Deal or no deal? Decision awaited on whether the F-35 will join the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)

Today's Straits Times report* headlined "S. Korea to buy 40 F-35 stealth fighters"' is a dress rehearsal for how the local media will describe the warplane if and when Singapore updates its fighter fleet.

If the Lockheed-Martin (LMCO) warplane is going to be touted by the Singaporean media as a "stealth fighter", one would hope our home audience of tax payers is discerning enough to know their war machines.

That's because in the world of low observable (aka "stealth") technology, there are stealth fighters and there are stealth fighters.

Clever marketing campaigns, below-the-radar lobbying and clueless newsrooms often conspire to upsell stealth wannabes as the real thing, when in reality the warplane falls short in the real world test of fighter jet versus integrated air defence system.

In the case of the LMCO F-35 Lightning II, design features such as its angular fuselage which make the fighter less observable have elevated the platform's status to that of a stealth fighter.

But what's linguistically correct may not pass muster in the eyes of discerning military buyers and knowledgeable defence scientists.

A warplane with low observable features does not magically transform into a stealth fighter just because one wishes it to. It would, for example, take an F-35 driver with boundless/misplaced optimism to fly against an island air defence system (like Singapore's) armed with current-day technology to deliver the miserable two bombs on target. If you wish, you could even pit an F-35 against an Su-30, like the ones they have up north, in a one-to-one gladiatorial contest and see if it can fly out again after stirring the hornet's nest.

That the F-35 has got short legs and a modest payload (to phrase it politely) counts against it. Ditto its uninspiring capabilities when pitted against current day dogfighters such as the F-16 or Su-30.

While the "stealth fighter" tagline is an instant conversation starter for defence buffs who are pro or anti-F-35, the stand first of the same article that said the warplane is a "costly jet" stands on firmer ground.

Hefty price tag
Even as the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and air warfare planners in the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) mull over the shape, form and lethality of Singapore's future air power capability, there are segments of defence-aware Singaporeans who have expressed private misgivings about the F-35's purported flyaway cost.

In and around Bukit Gombak, the figure touted is in the region of US$200 million per plane.

Now, you can argue that Singapore's peace and security is priceless. But there are many ways to defend our skies and the sound of freedom need not thunder out of the nozzle of a F-35B.

Options include buying more Boeing F-15 Strike Eagles, with bar talk suggesting that Singapore can buy several top-end F-15s for the price of a single F-35B.

Looking in the years ahead, there are unmanned options the RSAF can consider and if you are part of this conversation, there's no need to elaborate.

To be sure, the vision of overcoming land constraints by putting frontline military aviation on surface platforms is alluring. From a force survivability and operational flexibility point of view, there are convincing arguments for having strike aircraft based off mainland Singapore. The scenarios projected are interesting and yes, Singapore must start somewhere if potential game-changers are to be added to the list of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) capability options.

However, Singapore's air warfare planners must be self-aware that tech infatuation is a malady that may afflict military minds subjected to LMCO's relentless marketing blitz to find and secure buyers for the costly fighter.

We must also remember that the aggressive push by the United States to grow the F-35 fraternity is made with its self interest in mind, as it fights to enlarge the pool of buyers to make it economically sensible to commence F-35 low-rate initial production.

High-low fighter force
Not mentioned in the article on South Korea's decision on the F-35 is its stablemate, the F-22 Raptor.

Air warfare professionals have noted that since the 1970s, the United States Air Force fighter fleet has been raised on a high-low concept, with a high performance fighter complemented by larger numbers of fighters with a more modest performance envelope.

The high-low mix was defined by the F-15s and F-16s. Not for nothing is the F-15SG described as Singapore's most capable fighter, even though in terms of product evolution, the F-15's product life cycle actually began years before that which led to the General Dynamics YF-16 lightweight fighter. The RSAF's present day order of battle which comprises F-15SGs and a large flock of three variants of the F-16 (we fly Southeast Asia's largest F-16 fleet) is the state-of-the-art that has been combat proven by the Israelis and is a combination also adopted by the South Koreans.

In theory, today's USAF sees itself fighting with a high-low mix comprising F-22s and F-35s.

The F-22 is not for sale, owing to its superior technology and low observable features that are said to give American fighter pilots  a winning edge against fifth generation fighter platforms. As far as stealth fighters go, the F-22 is the Real McCoy.

So countries which hanker for the F-35 are not in the same league, developmental cycle wise, as those which aspired to add the F-15 Eagle to their air force once upon a time in order to achieve the high-low mix. Countries that want the F-35 must realise they are chasing the "low" in the high-low mix as the F-22  is not for sale.

With the Singapore Airshow 2014 around the corner, you can bet LMCO will go great guns to tout the F-35 as the fighter for the future.

But with the F-22 - also made by LMCO - barred from its sales catalogue, Lockheed salesfolk have no option but to bet the farm on that costly fighter.

As for the Singapore media - so prone to calling every armoured vehicle a tank and every large warship a battleship - let's hope the defence writers can tell rhetoric from reality.


* The story on South Korea's decision on the F-35, plucked from wire agencies, could have been copy edited to sieve out the marketing fluff.