.
Citizen soldiers (especially those who are Singaporean) are champion cynics. They will see through any theatrics from commanders who pull off PR stunts with an ulterior motive.
Being a tough commander isn’t the same as being an effective leader.
By the same reasoning, it would be a mistake to caricature a caring commander as being a softie.
Above all, it would be a colossal mistake to equate book smarts to leadership potential.
More than a handful of SAF officers have told me that the most important exam they took in their lives was the A Levels when they were 18. This is the benchmark the system uses to pick its future leaders and separate the wheat from the chaff.
They related how scholars who aced their A Levels ended up coasting through their university days – performing as well as but perhaps no better than the late bloomers who somehow botched their A Levels.
But once scholarships are minted and career endpoints charted, all these high fliers need do is watch out not to step on anyone’s toes or rock the boat too much. Creativity and innovation is needed in so far as getting the obligatory PRIDE Day submission in one’s P-file. And of course there’s the obligatory essay to the Pointer that proves one’s writing and analytical skills haven’t gone rusty.
Nobody likes a wild card in the pack. Same goes for an unpredictable maverick in a system where conformity rules. This is perhaps why most scholar soldiers seem cut from the same template: exam results which are virtual facsimiles of one another, attendance at an overseas staff college is a must, trophy girlfriends followed by marriage and kids by a certain age etc.
A contact who used to work at a particular Ministry of Defence department dealing with SAF officer matters related how he used to field cold calls from officers anxious to know whether they had been scheduled for a particular command course. You see, there’s fierce rivalry among ambitious officers to top the league table. Attendance at some courses, which are a pre-requisite for higher command, are treated as a leading indicator of the market worth of up-and-coming officers.
With their IQ applied for the right exam and charmed with an astute sense of EQ, high fliers can indeed go far.
But there are some scholar soldiers who fail the system with their absymal performance. To its credit, the system is smart enough to recognise and weed out these anomalies.
Don't we all know a couple of these flunkies?
National Service: View from a foreign mum
The first concerns the gulf in attitudes towards NS among Singaporeans. Another red flag is the perception that NS is a sacrifice capped at the duration of a full-time National Serviceman's service to Singapore.
As increasing numbers of foreign-born citizens approach conscription age, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) - which account for the bulk of defence manpower - have little time to lose in calibrating their messages properly.
Every family that sinks its roots in the Lion City brings essentially the same mindset, outlook, fears and prejudices towards NS that Singaporeans harboured when conscription began in 1967. This gulf in attitudes between New Citizens and long-time citizens (Old Singaporeans?) is not easy to bridge.
Dumb down defence information messages for New Citizens and the tone of the messaging could be seen as smug and patronising by older folk.
Calibrate it for Singaporeans who have embraced full-time NS and you risk losing the New Citizens who have yet to buy into the lofty ideals of nation-building and national security.
More worrying is the fallout MINDEF/SAF will be saddled with should a New Citizen NSF end up as a training fatality. Going by probability and the rules of chance, it is only a matter of time before a training accident/incident/glitch that involves a New Citizen NSF triggers the proverbial wake-up call.
When the clarion call is sounded, will New Citizens be rattled?
And how will New Citizens who hail from caste-based societies react when their sons are commanded by someone from outside their social circle? Will centuries-old prejudices undermine their commitment to defence?
Chinese parents in the 1960s knew of the old saying that good sons do not become soldiers, just as good iron is not used as nails. After years of public education more or less erased that point of view, in comes the influx of foreign talent. The wheel has turned full circle and defence information managers may find themselves back at the start line, educating and engaging New Citizens with zero exposure to the military.
This is why MINDEF needs a Public Affairs Directorate (PAFF) at the top of its game. In my opinion, the time for rebuilding will have to begin in earnest after the Director Public Affairs (Designate), Colonel Desmond Tan Kok Ming, formally assumes command of PAFF next month.
Ms Giri's letter is useful because it exposes how expatriates feel towards NS.
She wrote: "I have often come across expatriates discussing how they can help their children avoid NS. To me, it is only fair that if one wants to become a permanent resident or call Singapore home, one should willingly serve because that is what every Singapore male does."
For Singapore's sake, one hopes her point of view is not in the minority.
If Ms Giri keeps it up, her attitude and pro-NS letters may, someday, win her a Total Defence Award.
Be that as it may, even converts such as Ms Giri seem to cling on to fallacies about NS.
She noted that "sacrificing two years of a man's career is a small price to pay for Singapore's safety and security".
This statement ignores the sacrifices that Operationally-Ready NSmen make every time they are called up for NS. It is an obligation that stretches till 40 for other ranks and the age of 50 for officers and key appointment holders.
So New Citizens will need to know, appreciate and accept the stark reality that NS is really a life-long commitment.
NS in Singapore is not a limited tenure, 24-months stint in which citizen soldiers serve and forget.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Embracing the value of sea power
When you think of the part sea power served in defending Singapore during the Second World War, it is likely that the failure of the Royal Navy's Force Z warships will spring to mind.
The tragic loss of the British battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, and the battlecruiser, HMS Repulse, to Japanese air power has a little-known prologue: some naval assets that defended British interests in the Mediterranean came from Singapore.
These include the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, which was based in the Far East, an entire flotilla of Singapore-based submarines and a shallow draft 15" gun monitor, HMS Terror, which lived up to its name harassing the Italian Army in the Libyan Desert.[Terror Camp in Sembawang is named after this monitor and not after the attitude of Naval Diving Unit instructors who lord over their tadpoles.)
Had these warships stayed in Singapore, the fate of Force Z may have been very different. This blast from the past underlines the importance of a balanced fleet and shows the telling effect that sea power, when ably led by aggressive commanders, can serve in a theatre of war.
Those who ask why these precious assets set sail from Singapore would do well to remember that Europe had been at war for nearly two years and three months while people in the Far East watched as bystanders.
In a war of survival, the Royal Navy needed every war machine at its disposal. Warships recalled from Singapore robbed defence planners here of naval aviation and submarines that would have complemented the weight of fire from capital ships.
A 64-page booklet published during WW2 by His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), titled simply His Majesty's Submarines, noted: "As diplomatic relations with Italy grew steadily worse, all submarines east of Suez, including the 4th Flotilla at Singapore and the 8th Flotilla at Colombo, were sailed for Alexandria to form the 1st Flotilla. Half of this force went to Malta; and when the war with Italy began, there were six British submarines there (two of them refitting) and six at Alexandria."
The withdrawal of 4th Flotilla from Singapore explains why Imperial Japanese Navy submarines had a free run of the South China Sea in December 1941. These submarines formed a picket line which detected Force Z as it made its passage north for its date with destiny.
The fact that half of the HMSO booklet sings praises to successful RN submarine operations in the Mediterranean tells us the impact these boats could have had in regional waters. RN submariners could have been sent first in, ahead of Force Z to protect the surface ships from enemy submarines.
The aircraft carrier Eagle was pulled out for the same reason.
The HMSO booklet, East of Malta West of Suez, recounted: "Early in 1940, Italian neutrality deteriorated into passive hostility towards the Allies. By the end of March, 1940, she had made it plain that she was only biding her moment to throw in her lot with Germany. The lull was nearly over and the gathering storm sent the Battle Fleet from home waters to the Mediterranean, and reinforced it with cruisers from the East Indies, the aircraft-carrier Eagle and some submarines from China."
HMS Eagle served with distinction in the Mediterranean. The RN recognised the value of naval aviation and paired aircraft carriers together with battleships and battlecruisers into task groups named after letters of the alphabet (Force A, Force B, Force H etc).
In that theatre, the battlecruiser HMS Renown showed that warships steaming at speed in the open sea were hard to hit. That the Renown was a sister ship of HMS Repulse is unlikely to have been overlooked by British planners who despatched the Repulse to Singapore.
The battleship Prince of Wales was no ordinary battle wagon either. The King George V-class warship was then Britain's newest battleship, bloodied during the Battle of the Denmark Strait during the encounter with the Bismarck and having won the affection of Britons for ferrying British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Newfoundland for his meeting with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. She was known fondly as Churchill's yacht.
After two years of operations in the Mediterranean, no RN capital ships had been lost to air attack.
British disdain for the "new weapon" (i.e. air power), as noted in the WW2 HMSO booklets, is spelt out clearly in this account of a clash with the Italians.
"The Warspite and her attendant destroyers were attacked by bombers twenty two times. Force C fifteen times; altogether nearly 400 bombs were dropped on the British Fleet during its return to Alexandria without causing damage or casualties. The new weapon had had every chance to prove itself a substitute for sea power and had apparently failed; in the confusion of the enemy's retreat to the Straits of Messina the Italian bombers were twice observed to be attacking their own fleet. The German dive-bombers had not yet appeared on the scene."
HMSO's text is accompanied by pictures I've not seen elsewhere. These show RN warships under heavy air attack. One picture shows the battleship Malaya (what an irony, considering where Force Z met its fate) sailing "unscathed through the forest of water hurled up in the bombing attack".
With more than two years of experience fending off attacks by two air forces in the narrow seas, one cannot be surprised at British confidence that Force Z would stand up to the then-untested Japanese air power.
The signal lessons for Singapore are as follows:
1. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) military history reading list should include British naval ops in the Med. This theatre should not be considered out of the syllabus. Understanding how and why British sea power remained undefeated in the Med is a key to appreciating the importance of a balanced fleet.
2. A study of Allied ops in the Med would also show the importance of timely intelligence. What the HMSO booklets do not mention is how Axis convoys were found and wrecked. Years later, we all know the part that Ultra intelligence played in betraying Axis intentions and destroying Rommel's supply lines.
3. Early SAF planners seem to have spent too much time fighting the last war. Singapore's defenders during WW2 had no tanks, a weak air force and relied on powerful warships for their defence. The 1st Generation SAF reversed all three factors - we had armour and plenty of it, a strong air force and the navy became the Cinderella of the SAF.
4. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) needs to maintain a balanced fleet. Sea power amounts to more than what its six Formidable-class stealth frigates can bring to the party. Photo calls with all the good and the great aboard these stealth warships should not detract from the fact that the RSN needs to keep its undersea, naval aviation, close escort (i.e. patrol vessels), underway replenishment and special operations capabilities sharp.
5. Some naval capabilities such as naval aviation will cost a pretty penny. This is because specialised warships need to be designed and built for naval air power. Central to the whole operation are the people who generate and sustain naval air power. Underfund the navy and you undermine the SAF's full spectrum capabilities. How much is the economy worth?
6. In the pre-Springboard era, the neglected Navy lost many officers and WOSEs. With economic prospects in the private sector continuing to beckon warfighters to hang up their uniforms for good, we cannot afford to have a similar mindset or the Navy will never make good its manpower losses.
7. The best drawer plans can sometimes be scuttled by events outside one's control. Pre-war Singapore had an aircraft carrier plus submarines. These were siphoned off to shore up the Med front. Drawer plans are imperiled by cost pressures that cut capabilities razor thin. Our one-per-ship assignment for the S-70B Seahawks is a good example - there's no spare capacity to go round. The cost per helo in the event we ever need to replace one will be far in excess of what it would have cost Singapore to buy spare airframes in the first place.
The tragic loss of the British battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, and the battlecruiser, HMS Repulse, to Japanese air power has a little-known prologue: some naval assets that defended British interests in the Mediterranean came from Singapore.
These include the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, which was based in the Far East, an entire flotilla of Singapore-based submarines and a shallow draft 15" gun monitor, HMS Terror, which lived up to its name harassing the Italian Army in the Libyan Desert.[Terror Camp in Sembawang is named after this monitor and not after the attitude of Naval Diving Unit instructors who lord over their tadpoles.)
Had these warships stayed in Singapore, the fate of Force Z may have been very different. This blast from the past underlines the importance of a balanced fleet and shows the telling effect that sea power, when ably led by aggressive commanders, can serve in a theatre of war.
Those who ask why these precious assets set sail from Singapore would do well to remember that Europe had been at war for nearly two years and three months while people in the Far East watched as bystanders.
In a war of survival, the Royal Navy needed every war machine at its disposal. Warships recalled from Singapore robbed defence planners here of naval aviation and submarines that would have complemented the weight of fire from capital ships.
A 64-page booklet published during WW2 by His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), titled simply His Majesty's Submarines, noted: "As diplomatic relations with Italy grew steadily worse, all submarines east of Suez, including the 4th Flotilla at Singapore and the 8th Flotilla at Colombo, were sailed for Alexandria to form the 1st Flotilla. Half of this force went to Malta; and when the war with Italy began, there were six British submarines there (two of them refitting) and six at Alexandria."
The withdrawal of 4th Flotilla from Singapore explains why Imperial Japanese Navy submarines had a free run of the South China Sea in December 1941. These submarines formed a picket line which detected Force Z as it made its passage north for its date with destiny.
The fact that half of the HMSO booklet sings praises to successful RN submarine operations in the Mediterranean tells us the impact these boats could have had in regional waters. RN submariners could have been sent first in, ahead of Force Z to protect the surface ships from enemy submarines.
The aircraft carrier Eagle was pulled out for the same reason.
The HMSO booklet, East of Malta West of Suez, recounted: "Early in 1940, Italian neutrality deteriorated into passive hostility towards the Allies. By the end of March, 1940, she had made it plain that she was only biding her moment to throw in her lot with Germany. The lull was nearly over and the gathering storm sent the Battle Fleet from home waters to the Mediterranean, and reinforced it with cruisers from the East Indies, the aircraft-carrier Eagle and some submarines from China."
HMS Eagle served with distinction in the Mediterranean. The RN recognised the value of naval aviation and paired aircraft carriers together with battleships and battlecruisers into task groups named after letters of the alphabet (Force A, Force B, Force H etc).
In that theatre, the battlecruiser HMS Renown showed that warships steaming at speed in the open sea were hard to hit. That the Renown was a sister ship of HMS Repulse is unlikely to have been overlooked by British planners who despatched the Repulse to Singapore.
The battleship Prince of Wales was no ordinary battle wagon either. The King George V-class warship was then Britain's newest battleship, bloodied during the Battle of the Denmark Strait during the encounter with the Bismarck and having won the affection of Britons for ferrying British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Newfoundland for his meeting with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. She was known fondly as Churchill's yacht.
After two years of operations in the Mediterranean, no RN capital ships had been lost to air attack.
British disdain for the "new weapon" (i.e. air power), as noted in the WW2 HMSO booklets, is spelt out clearly in this account of a clash with the Italians.
"The Warspite and her attendant destroyers were attacked by bombers twenty two times. Force C fifteen times; altogether nearly 400 bombs were dropped on the British Fleet during its return to Alexandria without causing damage or casualties. The new weapon had had every chance to prove itself a substitute for sea power and had apparently failed; in the confusion of the enemy's retreat to the Straits of Messina the Italian bombers were twice observed to be attacking their own fleet. The German dive-bombers had not yet appeared on the scene."
HMSO's text is accompanied by pictures I've not seen elsewhere. These show RN warships under heavy air attack. One picture shows the battleship Malaya (what an irony, considering where Force Z met its fate) sailing "unscathed through the forest of water hurled up in the bombing attack".
With more than two years of experience fending off attacks by two air forces in the narrow seas, one cannot be surprised at British confidence that Force Z would stand up to the then-untested Japanese air power.
The signal lessons for Singapore are as follows:
1. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) military history reading list should include British naval ops in the Med. This theatre should not be considered out of the syllabus. Understanding how and why British sea power remained undefeated in the Med is a key to appreciating the importance of a balanced fleet.
2. A study of Allied ops in the Med would also show the importance of timely intelligence. What the HMSO booklets do not mention is how Axis convoys were found and wrecked. Years later, we all know the part that Ultra intelligence played in betraying Axis intentions and destroying Rommel's supply lines.
3. Early SAF planners seem to have spent too much time fighting the last war. Singapore's defenders during WW2 had no tanks, a weak air force and relied on powerful warships for their defence. The 1st Generation SAF reversed all three factors - we had armour and plenty of it, a strong air force and the navy became the Cinderella of the SAF.
4. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) needs to maintain a balanced fleet. Sea power amounts to more than what its six Formidable-class stealth frigates can bring to the party. Photo calls with all the good and the great aboard these stealth warships should not detract from the fact that the RSN needs to keep its undersea, naval aviation, close escort (i.e. patrol vessels), underway replenishment and special operations capabilities sharp.
5. Some naval capabilities such as naval aviation will cost a pretty penny. This is because specialised warships need to be designed and built for naval air power. Central to the whole operation are the people who generate and sustain naval air power. Underfund the navy and you undermine the SAF's full spectrum capabilities. How much is the economy worth?
6. In the pre-Springboard era, the neglected Navy lost many officers and WOSEs. With economic prospects in the private sector continuing to beckon warfighters to hang up their uniforms for good, we cannot afford to have a similar mindset or the Navy will never make good its manpower losses.
7. The best drawer plans can sometimes be scuttled by events outside one's control. Pre-war Singapore had an aircraft carrier plus submarines. These were siphoned off to shore up the Med front. Drawer plans are imperiled by cost pressures that cut capabilities razor thin. Our one-per-ship assignment for the S-70B Seahawks is a good example - there's no spare capacity to go round. The cost per helo in the event we ever need to replace one will be far in excess of what it would have cost Singapore to buy spare airframes in the first place.
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