Fighting ships deserve a fighting chance: Time to relook naval base security

Block 214 Bravo, Changi Naval Base (CNB), is unique among all of Singapore's naval facilities. It houses the only sheltered - some would say blast-resistant - berths built for the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).

Inside the stout walls of this otherwise plain looking, box-like structure alongside CNB's East Wharf are berths where the RSN's diesel-electric submarines can be secured pierside where the sun doesn't shine.

Even in daytime, work that takes place inside Blk 214 Bravo is done under artificial lighting by 171 Squadron's submariners, whose corporate office at Block 214 is a short walk across the concrete hardstanding and overlooks the massive structure.

The submarine pens are the only passive defence for Singapore's warships at the naval base. All other men-of-war that call CNB home such as the Formidable-class stealth frigates, Endurance-class tank landing ships and assorted small craft used by the Base Defence Squadron remain unprotected by physical infrastructure like hardened walls.

Enter the Sea Soldiers, the Singapore Navy's post 9/11 answer to the heightened security climate.

The RSN has had servicemen guarding its warships and bases since eons ago. To test its drawer plans, HQ RSN has staged defence readiness war games such as Exercise Papermate and the Gondola series of naval base defence exercises since the RSN was renamed from the Maritime Command on 1 April 1975. Exercise Gondola is said to have undergone several evolutions with the scenario of the war game expanded in scope, scale and complexity as the years went by.

What the Sea Soldiers bring to the table are enhanced capabilities that Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) infantry are trained with (like chem-bio defence and small unit tactics) as well as fast craft tactics, techniques and procedures that are necessary for sea screening duties within and in the vicinity of RSN naval bases.

Think of the Sea Soldiers as RSN security personnel who serve a force protection function that falls in between those of regimental policemen (RPs) and full fledged naval infantry. When first publicised around 2006, these Sea Soldiers appeared to be a credible force that no naval base could do without.

Alas, their structure and organisation appeared to be letdown by a mindset that placed Sea Soldiers of the Base Defence Squadron low on the table of precedence when it came to the distribution of the SAF's latest infantry weapons.

Even in 2006, Sea Soldiers were armed with M-16 rifles that were being phased out of the Singapore Army's frontline combat formations as warfighters in these formations swapped their ageing rifles for the SAR-21 5.56mm assault rifle.

We thus had a curious situation where the RSN's latest warships (i.e. the Formidable-class stealth frigates) relied on Sea Soldiers carrying the SAF's oldest rifles for force protection. RSN personnel entrusted to guard Singapore's most expensive warships had better be able to shoot straight because their M16s were fitted with nothing better than iron sights. They carried no side arm and drove around the base in unarmoured patrol vehicles - not quite a force to be reckoned with if you think about it.

In terms of numbers on duty at any time, the amount of frontage each Sea Soldier had to defend was considerably more than an average infantryman deployed on the FLOT.

Apart from worn out M16s, the Sea Soldiers' armoury had another curious medieval oddity - meat hooks that were towed behind speeding fast craft in the (vain/improbable/futile) attempt to scare the wits out of the Enemy's underwater intruders.

Other countries use seabed sensors so sensitive they could probably hear a seahorse fart to detect underwater craft like submarines. In Singapore, our Sea Soldiers are expected to go into operations like seaborne rodeo cowboys trailing meat hooks and tossing scare charges into the water.

If you really believe Fleet RSN is worth investing in, then the safety and security of RSN war machines and Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) assets should be placed uppermost on the priority list even ahead of Army combat formations.

If our Army has to deploy for action, this deployment in its projected area of operations can only take place under the security cover provided by the air force. The Army's heavy stuff isn't going anywhere unless carried there by the Navy. Aerial resupply can only carry that much to the fight. A sizeable amount of war material will have to get there by sea via the RSN's extant fleet and requisitioned merchantmen.

This explains why both RSN and RSAF will be top on the priority list should deterrence fail and the SAF has to do what it is trained to do. Only a fool of an opponent would sit and wait while the clarion call mobilises the full force potential of the SAF.

One hopes the intervening years since the initial burst of publicity on Sea Soldiers has given these personnel more punch.

Their role is vital because any warship lost prior to or during action cannot be easily replaced. Indeed, the same argument extends to the need for the air force's war machines to be better protected.

Their mission is challenging as CNB and its western stablemate, Tuas Naval Base, have piers that are wide open to outside observation.

The Sea Soldiers had better be good at the game because our sea borders are porous and open to anyone or anything with the determination to get through.

In 1990, three bull elephants demonstrated just how porous our sea borders are when they swam 1.5km across the Johor Strait and landed (apparently undetected) on the military training area on Pulau Tekong. No only was the SAF caught unaware by these visitors, the lumbering pachyderms evaded capture for several days while on Pulau Tekong.

There was an encore a year later on neighbouring Pulau Ubin, this time by a sole elephant which swam there from Johor. The northern shore of Pulau Ubin has since been fenced to deter snakeheads running human smuggling operations from putting their human cargo ashore on that unwatched shoreline.

Did we learn anything at all from these "intrusions"?

In 2004, three fugitives from Malaysia landed on Singapore soil without being intercepted. Once again, Pulau Tekong was the scene of a flurry of activity as the Tekong manhunt cranked into action. Scores of SAF troops were deployed for cordon and search operations, police coast guard ringed the island while RSAF helicopters buzzed overhead. The trio were eventually apprehended (by police Gurkhas) but not before making a hammer blow on the ability of the tech-heavy Third Generation SAF to solve basic security scares like a manhunt.

When pitted against opponents who dare, our fighting ships may be put out of the fight before they sail into action. Only then will the next generation of Sea Soldiers be armed to the teeth - by which time it would be too late.